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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(h).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Appellant Valerie Connell ("Valerie") presents the following issues in her appeal:
1.

After establishing that Valerie had a need for support because her monthly

expenses exceeded her income by more than $2,500.00, did the trial court abuse its
discretion in refusing to award Valerie alimony despite her demonstrated need and in
awarding Respondent Mr. Connell ("Harold") a credit for past alimony paid based solely
on a comparison of the parties' monthly incomes? (Issue preserved: R. 1914-20.)
a.

Did the trial court's refusal to enforce sanctions against Harold for

failing to produce discoverable documents result in prejudice to Valerie such that she
is entitled to a new trial to determine the parties' income, assets, and debts?
Standard of Review: "In exercising its discretion in determining the amount of
alimony to be awarded, the trial court must consider the financial condition and needs of
the spouse claiming support, the ability of that spouse to provide sufficient income for
him or herself, and the ability of the responding spouse to provide support. Failure to
consider these factors constitutes an abuse of discretion." Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d
952, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Even if the required factors have been considered, an
award may be reversed by showing that "a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a
clear abuse of discretion." Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
2.

Did the trial court err in awarding less than 15% of Valerie's attorney fees

incurred in both the divorce and bankruptcy proceedings when the record clearly
4837-3031-6803/CO006-001
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established that Harold displayed "a distinct pattern of withholding, evading and avoiding
discovery and ... repeatedly failed to comply with court orders," thereby costing Valerie
"a great deal in attorney's fees and delays"? (Issue Preserved: R. 1894-98.)
Standard of Review:

"A trial court has discretion to award attorney fees."

Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 850 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). To challenge a finding
of fact, the appellant must "marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then
demonstrate that, despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support
as to be against the clear weight of the evidence." Gray v. Oxford Worldwide Group,
Inc., 2006 UT App 241, % 8,139 P.3d 267.
3.

Did the court err in finding Valerie's request for nanny care unreasonable

despite the undisputed evidence that her job requires that she be gone from home ten
hours per day and that she leave her five minor children at least once per month for
business trips, which average three to six days per trip? (Issue Preserved: R. 1920-23.)
Standard of Review: To challenge a finding of fact, the appellant must "marshal
the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that, despite this evidence,
the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence." Gray, 2006 UT App 241 at f 8.
4.

Did the trial court err in refusing to award Valerie any portion of the

$64,000.00 paid solely by her on the parties' home mortgage after the parties separated
and which Harold refused to pay, when the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the
marital residence due to Harold's bankruptcy and therefore could not fix the parties'
interests in the property? (Issue Preserved: R. 1936-37.)
4837-3031-6803/CO006-001
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Standard of Review:

A trial court's property division determination may be

reversed if "there was a misunderstanding or misapplicati0n of the law resulting in
substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings,
or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a plear abuse of discretion."
Thomas v. Thomas, 1999 UT App 239, f 16, 987 P.2d 603 (internal quotations omitted).
5.

Did the trial court err in ruling that Valerie had not raised or reserved the

issue of back child support when her Complaint requested that child support commence
November 1, 2001, and the trial court held in its July 2002 Order that Valerie "reserves
the right to argue retroactivity of support"? (Issue Preserved: R. 4, 81,1911-12.)
Standard of Review: To challenge a finding of fact, the appellant must "marshal
the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that, despite this evidence,
the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence." Gray, 2006 UT App 241 at % 8.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
(1) Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (2002), attached hereto as Addendum E; and
(2) Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (2002), attached hereto as Addendum F.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case:
This is an appeal from the Amended Decree of Divorce issued by the Fourth

District Court in the divorce proceedings of Valerie and Harold Connell.
2.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below:
On April 4, 2002, Valerie filed a Complaint for Divorce with the Fourth Judicial
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District Court for the State of Utah. (R. 5.) Valerie's Complaint sought permanent care,
custody, and control of the parties' six minor children, subject to Harold's right to
supervised visitation; requested an order of child support and alimony, commencing
November 1, 2001; and sought division of the marital assets and debts. (R. 1-5.) Valerie
also requested an award of attorney fees incurred in the divorce proceedings. (R. 1-2.)
On July 9, 2002, the trial court awarded Valerie temporary custody of her six
children, recognizing "[t]here is an issue regarding the extent and number of incidences
of sexual molestation and whether [Harold] is a danger to the children." (R. 87.) Based
upon that issue and the stipulation of the parties, the court allowed Harold "supervised
visitation" and ordered him to take a polygraph and continue certain psychosexual
testing, stating that the issue of supervised visitation could be reviewed upon a request of
either party after the testing was completed. (R. 86-87.)
The July 2002 Order required Harold to begin paying $1,797 in child support and
$230 in alimony per month, specifically reserving the issue of retroactive support. (R.
86.) Harold was ordered to pay the parties' car insurance and to maintain Valerie's and
the children's health insurance. {Id.) Each party was required to pay one-half of all
unreimbursed medical expenses and work-related child care expenses after Valerie
obtained employment. (R. 84, 86.) The court also awarded temporary possession of
personal property, with the express order that both parties were restrained from
"dissipating, encumbering, or hiding assets" during the divorce proceeding. (R. 85.)
Despite this Order, and several subsequent orders from the trial court, Harold
continually refused to produce records related to his polygraph and psychosexual testing.
4837-3031-6803/CO006-001
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(R. 378-79; 601; 700-02; 1070-72; 2262:180-198.) Harold ajso refused to comply with
discovery requests concerning his financial status, including document requests which
sought evidence of his income and expenses and the financial status of his new wife. As
a result, Valerie was compelled to seek the trial court's intervention and enforcement on
several occasions. (R. 700-02, 817-21, 1273-1316, 1563-1712, 1757-60.) Harold also
failed to pay the court ordered child support, alimony, day care expenses, medical
expenses, and health and car insurance premiums, forcing Valerie to bring numerous
orders to show cause seeking to recover the amounts owed. (R. 400-01; 600-01; 700-02;
1019-20; 1070-72; 1340-41; 1448-49; 1817-19; 2262:143-45.) As a result of Harold's
continuous violations of its orders, the trial court found him in contempt on multiple
occasions. (R. 817-821; 1335-38; 1817-19; 2261:44.) Indeed, due to the ongoing nature
of his conduct, the trial court sanctioned Harold by ordering him to serve a five-day jail
sentence in May 2005. (R. 819.) Although the trial court initially stayed this sentence
"due to the county jail being near capacity and only for tljiat reason," (id.), the court
reissued that sentence on November 14, 2006, only one week prior to the first day of trial,
due to Harold's continued failure to comply with the court's orders. (R. 2261:44.)
After over 4 Yz years of protracted litigation, during which the trial court found
Harold had displayed a "distinct pattern of withholding, evading and avoiding discovery
and .... repeatedly fail[ing] to comply with court orders,'* (R. 2160), the trial court
ultimately set the trial date for November 22, 2006. (R. 1441.) The court held that this
date was "set in concrete" and refused to continue the trial even though it had found that
Harold had still not completely responded to Valerie's discovery requests, thereby
4837-3031-6803/CO006-001
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preventing Valerie from deposing him and his new wife before trial. (R. 2261:45, 48.)
However, because the court found that Harold's hands "are very unclean" due to his
"unvarying pattern in this case" "to duck and to evade and to avoid and to withhold," (R.
2261:43-44), it ordered, just one week before trial, that: "[i]f it turns out that we get to
trial and [Valerie] is unable to present the necessary evidence based on [Harold's] failure
to provide the necessary evidence through the discovery, I'm going to make the ruling
that [Harold] will be precluded from defending on that issue." (R. 2261:45.)
The four day trial began on November 22, 2006, and concluded on December 20,
2006. (R. 2262-2265.) The trial court did not enter its Memorandum Decision until May
29, 2007, (R. 2026-87), and its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Amended Decree of Divorce until June 24, 2008, copies of which are attached hereto as
Addendum A, B, and C, respectively. (R. 2096-2151; 2152-2217.)
In its Amended Decree of Divorce, the court refused to award Valerie any future
alimony based on its finding that Valerie earned about $675 per month more than Harold.
(R. 2177.) In so finding, the trial court refused Valerie's request to impute income to
Harold based on the salary he was earning just four months prior to the parties' final
separation. (R. 2183.) And, in addition to refusing to grant Valerie future alimony in any
amount, the trial court also granted Harold's request for a credit of all alimony paid to
Valerie after she obtained employment in November 2003. (R. 2175-76.)
With respect to Valerie's request for attorney fees, the trial court again found that
Harold "has displayed a distinct pattern of withholding, evading and avoiding discovery
and that he has repeatedly failed to comply with court orders.... [Harold's] intentional
4837-3031-6803/CO006-001
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efforts to thwart discovery have increased [Valerie's] attorney's fees substantially and
[the court] will, therefore, increase her award of attorney's fees accordingly." (R. 2160
(emphasis added).) But the trial court then awarded Valerie less than 15% of the attorney
fees incurred in both the divorce and bankruptcy cases,1 declaring that the fees "are not
reasonable, but are truly beyond reason for a marital estate of this size." (R. 2155,2157.)
Rejecting Valerie's request for an award of one-half of the expenses to hire a fulltime nanny to take care of the minor children during Valerie's ten-hour work days and
during the three to six days she is away from the home each month on required business
trips, the trial court found that the "infrequency" of Valerie's required travel did not
justify the expense of a nanny. (R. 2186-87.)
With respect to Valerie's request that she be granted an award in the amount of
$64,000.00 for the payments she had been forced to make on the mortgage for the marital
residence, the trial court simply declared that Valerie "received the benefit and comfort of
living in the home and should not be granted judgment against [Harold] for having made
the payments on the home." (R. 2205.)
Finally, with respect to Valerie's request for back child support for the period of
October 1, 2001, to April 1, 2002, during which time Valerie "was forced to solely
provide for all of the children and family living expenses from her own funds ... even
though she was not working," the trial court erroneously concluded that, "[a]s far as the

1

Valerie testified at trial that she had hired other attorneys prior to engaging Mr. Thayer
as her legal counsel in the divorce case and that she paid approximately $12,000.00 in
attorney fees in addition to the fees charged by Mr. Thayer. (R. 2262:208-09.) However,
the trial court did not include those fees when reaching its award. (R. 2156,2023.)
4837-3031-6803/CO006-001
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court can determine, this matter has never been brought before the court and has not been
reserved by [Valerie]." (R. 2171-72.)
It is from these rulings that Valerie appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The Parties' Marriage
Valerie and Harold were married on November 22, 1986. (R. 5). At that time,
Valerie had one daughter, whom Harold later adopted. (R. 2216.) The parties also had
six biological children during their marriage. (Id.) Valerie had been employed for
several years at the beginning of the marriage, (R. 2262:261-65), but she became a fulltime mother to her then five young children in 1995.2 (R. 2262:264.) At that time,
Harold became the family's sole provider. (Id.; R. 2263:378.)
By 2001, the parties' seven children were 19, 13, 10, 7, 5, 3, and 1 years old. (R.
2216). During that year, the parties' marriage deteriorated, and they separated several
times beginning in May 2001. (R. 2262:38-39.) In June 2001, Harold voluntarily quit
his $95,000.00 per year3 position at Novell to begin working for the Corporation of the
Presiding Bishopric (the "CPB"), at an annual salary of only $65,000.00. (R. 2262:14142; 2263:385, PL's Ex. 18.) Valerie testified that, while it did not matter to her where
Harold worked, she had objected to Harold's unilateral decision to quit his Novell
position because of the substantial loss of income. (R. 2262:142.) Despite Valerie's
Valerie testified that between 1995 and 2001, she did a few consulting jobs to earn
income, earning about $3,000 total between 1999 and 2001. (R. 2262: 264, 266-67.)
3
Harold's 2001 W-2 showed that, as of June 2001, Harold had earned $47,879.77 from
Novell. (PL's Ex. 18.) Thus, his total yearly salary for 2001 would have been over
$95,000.
4837-3031-6803/CO006-001
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objections, Harold began working for the CPB in June 2001.4 (R. 2262:142; 2263:385.)
After multiple separations, the parties permanently separated in October 2001,
when Valerie asked Harold to leave their home after learning that he had molested their
children.

(R. 2262:38-39, 221; R. 2263:329.)

At that time, Harold had not been

depositing his paycheck into the parties' joint account. (R. 2265:737.) Thus, until the
parties stipulated to an order in May 2002, Valerie received no support from Harold, with
the exception of one check for $2,000, leaving Valerie, who was unemployed, to pay all
of the family's monthly expenses, including the nearly $1,200.00 per month first
mortgage on the marital residence. (R. 2262:44,131, 225, 266-67; R. 2265:737; PL's Ex.
9.)
2. The Divorce Proceedings
On April 4, 2002, Valerie filed her Complaint for Divorce with the Fourth Judicial
District Court. (R. 1-5.) In her Complaint, Valerie sought, inter alia, child support,
alimony, attorney fees, and the permanent custody of the children, subject to Harold's
right to supervised visitation. Valerie simultaneously moved for an order of temporary
support and temporary custody subject to limited supervised visitation by Harold. (R. 812.) At that time, Valerie had very little to support herself and her children and could not
meet the family's monthly marital obligations. (R. 9-12.)
In its Order on Order to Show Cause, entered July 9, 2002, the trial court awarded
Valerie temporary custody of the children subject to Harold's right to supervised
4

Harold subsequently left the CPB for Brigham Young University ("BYU"). (R. 2182;
2263: 388.) In February 2006, prior to being forced to resign from BYU, Harold grossed
approximately $5,996.00 per month. (R. 2181-82.)
4837-3031-6803/CO006-001
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visitation, recognizing "[t]here is an issue regarding the extent and number of incidences
of sexual molestation and whether [Harold] is a danger to the children." (R. 87.) The
court also ordered Harold to take a polygraph and continue certain psychosexual testing
with Dr. Roby and stated that it would review the visitation issue upon request of either
party after Harold completed the testing. (R. 86-87.)
In that July 2002 Order, the trial court also ordered Harold to pay $1,797 in child
support and $230 in alimony per month, specifically finding that Valerie "reserves the
right to argue retroactivity of support." (R. 86.) The court further ordered Harold to
maintain health insurance on Valerie and the minor children and to maintain the parties'
car insurance. (Id.) The court awarded temporary possession of the marital residence to
Valerie and ordered that Valerie pay the first mortgage on the home. (Id.) The court
awarded temporary possession the parties' 1991 Subaru, 1990 GMC truck, and 1977
LaSalle trailer to Harold and awarded the 1993 Suburban and the 1987 Ford Van to
Valerie, with the provision that both parties were restrained from "dissipating,
encumbering, or hiding assets" during the divorce proceeding. (R. 85.)
The trial court ordered the appointment of a Guardian ad Litem ("GAL") on
December 26, 2002. (R. 124.) And the court entered a Case Management Order on
January 21, 2003, requiring the parties to produce, as part of their initial disclosures, bank
statements for all accounts, as well as credit card statements, bills, or other evidence of
the parties' debts or obligations.

(R. 129-31.)

The Case Management Order also

provided that "[e]ach party will have unlimited interrogatories including discrete
subparts." (R. 129.). This was the only Management Order entered in the case.
4837-3031-6803/CO006-001
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a.

HaroWs Contemptuous Conduct

Throughout the course of the proceedings, Harold engaged in repeated conduct
designed to delay discovery and the conclusion of the matter, which resulted in greatly
increasing Valerie's attorney fees. The first instance of si^ch conduct was raised by
Valerie on September 24, 2003, in response to Harold's motion for temporary relief. (R.
160, 183.) In her Counter-Affidavit, Valerie explained that Harold refused to comply
with the July 2002 Order by submitting to the polygraph and completing the
psychosexual testing. (R. 183.) Valerie also stated that Harold has "intentionally stalled"
the "final determination of child support, alimony, auto insurance, and medical
insurance" by his refusal to complete the testing ordered by the trial court.5 (R. 182.)
Over six months later, Harold had still failed to comply with the trial court's order.
As a result, the GAL filed a Motion to Compel Discovery, echoing Valerie's concerns
about Harold's evasive and dilatory conduct. In that motion, the GAL stated as follows:
The [GAL] has had to make extensive efforts to find out if [Harold] had in
fact completed [the] polygraph testing and ... the psycho-sexual evaluation
with Dr. Roby. While [Harold] did complete the psycho-sexual evaluation
which the [GAL] finally obtained from Dr. Roby, [Harold] did not submit
himself for the polygraph exam as previously ordered by the Court.
....

[T]he [GAL] believes the Court must address [Harold's] failure to abide by
a Court order and his failure to respond to the discovery that has been
sought and ordered.
(R. 210-11.)
In response, Harold admitted that he had undergone a polygraph examination but
claimed that he did not "have a copy in his possession." (R. 221.) Harold also claimed
5

It appears that Harold's motion was never submitted to the court for a ruling.
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that, while he had provided signed releases to the GAL to obtain the results of the
polygraph, he would "be willing to re-sign any release papers to have the results of the
polygraph examination released to the [GAL's] office if the release papers have been
misplaced, and if a copy of the polygraph exam can be located." (R. 220.)
However, nearly two months after Harold's representations, neither the GAL nor
Valerie had been provided a copy of the polygraph examination.

(R. 2249:19, 21.)

Harold also failed and refused to provide documents requested by Valerie concerning his
financial status. (R. 362; 2249:20.) Despite these repeated violations of the court's
order, however, Harold moved the court to reduce his child support and to eliminate the
award of temporary alimony because of Valerie's newly obtained job. (R. 160, 296.)
Valerie responded by filing her own Order to Show Cause and Request for Order for
Contempt based on Harold's violations of the July 2002 Order. (R. 357-62.)
At the June 24, 2004 hearing on these motions, the GAL expressed her concerns
about Harold's delay and failures to comply, noting that the case had "languish[ed]" for
two years. (R. 2249:18.) The GAL requested that the court require Harold to "obey the
terms of the order he stipulated to and willingly agreed to" and impose "specific cut-off
dates for discovery so we can be sure to have this information, so that ... this case ...
isn't prolonged any further than what it already has." (Id.)
After argument, the court refused Harold's request for affirmative relief from the
award of temporary alimony based on Harold's failure to comply with the court's orders.
(R. 379, 2249:32.) The court also reserved Harold's claim for a credit for overpayment
of child support "pending his completion of the psychosexual testing." (R. 378.)
4837-3031-6803/CO006-001
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Nearly two months after this hearing, Valerie subpoenaed the information
regarding Harold's psychosexual evaluation from IS AT and Dr. Roby, (R. 384, 391), but
Harold had still failed to provide the necessary releases, resulting in ISAT's motion to
quash the subpoena on the ground that "[t]here has been no waiver of the [patienttherapist] privilege by the patient himself in this case." (R. 462.) At the same time,
Harold had also failed to pay his share of the children's medical and child care expenses
as ordered by the court. Thus, on August 19, 2004, Valerie filed an Order to Show Cause
and Motion to Compel. (R. 392-97, 400-46.) In her affidavit, Valerie emphasized the
need for receiving complete responses to her discovery request, declaring that she
"cannot go forward in preparation for trial without the requested items." (R. 396).
At the September 21, 2004 hearing on Valerie's motion, the court rejected
Harold's excuses that he could not produce the records because they were not in his
possession. (R. 2250:8.) Based upon Rule 34, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the court
ordered Harold to provide all of the requested documents within two weeks. (R. 601;
2250:8.) The court further ordered that, if Harold did not have possession of certain
documents, he was required to provide releases for those records to the GAL and Valerie
within two weeks from the date of the hearing. (R. 601, 2250:8-9.) The court also
awarded Valerie judgments of $231 for unpaid medical expenses and $7,590 for unpaid
child care expenses. (R. 600-01.)
On October 8, 2004, more than two weeks after the September 21, 2004 Hearing,
Valerie's counsel was forced to cancel the deposition of Dr. Roby because Harold had
still not complied with the court's order to produce the records and provide the necessary
4837-3031-6803/CO006-001
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releases. (R. 521.) Accordingly, on October 12, 2004, Valerie filed a Notice to Court of
Willful Refusal of [Harold] to Sign Releases. (R. 518-24.) Harold responded by filing a
Notice of Compliance on October 18, 2004, (R. 554-59), misrepresenting that he had
complied with the court's order "when in reality he had only signed one release and
failed to produce any other documents." (R. 2164.)
At the same time that he made this misrepresentation to the court regarding his
alleged compliance, Harold moved for unsupervised visitation based upon the
recommendation of Dr. Roby. (R. 551-53.)

Harold also moved for a stay of judgment

to prevent Valerie from garnishing his wages to recover the judgment for unpaid child
care expenses. (R. 630-31.)
At a December 2, 2004 hearing, Harold withdrew his request for unsupervised
visitation, conceding that Dr. Roby may not have been qualified to render a visitation
recommendation when he had never actually seen Harold or the children. (R. 2251:3.)
Harold did argue his request to stay the garnishment, which the court denied. (R. 666.)
On March 23, 2005, over six months after he was ordered to produce all releases
for the financial information and psychosexual evaluations, Harold still had not produced
releases for the polygraph examination or for any of his financial institutions, forcing
Valerie to again file another Order to Show Cause to seek enforcement of the court's
orders. (R. 701-02.) In that motion, Valerie also sought relief from Harold's continuing
failure to pay the child care expenses and car insurance premiums. (R. 701.)
The trial court heard argument on Valerie's order to show cause on April 18, 2005,
during which Harold argued that he had fully complied with the court's orders. (R.
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2253:10-11.) However, the trial court declared that, "reviewing the file as a whole, it is
clear to the Court that [Harold] has not been forthcoming with the discovery responses as
requested by [Valerie]."

(R. 2253:22-23.)

The court therefore found Harold "in

contempt" and sentenced him to five days in jail. (R. 2253:270 The court stayed the jail
sentence "due to the county jail being near capacity and only for that reason." (R. 819.)
The court authorized Valerie's counsel to prepare the needed releases and ordered Harold
to pay the attorney fees incurred to do so. (R. 819-20.) And the court awarded Valerie
the attorney fees incurred to bring the matter before the court. (R. 819.)
On April 28, 2005, Harold filed another "Notice of Compliance," representing to
the court that he had provided signed releases for the polygraph information on April 25,
2005. (R. 791.) However, unbeknownst to anyone, Harold withdrew his releases two
weeks later on May 9, 2005, before the documents could be obtained. (R. 2163.)
Also in April 2005, Harold filed his own order to show cause as to why Valerie
should not likewise be held in contempt for her alleged failure to comply with discovery
requests. (R. 771-73.) At the hearing regarding that motion, however, Valerie explained
that she had provided the information nearly two years before, that she had fully
answered the discovery requests, and that she was willing to supplement or update the
information, if necessary.

(R. 2254:13-18.)

The trial court agreed with Valerie,

declaring, "I don't find the answer in regards to those issues [child care expenses] to be
insufficient on their face." (R. 2254:19.) The trial court did order both parties to fully
update the documentation provided to each other within 30 days. (R. 823.) No finding of
contempt or other sanction against Valerie was ever made. (R. 822-23.)
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By October 7, 2005, Valerie had still not received any documents related to
Harold's polygraph examination despite subpoenaing the information and providing the
signed releases from Harold, which she believed were still valid. (R. 2255:21.) The trial
court, also believing the releases to be valid, ordered that the documents be disclosed and
declared that, because Harold signed the releases, "the focus is going to shift to the
providers as to why they haven't released it. If they want to come in and try to explain
and give me some legal basis for not releasing it... I'll hear it." (R. 2255:30-31.) While
Harold renewed his claim to pursue unsupervised visitation during that hearing, he did
not inform the court that he had rescinded his releases. (R. 2255:9.)
Thereafter, on October 18, 2005, Valerie served Dr. Roby and the polygraph
testers with subpoenas duces tecum, requiring them to produce all information regarding
any tests conducted with Harold. (R. 886-91, 892-97.) On March 14, 2006,6 Dr. Roby
objected to the subpoena, stating that "disclosing confidential information without proper
authorization constitutes unprofessional conduct." (R. 953.) Valerie again served Dr.
Roby and the polygraph testers with additional subpoenas duces tecum on March 24,
2006. (R. 986-1009.) To prevent the disclosures, Harold moved to Quash Subpoenas
Duces Tecum, Reconsider Its Prior Ruling re: Lie Detector Tests and Prevent Further
Depositions. (R. 1010-17.)
Harold's motion to quash was scheduled to be heard on May 15, 2006, along with
6

It appears that the reason for the delay between the date on which the subpoena was
served and the date on which Dr. Roby filed his objection is due to the automatic stay that
was imposed after Harold filed for bankruptcy on October 14, 2005. (See Respondent's
Notice, R. 914 (stating that "this matter is stayed from further litigation, until the
bankruptcy matter has been resolved").)
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Valerie's two motions for contempt based on Harold's failure to comply with discovery
requests and his failure to pay the court ordered child support and alimony. (R. 1042-43,
1054, 2256:22.) At the beginning of that hearing, Harold abruptly backtracked, stating
that he wanted "to not proceed on unsupervised visitation." (R. 2256:7.) Harold then
entered into a stipulation in which he permanently waived his right to any visitation other
than visitation that "is supervised by a third party professional visitation supervisor such
as ACAFS or WillWin." (R. 1337-38.) Harold also stipulated that Valerie made a prima
facie case of contempt regarding her two motions, reserving his right to argue against the
prima facie case of contempt at trial. (R. 2256:43)
On March 1, 2006, Harold filed a Verified Motion to Modify Alimony, Child
Support & Child Care & for Visitation Sanctions, in which he requested that the trial
court reduce his amount of child support and award him temporary alimony based on the
fact that he had recently lost his job, (R. 944), even though he had already remarried.7
(R. 2180.) Although Harold claimed in his motion that he should only be imputed
minimum wage as "his current income," (R. 944), Harold ultimately admitted later at trial
that he had actually received his normal BYU monthly salary through April 1, 2006, and
received a lump-sum severance payment for earned leave of $2,942.82. (R. 2263:413Respondent also formally moved to amend his answer, on June 5, 2006, to allege that he
is entitled to alimony. (R. 1199-1201.) Although Harold's motion was granted, (R.
2259:36), Harold's replacement counsel established the unreasonableness of that request
by announcing to the court in a hearing held on November 14, 2006, that he was
"baffle[d]" and "amazed that [Harold's previous counsel] filed a motion to amend
pleadings to allege alimony on the part of [his] client." (R. 2261:38.) Because he
conceded that any "alimony order would ... be limited to a very short period of time and
[Valerie] probably wasn't working and [Harold] was," Harold's counsel withdrew that
issue as a trial issue. (Id.)
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16.) Harold then began his new job with Medicity on May 3, 2006. (R. 2263:418.)
Thus, at no time during the pendency of Harold's motion was Harold without income.
Yet, despite this fact, Harold unilaterally reduced the amount he paid as child support to
$45.00 and unilaterally eliminated any payment for alimony. As a result, on April 14,
2006, Valerie was forced to bring another Motion for Order to Show Cause to compel
Harold to comply with the court's support orders. (R. 1019-20.) Valerie also requested
on May 8, 2006, that Harold be found in contempt for failing, inter alia, to (1) maintain
health insurance, (2) pay the parties' car insurance, and (3) pay his share of the children's
unpaid medical expenses. (R. 1071-72.)
Valerie's motions were heard on June 15, 2006, during which Harold stipulated
that Valerie made a prima facie showing of contempt, (R. 2257:6), and the court entered
judgment in favor of Valerie, reserving the issue of contempt for trial. (R. 1340-41.)
Also in April 2006, Valerie served Harold with a second set of discovery requests,
seeking information related to Harold's financial status. (R. 1294-1300.) Harold refused
to answer Interrogatory Nos. 8-15 on the ground that the interrogatories, including
discrete subparts, exceeded 25. 8 (R. 1287-89.) Harold also failed to produce any of the
requested documents. (R. 1287-92.) On June 15, 2006, Valerie's counsel wrote to
Harold's counsel, requesting that Harold provide responses to the outstanding discovery
or state the reasons he believed the requests to be unreasonable. (R. 1329.) Valerie's
counsel also requested to depose Harold's new wife, Ms. Bruni. (Id.) When Harold

8

This is so despite the "unlimited interrogatories" provision in the Case Management
Order. (R. 129.)
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refused to comply with these requests, Valerie again moved the court to compel Harold to
respond on July 13,2006. (R. 1273-1316.)
As a result of Harold's delays and to ensure that she received "complete disclosure
of all outstanding discovery" prior to trial, Valerie requested that the August 24, 2006
trial date be rescheduled after the discovery issues were resolved. (R. 1342-43, 13441440.) Valerie emphasized the need to obtain complete discovery responses in sufficient
time to depose Ms. Bruni and then to adequately prepare for trial. (R. 1436-39.) Because
the information sought by Valerie was "needed by her to fully and adequately present her
claims at trial," Valerie requested that the court continue the trial until the issues could be
resolved. (R. 1436.) The court rescheduled the trial date to November 22, 2006, (R.
1441), and set a hearing on Valerie's motion to compel for August 24, 2006.
At that hearing, the trial court questioned Harold's counsel regarding Harold's
compliance. (R. 2259:61.) In response, Harold's counsel, who had moved to withdraw,
essentially conceded to Harold's pattern of evading discovery and disregarding the
court's orders when he declared, "Your Honor, ... this is part of the problem that I'm
having and I want you to remember this as far as my motion to withdraw. I tell my client
to do something, he doesn't do it and then I look bad ..." (Id.) The court responded by
stating its perception that the case was "dragging out" because of the "recalcitrance on
[Harold's] part, [and] his wife's [Brenda] part." (Id.)
Ultimately, the trial court found Valerie had a "reasonable basis" to seek the
financial information from Harold's new wife, Brenda Bruni, because such documents
concerned Ms. Brum's ability to contribute to Harold's financial expenses and whether
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Harold had been diverting funds to Ms. Bruni. (R. 2259:29.) The court ordered that
Valerie could depose Ms. Bruni by a subpoena duces tecum to obtain her "bank records."
(R. 1760.) The court also ordered Harold to respond to the interrogatories to which he
had objected on the ground that they exceeded 25 and ordered Harold to produce his tax
records, W-2s for the years 2003 and 2005, and his cell phone records. (R. 1759.) The
court ordered both parties to provide complete sets of bank account statements, revolving
account statements, and updated financial statements, declaring that the documents must
be provided within 30 days and that depositions must be conducted within 60 days from
the date of the hearing. (R. 1758-59.) Of course, Harold did not provide the information
within the 30 days. (R. 1703-04.)
During the entire litigation, Valerie was forced to spend valuable financial
resources to deal with Harold's "recalcitrance" and delay tactics, but never received the
full amount of court ordered child support, child care, and unreimbursed medical
expenses. (R. 1448-49.) At a hearing held on August 28, 2006, the court awarded
Valerie judgment in the amount of $3,612.00 for the unpaid child support, day care
expenses, and unpaid medical insurance. (R. 1819.) The court also found Harold in
contempt for failing to pay the ordered child support and alimony, and it reserved the
issue of Valerie's legal fees for trial, specifically finding that she "substantially prevailed
on the issues before the Court today." (R. 1818; 2260:31.)
Valerie noticed Brenda's and Harold's depositions for October 11, 2006, and
October 13, 2006, respectively, (R. 1546), but was forced to cancel both depositions
when Harold and Brenda continued to refuse and failed to produce the documents and
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information previously requested. (R. 1704.) Harold's deposition was rescheduled for
November 6, 2006, (R. 1559), but he again failed to adequately respond to the discovery
requests. (R. 1704.) As of November 6, 2006, Valerie had still not received the cell
phone records, the complete set of bank account statements, the monthly statements for
Harold's revolving accounts, and full information on his medical, life, disability, and
health insurance.

(R. 1703-04.)

Faced with this complete and deliberate lack of

compliance despite previous findings of contempt, Valerie filed a motion on November 7,
2006, just two weeks before trial, requesting that Harold's default be entered as a
sanction for his conduct. (R. 1563-64.) In that motion, Valerie detailed Harold's
extensive history of contemptuous conduct by refusing to comply with her discovery
requests and the court's orders. (R. 1563-1712.)
The court heard argument on Valerie's motion on November 14, 2006, just one
week before trial was to begin. At that hearing, Harold appeared with new counsel and
no real excuse as to why he had not fully complied with all the discovery requests. To
the contrary, Harold's new counsel agreed that Valerie is "entitled" to the documents, and
he represented that "we'll continue to try to get it and we'll provide it as soon as we do
get it ...." (R. 2261:20.) After argument, the court found tfyat Harold's hands "are very
unclean" because of his "unvarying pattern in this case" "to duck and to evade and to
avoid and to withhold." (R. 2261:43-44.) The court did not enter Harold's default, but it
did order that: "If it turns out that we get to trial and [Valerie] is unable to present the
necessary evidence based on [Harold's] failure to provide the necessary evidence through
the discovery, I'm going to make the ruling that [Harold] will be precluded from
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defending on that issue." (R. 2261:43, 45.) The court also reinstituted Harold's 5-day
jail sentence to be served after conclusion of the trial. (R. 2261:44,47.)
The trial began on November 22, 2006. Valerie provided substantial testimony
regarding Harold's contemptuous conduct and violations of court orders. Indeed, Valerie
provided uncontested testimony that Harold had dissipated the marital estate, in direct
contravention of the court's July 2002 Order, by selling the GMC truck and trailer
temporarily awarded to him, by abandoning exercise equipment owned by the parties,
and by giving Ms. Bruni the parties' entertainment center. (R. 2262:112, 113, 114;
2264:563, 571, 572-73; 2265:623.) Valerie also testified about the numerous discovery
battles she had with Harold over matters essential to Harold's quixotic claim for
unsupervised visitation and his believed financial status. (R. 2262:181-99, 203-04.)
Valerie also testified that, early in the proceedings, Harold's legal counsel told Valerie
that if she did not accept a settlement proposed by Harold, he would "delay and delay and
delay this case until you pay out more in attorney's fees than you'll ever see out of my
client." (R. 2262:203.)
The trial concluded in December 2006. The court then issued a Memorandum
Decision, but not until May 2007. (R. 2027-87.) Despite finding Harold in contempt for
violation of several interim court orders, including failing to maintain health insurance
and pay insurance premiums, failing to maintain car insurance, failing to pay medical
expenses, disposing of marital assets, failing to pay child care expenses, failing to pay
alimony, unilaterally reducing child support, failing to pay child support, and failing to
comply with discovery requests, (R. 2156-57, 2160-67, 2173, 2174, 2186, 2189, 2192,
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2193, 2195, 2196, 2198), the trial court then only awarded Valerie $12,502 in her
attorney fees for the divorce case, which was less than 15% of her total attorney fees
incurred. In so doing, the trial court reasoned that the attorney fees incurred were truly
"beyond reason for a marital estate of this size." (R. 2157.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As discussed more fully below, the trial court erred in (1) refusing to award
Valerie alimony, (2) awarding Valerie less than 15% of her attorney fees incurred in the
divorce and bankruptcy proceedings, (3) finding Valerie's request for nanny care was
unreasonable, (4) refusing to award Valerie any portion of the payments she made to the
parties' home mortgage after the parties separated, and (5) finding that Valerie did not
raise and reserve her right to argue for retroactive support. Accordingly, Valerie requests
that this Court reverse the trial court on those issues and hold that, due to the court's
failure to enforce sanctions against Harold for his continuous and willful refusals to
provide discoverable documents, Valerie was prejudiced in her ability to present her case
such that she is entitled to a new trial to determine the parties * income, assets, and debts.
First, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Valerie's request for alimony
because it failed to properly consider each of the Jones factors required in an alimony
determination and, more specifically, failed to determine Harold's ability to pay.
Additionally, the court erred in refusing to impute as income to Harold his Novell salary
when the undisputed evidence established that Harold had the ability to earn such an
income. Finally, the trial court abused its discretion in tailing to enforce sanctions
against Harold despite the fact that Harold's conduct prejudiced Valerie and deprived her
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of her right to a fair trial.
Second, the trial court erred in finding that the amount of attorney fees incurred by
Valerie was unreasonable given the undisputed evidence that Harold's contemptuous and
willful misconduct resulted in delays in the proceedings and caused Valerie's fees to
increase "substantially."
Third, the trial court erred in finding that Valerie's request for nanny care was
unreasonable when the clear weight of the evidence demonstrated that nanny care was the
only available option to Valerie give that her job demands that she be away from home
on business trips from three to six days each month.
Fourth, the trial court erred in denying Valerie any portion of the $64,000 she paid
to the parties' home mortgage after their separation because Valerie is entitled to be
reimbursed for the contribution that she made to the home's equity.
Finally, the trial court erred in finding that Valerie did not raise and reserve her
right to argue retroactive support when the evidence clearly establishes that she requested
retroactive support in her Complaint and the trial court reserved that issue for trial.
ARGUMENT
1.

T H E TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING ALIMONY

Although a trial court has broad discretion in determining alimony, it "must
exercise its discretion in accordance with the standard(s) that have been set by this
Court." Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985). Those standards mandate that
the trial court "consider 'at least the following factors in determining alimony: (i) the
financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient's earning capacity
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or ability to produce income; (iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and
(iv) the length of the marriage."' Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT App 219, ^f 8, 983
P.2d 1103 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(a) (1998)).9 The failure to properly
consider each of these factors, often referred to as the Joqes factors, is an abuse of
discretion. Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Also, even if the
trial court has considered each of the Jones factors, its aiimony award may still be
reversed if it is shown "that such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear
abuse of discretion." Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, % 10, 80 P.3d 153
(internal quotations omitted).
As discussed more fully below, the trial court's ruling that Valerie could not
recover alimony is erroneous in at least three respects. First, the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to consider each of the required Jones factors. Second, the trial
court's failure to preclude Harold from defending against Valerie's claim that Harold's
new wife either shared, or was able to share, his living expenses resulted in a serious
inequity manifesting an abuse of discretion. Third, the trial court erred when it refused to
impute income to Harold in the amount that he had earned during the marriage.
a. The Trial Court Failed to Consider Each of the Jones Factors
To properly consider each of the Jones factors, this Court has held that the trial
court must "move beyond merely considering [the parties'] incomes and inquire more
fully into their financial situations, including [a party's] new spouse's financial ability to

9

Section 30-3-5 has subsequently been amended to require the consideration of
additional factors. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(a) (2002).
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share living expenses with him [or her]." Williamson, 1999 UT App 219 at If 11 (internal
quotations omitted). Such an "in-depth consideration of the parties' circumstances is
necessary to fulfill the goal of alimony, which is to equalize the parties' standards of
living, not just their incomes, in those cases in which insufficient resources exist to
satisfy both parties' legitimate needs." Id. A trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to
conduct such a consideration into the parties' circumstances and instead attempts to
"simply equalize [the parties'] income." Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357 at f 12.
In this case, the trial court analyzed only the first two Jones factors, finding that
Valerie's monthly expenses, excluding her monthly donation to the LDS Church and her
attorney fees, exceeded her income by $2,548.75 per month. (R. 2184; 2262:141.) The
trial court did not, however, conduct a similar analysis of Harold's ability to pay. Indeed,
although the court found that Harold had the ability to earn $5,996.00 gross per month,10
(R. 2180), the court did not review or consider Harold's living expenses, other than to
declare that the $2,252.00 he claimed he paid to his new wife for her mortgage and living
expenses was not "unreasonable." (R. 2179.) The court made no other analysis or
finding concerning any additional monthly expenses that Harold may have had.11 (Id.)

As discussed infra, the trial court erred in refusing to impute a higher monthly income
of $95,000 per year to Harold based on his demonstrated ability to earn that salary during
the marriage before he unilaterally quit his Novell job.
11
The only reference the trial court made to any additional monthly expenses that Harold
may have had was when it declared, "[w]ere this court to award [Valerie] the monthly
alimony of $3,259.00 she seeks, plus the monthly average child-care cost of $380.00
awarded to her by the court (for a total of $3,639.00), [Harold], according to his financial
declaration, would have $73.46 left of his net income to pay child support and the rest of
his monthly expenses." (R. 2176.) However, the trial court never made any finding
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Given that Valerie presented evidence at trial to show that Harold's claimed monthly
expenses were inflated, increasing over $1,700.00 per month in just the one year prior to
trial, (R. 2264:548), the record is not uncontroverted such as to allow the Jones factors to
be applied as a matter of law by this Court. Therefore, "[wjithout a finding on reasonable
expenses, [this Court is] unable ... to determine [Harold's] actual ability to pay and,
therefore, to balance [Valerie's] needs against [Harold's] ability to pay as required in
Jonesr

Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); see also Baker v. Baker,

866 P.2d 540, 547 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("[S]imply stating such earnings does not
amount to an adequate finding of fact as to his ability to provide support.

To be

sufficient, the findings should also address his needs and expenditures, such as housing,
payment of debts, and other living expenses.")
Rather than considering Harold's ability to pay, the trial court based its refusal to
award alimony on the parties' relatively equal incomes. Indeed, despite finding that
Valerie had a monthly deficit of over $2,500.00, (R. 2184), the trial court refused to
award her any alimony after she obtained her "new well-paying job," (R. 2176), because
Valerie made about $675 per month more than Harold. (R. 2177.) But merely stating
and comparing the parties' respective incomes is insufficient to satisfy this Court's
mandate that the court conduct an in-depth consideration of the parties' circumstances.
See Williamson, 1999 UT App 219 at f 11. The trial court's analysis should have
focused on equalizing the parties' standards of living, not their incomes. Id. Because the

regarding the amount of Harold's reasonable monthly expenses which would have
allowed it or this Court to determine Harold's ability to pay alimony.
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trial court failed to do so, this Court should reverse the trial court's ruling on alimony,
including its ruling that Harold was entitled to a credit for past alimony paid, and remand
for a proper in-depth consideration of the parties' circumstances.
b. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Failing to Impute Additional
Income to Harold
Additionally, this Court should also hold that the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to impute additional income to Harold after finding that he was voluntarily
underemployed. "[W]hen determining an alimony award, it is appropriate and necessary
for a trial court to consider all sources of income that were used by the parties during
their marriage to meet their self-defined needs, from whatever source—overtime, second
job, self-employment, etc., as well as unearned income." Griffith v. Griffith, 959 P.2d
1015, 1017-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), affd by Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78, 985 P.2d
255. Although trial courts have broad discretion in assessing a spouse's income, Griffith,
1999 UT 78 at f 19, the "critical question" in determining if income should be imputed to
a party is "whether [the party's] drop in earnings was voluntary" and made as a result of
"personal preference" rather than resulting from "events beyond his control." Hall v.
Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025-26 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
In this case, the trial court found that Harold was underemployed for purposes of
child support and alimony calculations. (R. 2180.) Nevertheless, the court refused to
impute to Harold the income that he was earning at Novell just five months prior to the
parties' final separation and instead imputed the lower salary Harold received from BYU
just prior to his forced resignation. (R. 2180-83.) In so doing, the court declared that it
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"finds credible [Harold's] testimony that he voluntarily left his employment at Novell for
a lower paying job, because he was afraid he would be laid off before finding another
job." (R. 2183 (emphasis added).)
Clearly, this finding answers the critical question by establishing that Harold's
decision to leave his much higher paying job at Novell was indeed voluntary. Yet,
despite finding that Harold voluntarily quit, the court refused to impute the Novell
income to Harold, reasoning that this "change of employment occurred before the parties'
separation and the filing of this divorce." (R. 2183.)
In so stating, however, the trial court failed to consider its own findings that "[i]n
2001 [,] the parties separated several times from the beginning of May through the
summer" and that the parties' final separation occurred in October 2001. (R. 2216.) As
the goal of imputing income is to "prevent parents from reducing their child support or
alimony by purposeful unemployment or underemployment," Griffith, 959 P.2d at 1018,
the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider the fact that Harold made the
decision to resign from Novell and accept a lower paying job, a decision to which Valerie
objected, amidst the parties' multiple separations and just four months prior to the
parties' final separation. See Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963, 964, 966 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(holding the "court, in making the alimony award,' was not bound by Mr. Hill's
decision" to quit his job at the time the parties separated). As Harold's decision to resign
from Novell was entirely voluntarily and it is undisputed tt^at he has the ability to earn
that level of income, this Court should hold that the trial court's refusal to impute the
Novell income to Harold was an abuse of discretion.
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c. The Trial Court's Ruling Resulted in Serious Inequity
Finally, given the trial court's ruling that expressly held that Harold would not be
able to defend on any issues on which Valerie could not sufficiently present evidence due
to his evasiveness, the trial court's alimony determination, which was based, in part, on
its finding that Harold's new spouse could not contribute to his living expenses, is unduly
prejudicial and should be reversed. About three months prior to the trial in this case, the
trial court ruled that Valerie was entitled to take the deposition of Ms. Bruni regarding
her financial status, finding that such information was relevant to Ms. Bruni's "ability to
contribute to financial expenses" and Valerie's ability to show whether Harold diverted
funds to Ms. Bruni. (R. 2259:29.)
However, as outlined in Valerie's Motion for Default Judgment, Valerie was
forced to cancel the scheduled depositions of Ms. Bruni and Harold because they "failed
to produce the discovery as ordered by the Court." (R. 1704.)

Indeed, Ms. Bruni

admitted at trial that she did not produce any bank records received prior to marrying
Harold, erroneously claiming that she was only ordered to produce the bank records
received after she married Harold. (R. 1760, 2264:510-11.)

Based on this and several

other discovery violations, Valerie moved for Default Judgment, which was heard just
one week prior to the first day of trial. At the hearing, the trial court recognized that,
"[ojbviously, there's not going to be time for the depositions." (R. 2261:48.) But,
finding that Harold had engaged in a consistent and repeated pattern of evading
discovery, the court ordered that, "[i]f it turns out that we get to trial and [Valerie] is
unable to present the necessary evidence based on [Harold's] failure to provide the
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necessary evidence through the discovery, Fm going to make the ruling that [Harold] will
be precluded from defending on that issue." (R. 2261:45.)
At trial, Valerie attempted to present evidence that Ms. Bruni had an ability to
contribute to Harold's living expenses. {See, e.g., R. 2264:4^1-89.) However, Ms. Bruni
testified that she was unable to work due to medical reasons. (R.2264:482-83.) Had Ms.
Bruni produced her bank statements received prior to her marriage with Harold, Valerie
would have been able to establish that such testimony was indeed false. But because Ms.
Bruni failed to produce those records, Valerie was limited in her ability to challenge Ms.
Brum's claim. (R. 2264:491-93.) The only evidence th^t Valerie could produce to
challenge this claim and to show that Ms. Bruni was able to ^nd, in fact, did work during
the year she married Harold was a bank statement from 2(^06 which showed that Ms.
Bruni received a tax refund in the amount of $3,165.12 (R. 2264:515.) When confronted
with this evidence, Ms. Bruni stated that the refund was a "dhild credit." (Id.) She later
changed her testimony, however, when called by Harold, gating that she had actually
worked for nearly six months in 2005 at a periodontist's office, during the same time that
she had been dating Harold. (R. 2264:478; 2265:638-39.)
Despite this incredible and contradictory testimony from Ms. Bruni, the court
accepted her claim that she could not work and refused to consider her ability to share
living expenses with Harold. (R. 2178-79.) Because Ms. brum's income is relevant to

Valerie also intended to present testimony from a former co-worker of Ms. Brum's to
rebut Ms. Bruni's claim that she could not work. However, Valerie ultimately did not
call the co-worker after being informed by the court that th£ co-worker lived two doors
down from the judge. (R. 2264:494.)
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determining Harold's ability to pay alimony, see Williamson, 1999 UT App 219 at f 11,
and Valerie was unable to present additional evidence to disprove Ms. Brum's claim that
she is unemployable due to Harold's and Ms. Brum's failure to produce the requested
documents, the court should have enforced its November 14, 2006 Ruling and held that
Harold was precluded from defending on the issue. Its failure to do so, after recognizing
Harold's extensive pattern of evading Valerie's discovery in this case, results in a serious
inequity that manifests a clear abuse of discretion. Thus, the court's ruling on alimony
should be reversed, and Valerie should be granted a new trial to present evidence
regarding each of the statutory factors to be considered when awarding alimony13 after
she has been allowed an opportunity to obtain and present the evidence necessary to
support her claim.
2.

T H E TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING VALERIE ONLY
A SMALL PORTION OF H E R ATTORNEY FEES

Because the trial court found that Harold's contemptuous conduct resulted in a
"substantial" increase in Valerie's attorney fees, it abused its discretion in awarding
Valerie only a small portion of those fees. Section 30-3-3(1) provides that attorney fees
may be awarded to establish an order "to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the
action." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1) (2002). Also, section 30-3-3(2) provides for an
award of attorney fees "[i]n any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child
support, alimony, or division of property ... upon determining that the party substantially
prevailed upon the claim or defense." Id. § 30-3-3(2) (2002).

13

The award should include retroactive alimony as requested in the Complaint (R. 3.)
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Generally, when awarding attorney fees under seption 30-3-3(1), i.e., in a
proceeding to establish an order of custody, parent-time, child support, or alimony, the
award "must be supported by evidence that the amount awarded was reasonable and that
the party receiving the award was reasonably in need." Porco v. Porcoy 752 P.2d 365,
368 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
However, when attorney fees are "incurred by one party seeking to enforce a court
order, a court may disregard the financial need of the moving party." Finlayson v.
Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 850 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis added). Thus, attorney
fees are awardable pursuant to section 30-3-3(2) without regard to the needs or abilities
of the parties involved. See also Utah Code Ann. 78B-6-311 (2009) (authorizing an
award of attorney fees as damages for contempt).
As discussed more fully below, the trial court erred in refusing to award Valerie
attorney fees pursuant to section 30-3-3 based on its erroneous findings that she did not
substantially prevail, she did not have a financial need justifying the award, and the fees
incurred were unreasonable. (R. 2157-58.) Additionally, the court abused its discretion
in awarding Valerie less than 15% of the total fees incurred after finding she was entitled
to attorney fees as a result of Harold's contemptuous conduct,
a. The Trial Court Erred in Finding that Valerie Was Not Entitled to
Recover Attorney Fees under Section 30-3-3
In refusing to award Valerie attorney fees under section 30-3-3, the court found
that she "was not substantially successful on the issues she presented to the court, that the
total bill for attorney's fees and costs of $83,349.61 was not reasonable, and that she
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makes more money than [Harold] and will be receiving financial help from him on a
monthly basis."14 (R. 2155-56.)
With respect to the first of these findings, this Brief demonstrates that the trial
court erroneously denied several of Valerie's proper requests. When such errors are
considered, it is clear Valerie substantially prevailed upon a majority of her claims.15
Additionally, with respect to the last of these findings, i.e., Valerie's financial need, the
trial court expressly found that Valerie's monthly expenses exceeded her monthly income
by more than $2,500.00. (R. 2184.) Thus, any finding to the contrary that Valerie did
not have a financial need is erroneous. See Malstrom v. Consolidated Theatres, 290 P.2d
689, 690-91 (Utah 1955) (noting that, "if, on the same evidence, the trial court should
make findings of fact necessarily contrary to each other, such action would be capricious
and that such inconsistent findings should not be permitted to stand.").
Finally, with respect to the trial court's finding that Valerie's attorney fees were
not reasonable, that finding is against the clear weight of the evidence and should be
reversed. In finding the fees unreasonable, the trial court reasoned as follows:
The court finds that the fees incurred by [Valerie] are not reasonable, but
are truly beyond reason for a marital estate of this size. The court is
appalled at the effort that went into minor areas, such as the $180.00 in
used gym equipment and the used $75.00 entertainment center. Some of
[Valerie's] requests were absurd, such as the amount requested for alimony
and reimbursement for all of the house payments. [Harold] should not have
14

It should be noted that Valerie paid an additional $12,000.00 for legal representation
prior to engaging Mr. Thayer. (R. 2262:208-09.) However, the trial court's award only
considered Mr. Thayer's legal fees.
15
It should also be noted that the finding that a party "substantially prevail" is not an
element required to grant Valerie attorney fees under section 30-3-3(1) for establishing
an order, which is what the trial, in fact, accomplished.
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to pay for attorney's fees incurred in pursuing such unreasonable requests.
(R.2157.)
At trial, the following evidence was presented in support of the trial court's
finding that Valerie incurred fees related to "minor areas": Valerie testified that Harold
dissipated six pieces of home gym equipment by abandoning the equipment in Montana
and that Harold dissipated an entertainment center by giving it to his new wife, (R.
2262:113-14), on cross examination, Valerie described the entertainment center, (R.
2262:255), Ms. Drake, Valerie's bankruptcy attorney, testified that Harold did not list
several personal property items, including the entertainment center and the gym
equipment, on his original schedules filed with the bankruptcy court, (R. 2264:445-46),
Ms. Bruni testified that Harold gave her several items when they married, including the
entertainment center, (R. 2264:500), Harold testified in the bankruptcy court that he took
the gym equipment to Montana to be held until he had a place to move into but that he
had no financial way to retrieve it and bring it down to Utah, (R. 2264:564-66; 2265:61920), Harold testified that his sister "[j]unked" the equipment, (R. 2264:571), Harold
testified that the only marital property item given to Ms. Bruni was the entertainment
center, (R. 2264:572-73), Harold testified that he originally took the gym equipment to
Montana in a U-haul trailer and that his subsequent trips to Montana were by motorcycle,
(R. 2265:645), Harold testified that he purchased the gym equipment used from the
Alpine School District for $20.00 per item, that he bought four or five pieces of
equipment, some of which were broken at the time of purchase, and that Valerie gave
them to him and told him to get rid of them, (R. 2265:645-47), Harold testified that the
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entertainment center was made of particle board, had crayon and marker marks on it, and
was worth approximately $150, (R. 2265:666-67), and Valerie testified that she did not
tell Harold to take the equipment, but that Harold took the equipment and several other
items when he requested to go through the house, (R. 2265:735.)
Although it is true that Valerie raised the issue of Harold's dissipation of the
entertainment center and the gym equipment, it must be recognized that she did so in the
overall context of establishing Harold's multiple and continuous violations of the court's
orders. Indeed, the evidence presented by Valerie regarding the entertainment center and
the gym equipment was only a portion of the long line of evidence presented to establish
Harold's pattern of flagrantly and willfully violating the trial court's orders. (See, e.g., R.
2262:112-13, 115-18, 144-45, 150-51, 180-204.) For example, Valerie first testified that
Harold sold the parties' GMC truck and the parties' 30' LaSalle trailer in contravention
of the trial court's order that Harold not dissipate the parties' marital property.

(R.

2262:112-13.) When asked whether there was any other property that Harold dissipated
in violation of the order, Valerie responded by describing the entertainment center and
the exercise equipment. (R. 2262:113-14.) Valerie also testified about Harold's repeated
violations of other court orders, including orders regarding child support and child care
and orders regarding document production. (R. 144-45, 150-51, 180-204.)
In addition to referring to the gym equipment as evidence of Harold's contempt of
court, Valerie also used that evidence to challenge Harold's credibility, noting that he
testified in the bankruptcy court that he had no "financial way of getting back up to
Montana," (R. 2264:565), but then establishing that he took over seven trips to Montana
4837-3031-6803/CO006-001
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during the years 2004 and 2005, alone. (R. 2264:568.) As a large part of this case rested
on the parties' credibility, especially given the fact that Harold failed to produce all of the
documents related to his and his wife's current financial status, Valerie was more than
justified in presenting evidence that Harold had provided false testimony in either the
bankruptcy proceeding or the divorce proceeding.
Overall, the trial transcripts span more than 740 pages, yet only a total of 21 of
those pages even mention the exercise equipment or the entertainment center. Of that,
only 13 pages contain references to the equipment elicited from Valerie's counsel.
Clearly, Valerie's very limited references to the gym equipment and entertainment center,
which served as evidence of Harold's willful violations of the court's orders and as
evidence of Harold's inconsistent testimony, were not frivolous or unreasonable.16
Finally, it should be noted that, in finding the attorney fees unreasonable, the court
compared the amount of the fees incurred to the value of the marital estate. But such a
comparison is improper in this case in light of the fact that qne of the major issues to be
litigated by the parties was whether Harold should be awarded unsupervised visitation.
Because Harold repeatedly evaded and ignored Valerie's revests for documents related
to his psychosexual evaluations, Valerie was forced to pursue all of the legal remedies
available to her to compel Harold to produce the documents so that she could ensure that
he would not be a danger to her children. Just six months before the trial, and after nearly

16

With respect to the trial court's finding regarding Valerie's requests for alimony and
reimbursement of mortgage payments, Sections 1 and 4 of this Brief show that these
requests were also not unreasonable or "absurd" but are in fact warranted by law and
equity.
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four years of ongoing discovery battles related to the production of that information,
Valerie was ultimately awarded full custody and Harold permanently waived his right to
unsupervised visitation. But that victory of ensuring her children's safety can never be
translated into a dollar figure. Thus, the trial court erred when it failed to consider the
complex issues in the case, including the substantial violations of contempt, and instead
merely compared the amount of attorney fees incurred with the value of the marital estate
to determine the reasonableness of the fees.
b. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Awarding Valerie Less Than
15% of Her Attorney Fees Based on Harold's Misconduct
As outlined above, this case is not a typical divorce case. From the beginning, one
of the primary issues to be resolved was whether Harold should be awarded unsupervised
visitation. (R. 2255:9 (statement by Harold's counsel that unsupervised visitation is "a
big issue").) Because of issues of abuse, Harold was initially ordered to submit to certain
psychosexual testing. (R. 87.) Throughout the next four years, Harold engaged in a
series of tactics designed to avoid producing his test results and/or related documents,
including reversing his stance on unsupervised visitation several times and even going so
far as representing to the court that he had signed the required releases even though he
had, in fact, rescinded the releases. (R. 2163; 2262:180-89.) As a result of Harold's
conduct, both Valerie and the GAL filed motions to compel. (R. 210-11; 357-62, 392-99,
701-02, 1071-72.) Valerie also incurred costs in scheduling depositions for Harold's
providers only to be later served with objections and motions to quash due to the fact that
Harold had not authorized the documents to be released. (R. 464, 953.) While Harold
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finally agreed to permanently waive his right to unsupervised visitation in May 2006, he
represented to Valerie up until that time that he intended to pursue unsupervised
visitation. (R. 551-53; 2255:9.) Thus, she had no choice but to bring the motions before
the court to ensure the safety of her children.
Valerie was also compelled to seek court intervention to address Harold's
intentional failures to pay court ordered child support, child care expenses, alimony,
medical expenses, and premiums for health and car insurance. Because Valerie was
taking care of six minor children and her monthly expenses far exceeded her income, she
was dependent upon the support that Harold was ordered to provide in order to sustain
her family.

Yet, on five separate occasions, Harold violated the court's orders and

unilaterally changed his obligations to Valerie and his qhildren based on his own
preferences and interpretations of law, including reducing his child support payments to
only $45.00 per month. (R. 1019-20.) Valerie was thus compelled to return to court five
times to obtain relief. (R. 357-62, 400-446, 701-02, 1019-20, 1448-49.)
In addition to that conduct, Harold also refused to answer Valerie's discovery
requests that sought information regarding his financial status. As such information was
necessary to present her case at trial, the only option available to Valerie to obtain the
documents was to seek court intervention. Valerie brought a total of three motions to
compel, requesting that the court compel Harold to produce the financial documents
relevant to the case. (R. 357-62, 391-97, 1273-1316.) Harold's evasiveness also caused
Valerie to request a continuance of trial, which was grantedt (R. 1342-43.)

But while

the court continually ordered Harold to comply with the discovery requests, he still
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refused to turn over the requested documents and information. In fact, just two weeks
before the trial was set to begin, Valerie had still not received the documents she
requested from Harold and his new wife, nor was she able to depose Harold or his new
wife regarding information which the court deemed relevant to the case due to their
failure to produce the requested information.

Therefore, Valerie moved for default

judgment as a sanction for Harold's willful misconduct. (R. 1563-1712.)
In total, Valerie was forced to seek court intervention on nine separate occasions
to address Harold's various violations of court orders and refusals to comply with
discovery requests.

These requests were never found to be without merit or frivolous.

To the contrary, just one week before trial, the trial court found that "much of what has
been said on behalf of [Valerie] is well taken and well-deserved." (R. 2261:44.) In fact,
the court found that Harold's contemptuous conduct rose to such a level that a jail
sentence was appropriate. Additionally, recognizing the prejudice that may result to
Valerie due to Harold's conduct, the trial court also ordered that Harold would be
precluded from presenting any defense to an issue on which Valerie could not present
sufficient evidence due to his obstructive behavior. (R. 2261:44-45.) Clearly, these
rulings establish that Valerie acted appropriately in seeking the court's intervention.
Indeed, this was confirmed in the trial court's Amended Decree of Divorce, which
awarded Valerie the attorney fees incurred in obtaining nine separate findings of
contempt. (R. 2156-57, 2160-67, 2173, 2174, 2186, 2189, 2192, 2193, 2195, 2196,

17

It should also be noted that Valerie participated in the hearing held on the GAL's
Motion to Compel, echoing the GAL's concerns regarding Harold's conduct.
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2198.) Yet, instead of allowing Valerie to submit an affidavit of attorney fees to establish
the amount of fees incurred in pursuing and obtaining multiple judgments against Harold
1R

for unpaid child support, alimony, child care, medical care, and insurance,

the court

arbitrarily limited the award to only 15% of the fees charged by Mr. Thayer.
As Harold's violations of court orders, misconduct, and "intentional efforts to
thwart" discovery over a period of 4 lA years are well documented and, in fact, resulted in
several findings of contempt, it is a manifest injustice and inequity to award Valerie only
15% of the fees charged by Mr. Thayer and her bankruptcy counsel to compensate her for
such conduct. Thus, this Court should hold that the trial court abused its discretion and
remand for reconsideration. This Court should also award Valerie her attorney fees
incurred in bringing this appeal. See Bell, 810 P.2d at 494 ("[W]hen fees in a divorce
were awarded below to the party who then prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded
to that party on appeal.").
3.

T H E TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT VALERIE'S REQUEST FOR
WORK-RELATED CHILD CARE W A S UNREASONABLE

The trial court's finding that Valerie did not present any "reasonable suggested
costs for child-care expenses" is against the clear weight of the evidence because that
evidence establishes that Valerie's request for work-related child care was the only

Pursuant to Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Valerie is entitled to recover
the attorney fees incurred in bringing each of her motions. See Utah R. Civ. P.
37(a)(4)(A) (providing that, "[i]f the motion is granted, or if the disclosure or requested
discovery is provided after the motion was filed, the court shall, after opportunity for
hearing, require the party ... whose conduct necessitated the motion ... to pay to the
moving party the reasonable expenses incurred..., including attorney fees ...." (emphasis
added).)
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reasonable option available to her given her work demands. At trial, the following
evidence was presented in support of the trial court's finding that Valerie's request for a
live-in nanny to provide work-related child care was unreasonable: Valerie paid for
nanny-care during the years 2003-2006, (R. 2262:126), for a majority of that time, the
nanny paid by Valerie was her mother, (R. 2262:127), Valerie paid on a weekly basis and
did not break down the wages paid to determine an hourly rate, (id.), Valerie paid the
nannies $400.00 gross per week, (R. 2262:129), when working as a nanny, Valerie's
mother also helped clean and run errands for her, (R. 2262:259), three of the children at
home were 11 years old or older at the time of trial, (R. 2262:259), Valerie did not take
business trips during the months of July, August, and September, (R. 2262:268-69), and
Harold testified he believed the two older children could take care of the younger
children, (R. 2265:676).
However, despite this evidence, the record demonstrates that the trial court's
finding of unreasonableness was so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of
the evidence. For example, Valerie testified that, prior to obtaining full-time employment
after her separation from Harold, she was a stay-at-home mom for her seven children.
(R. 2216; 2262:124.) Valerie also testified that her job is not a regular "9 to 5" job;
rather, she goes to work at 7:20 each morning, and she leaves work anytime from 5:20
p.m. to 11:00 p.m., depending on her work load and schedule. (R. 2262:125.) Valerie
testified that her job requires her to travel often for client relations and trade shows and
that she cannot refuse to travel. (R. 2262:126, 297.) Valerie travels at least once a month
for an average of three to six business days each trip. (R. 2262:125, 269.) While Valerie
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has advance notice of the trips for trade shows, the business t^ips to individual clients are
unpredictable and are based upon the needs of the particular client involved.

(R.

2262:297.) For the year 2006, Valerie took seven business trips during the first six
months of the year. (R. 2262:269.) Valerie also took a four day business trip in October.
(R. 2262:268.) Valerie also had two additional trips planned for the summer of 2006,
including a trip to England, but was forced to have someone else in her department fill in
for her due to the hearings scheduled in the divorce and the bankruptcy cases. (R.
2262:296-97.) While her boss filled in her for on those occasions, Valerie testified that
having her boss take her business trips caused difficulty at work because those trips were
Valerie's responsibility, and her boss was busy with other matters. (R. 2262:297.)
Because of the travel requirements of her job, Valerie found it difficult to find
responsible individuals to care for her children during her absence. Indeed, Valerie
testified that "[v]ery few people want to leave their own family to come and take care of
[her] children for three to five days." (R. 2262:127-28.) Consequently, when Valerie did
not have a nanny working for her, she had to rely on family members "or young teenage
girls who [were] available, which doesn't necessarily represent the best child care." (R.
2262:128.)

This was especially so when several of Valerie's children were on

medications and Valerie needed an individual "responsible enough to make sure they take
their medication at the appropriate times." (R. 2262:129.)
As a result of her demanding work schedule and the realities of trying to obtain a
temporary babysitter to watch her children three to six days each month, including
overnight, Valerie determined that hiring a nanny, at the rate of $400.00 per week, which
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was the undisputed going rate for nannies, (R. 2262:259), was the only reasonable option
available to her. The nanny's duties included all child care related activities, including
making the children breakfast and lunch, taking the children to and from school at the
appropriate times, taking the children to their activities and doctors' appointments,
helping the children with their homework, staying with the children until Valerie returned
home from work, and providing overnight care to the children when Valerie was away on
business trips. (R.2262:126, 258-59.)
While Valerie's mother, who worked as a live-in nanny for a majority of the time
from 2003 to 2005, also helped her daughter by cleaning and running errands, Valerie
testified that such activities were not part of the nanny's responsibilities and that none of
the nannies employed by Valerie, with the exception of her mother, ever performed
cleaning services or ran errands. (R. 2262:258-59, 298.) Once Valerie returned home,
either from work or from her business trips, the nanny was off-duty and was free to do as
she pleased.

(R. 2262:298.)

The undisputed evidence established that Valerie paid

$60,158.91 in child care expenses for the years 2003 to 2006. (PL's Ex. 16.)
Although the trial court found that "[t]he older children certainly can be expected
to help with the younger children," noting that the children were aged 16, 13, 12, 9, and 7
years old at the time the court issued its decision, (R. 2187), the testimony presented at
trial showed that, in 2003, when Valerie was forced to obtain full-time employment to
support her children, those children were aged 12 and younger, with two of the children
under school age. (R.2216; 2262:259.) Additionally, even at the time of trial, no child
over the age of 18 resided in the home. (R. 2262:257.) Rather, the oldest child in the
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home was only 15 years old. (Id.) While Valerie recognized that her 15 year old son
could technically help with his four younger siblings, all aged 12 or under, Valerie
testified that "he's not as patient with them as I would like for him to be." (R. 2262:260.)
Additionally, that son participated in his school's football program, which required that
he practice from 2:30 to 5:30 each afternoon; therefore, he would be required to quit
football in order to watch his siblings. (Id.) Finally, this Court may take judicial notice
that, at 15, the son could not legally drive without an adult present. See Utah R. Evid.
201. Therefore, he would be unable to pick up his younger siblings from school, and he
would be unable to drive the children anywhere in the event of an emergency. Clearly,
forcing a 15 year old child to drop out of his school's extracurricular activities in order to
watch four children aged 12 and under simply so that his father will be able to save the
expenses related to child care is not a reasonable alternative.
The evidence presented at trial unmistakably establishes that typical child care
arrangements did not meet the needs of Valerie and her children.

Indeed, because

Valerie's job requires that she take monthly business trips lasting three to six days each,
many times without advance notice, it was necessary that Valerie had someone available
to spend the nights with her children while she was away. The record demonstrates that
typical babysitters were, not surprisingly, unwilling to spend a week away from their own
family to provide such care. Because the clear weight of the evidence shows that the
only reasonable option available to Valerie was to hire a nanny who would be responsible
for caring for the children whenever Valerie was away from the home, the trial court's
finding that nanny care was unreasonable is erroneous. Therefore, this Court should
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reverse and remand with the instruction that Valerie be awarded one-half of the over
$60,000.00 in child care expenses during the years 2003 to 2006, less any judgments
previously awarded, with such judgment to be classified as family support.
4.

T H E TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO REIMBURSE VALERIE ANY
PORTION OF THE PAYMENTS PAID TO THE PARTIES' H O M E MORTGAGE

The trial court erred in denying Valerie's request for reimbursement of payments
she made to the parties' home mortgage, after the parties separated and Harold refused to
pay any portion of the same, because such a ruling constitutes a misunderstanding or
misapplication of the law resulting in a substantial and prejudicial error. "In dividing a
marital estate, the trial court is empowered to enter equitable orders concerning property
distribution."

Jensen v. Jensen, 2008 UT App 392, \ 25, 197 P.3d 117 (internal

quotations omitted). Indeed, although the general rule states that each party "is entitled to
fifty percent of the marital property," Thomas v. Thomas, 1999 UT App 239, \ 23, 987
P.2d 603, a trial court has the ability to allocate marital property "unequally where
circumstances justify departure from the presumptive rule of equal distribution." Id. at ^f
22 (internal quotations omitted).
Also, when determining the value of the marital property, trial courts generally
determine such value at the "time of the divorce decree or trial." Howell v. Howell, 806
P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The reason for doing so is that, "[b]y the very
nature of a property division, the marital estate is evaluated according to what property
exists at the time the marriage is terminated."

Id. (alteration in original) (internal

quotations omitted). Nevertheless, despite this general rule, trial courts can, "in the
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exercise of their equitable powers, use a different date, such as the date of separation, if
one party has acted obstructively." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
In this case, the record clearly establishes that Harold acted obstructively, resulting
in several delays in the divorce proceedings. (R. 2155 ([Harold's] efforts to avoid or
delay discovery have cost [Valerie] a great deal in attorney's fees and delays.").) Thus, it
would have been appropriate to value the marital residence and determine the parties'
respective shares of equity as of the time of separation, October 2001. Additionally, even
applying the general rule, the value of the home should have been determined no later
than September 2005, the date the decree of divorce was entered and the parties'
marriage was terminated. (R. 2207.) However, because Harold filed for bankruptcy in
October 2005 (after the marriage was terminated), the trial court lacked jurisdiction over
the marital home and was unable to fix the value of the residence at any date, let alone
exercise its authority to adjust the parties' share of equity to meet the unique
circumstances in this case. (R. 2206.) Thus, Valerie requested that, in lieu of an award
of equity, she be reimbursed for her payments to the parties' fitrst mortgage on the home.
The court rejected this request, stating "[Valerie] has received the benefit and
comfort of living in the home and should not be granted judgment against [Harold] for
having made the payments on the home." (R. 2205.) "To grant her a judgment for
unpaid alimony and child support, plus her mortgage payments," the court reasoned,
"would, in effect, grant her judgment twice and force [Harold] to pay twice." (R. 2204.)
In so ruling, the trial court misunderstood Utah law. Valerie's request was not to
be compensated for her monthly living expenses; rather, Valerie's request sought
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reimbursement for the additional equity that she, alone, contributed to the marital home
as a result of her payments made after the parties' separation.19 Utah's courts have
repeatedly recognized that a party's individual contributions to a marital residence are
recoverable in a marital property award. See Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Utah
1980) ("[I]t was undisputed that plaintiff contributed $10,000 from her own separate
funds to completely furnish the first home of the parties and when that home was sold
and their current home was purchased, many of those furnishings were moved to and are
still in the new residence. Plaintiff contributed another $5,000 of her own funds in 1967
to retire the mortgage on this residence. In view of these undisputed facts the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in awarding a greater portion of the marital property to the
plaintiff than to the defendant."); Jensen, 2008 UT App 392 atffif3-4, 27 (affirming trial
court's order that husband be reimbursed for one-half of the mortgage payments he made
on property that was occupied by wife after separation and that was equally divided by
the court).
As in Jensen, only one party in this case paid the first mortgage payments after the
time of separation and, thus, only one party contributed to the increase in equity in the
marital residence after the parties separated. In fact, Valerie paid over $64,000 in
mortgage payments throughout the four and one-half years before the trial in the divorce
proceedings, which occurred over one year after Harold's request for a bifurcated decree
of divorce was granted. Because Harold will share in the benefit of those contributions
19

It should be noted that Harold was ultimately only ordered to pay alimony in the
amount of $230 per month from May 2002 to October 2003. (R. 2175-76.) But the
mortgage payment made by Valerie each month was $1,194 per month. (PI. Ex. 9.)
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when the home is ultimately divided by the bankruptcy court, equity demands that
Valerie be reimbursed in the amount of at least 50% of the payments she made toward the
home in order to prevent Harold from receiving a windfall. Additionally, because the
unique circumstances in this case justify departure from the presumptive rule of equal
distribution given (1) Harold's repeated delays and contemptuous conduct, which
resulted in prolonging the case over such a long period of time, (2) the entry of a
bifurcated divorce decree over one year prior to the trial in {his case, and (3) Valerie's
demonstrated need, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to award Valerie more
than one-half of the payments she made on the home. Accordingly, this Court should
reverse the trial court's ruling, hold that Valerie is entitled to be reimbursed for at least
one-half of the payments made on the marital home after the parties separated, and
remand for a consideration of any additional amounts Valerie should be awarded given
the unique circumstances of this case.
5.

T H E TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT VALERIE FAILED TO RAISE OR
RESERVE H E R RIGHT TO ARGUE FOR RETROACTIVE SUPPORT

Lastly, this Court should hold that the trial court's finding that Valerie failed to
raise and/or reserve her right to argue the issue of retroactive child support is against the
clear weight of the evidence. In response to Valerie's request that Harold be ordered to
pay retroactive child support for the six months prior to the entry of the temporary
support order in May 2002, the trial court found as follows: "As far as the court can
determine, this matter has never been brought before the court and has not been reserved
by [Valerie]." (R. 2171.) However, this statement is contrary to the record.
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Valerie's Complaint for Divorce, filed April 4, 2002, specifically requested that
the award of child support "commenc[e] November 1, 2001." (R. 4). And, in the July
2002 Order, the court awarded Valerie child support in the amount of $1,797 per month
and held that "[Valerie] reserves the right to argue retroactivity of support." (R. 86.)
Valerie exercised that right in her Proposed Decision, which functioned as
Valerie's closing argument. (R. 2265:720.) In that Proposed Decision, Valerie argued
that, as a result of Harold's failure to provide any support to the family during the six
months after separation, Valerie was forced to provide the sole support for the children
and the family's living expenses even though she was unemployed.

(R. 1911.)

Therefore, Valerie requested that she be awarded "back child support in the amount of
$1,797 per month, as ordered by the Court in May 2002, for the months of October 2001
through April 2002." (Id.)
Because the clear weight of the evidence establishes that Valerie properly raised,
and reserved her right to argue, the issue of retroactive support, the trial court's finding
that Valerie failed to do is clearly erroneous. Thus, this Court should hold that Valerie is
entitled to child support for the six months prior to the entry of the first order.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, this Court should reverse the trial court and order
that Valerie be granted a new trial on the issue of alimony, including a determination of
the parties' income, assets, and debts, that the Court award Valerie one-half of all child
care expenses and at least one-half of the mortgage payments paid by her, and that
Valerie be awarded all her attorney fees at trial and in bringing in this appeal.
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<rn

Dated this J j ^ d a y of July, 2009,

SMITH HARTVIGSEN,

PLLC

^ A i u * Ab(^x

Clark R. Nielsen
' x
Kathryn J. Steffey
Attorneys for Appellant/Petitioner Valerie Connell

4837-3031-6803/CO006-001

51

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of July, 2009,1 caused to be served, via first-class
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the BRIEF OF APPELLANT VALERIE
J. CONNELL addressed as follows:

Harold G. Connell
1537NuttallDr.
Lehi, Utah 84043

4837-3031-6803/CO006-001

52

ADDENDUM

A. Memorandum Decision (Record No. 2026 - 2087)
B. Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law (Record No. 2096-2151)
C. Amended Decree of Divorce (Record No. 2152-2217)
D. Excerpts from November 14, 2006 Hearing (Record No. 2261, pages 43-45)
E. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (2002)
F. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (2002)
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

VALERIE J. CONNELL,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,

vs.

CASE NO. 024400765
DATE: 29 May 2007

HAROLD G. CONNELL,

Judge Claudia Laycock

Defendants.

Division 3
This matter came before the Court for trial on November 22 and December 8,19 and
20,2006. Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Douglas B. Thayer and Nancee
Tegeder. Respondent was present and represented by counsel, Scott P. Card. Although there is
also a protective order case pending (Case No. 064401019) between the parties, it is a separate
matter and will not be addressed as part of this divorce case.
Subsequent to the trial, the parties have submitted proposed memorandum decisions to
the court. The court has now reviewed the file, the evidence, and the proposed memorandum
decisions and now enters its Memorandum Decision.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Valerie J. Connell ("the petitioner") and Harold G. Connell("the respondent") were
married in November 22, 1986.
2. At the time of the marriage, petitioner had one daughter, Heather Stacey Connell,
born August 23,1982. Respondent adopted Heather in 1990.
3. The parties also had six biological children during the course of the marriage:
1

Meaghan Tovey Connell, bom October 22, 1987; Spencer Ward Connell, bom January 16,1991;
Cameron Wenger Connell, bom October 17, 1993; Madison Evans Connell, bom August 19,
1995; Cassidy Ford Connell, bom December 23,1997; and Caitlyn Phelps Connell, bom April 8,
2000.
4. In 2001 the parties separated several times from the beginning of May through the
summer. They separated on permanent basis in the beginning of Oct 2001.
5. The petitioner filed a petition for divorce on April 4, 2002.
6. Judge James R. Taylor signed an order bifurcating the proceedings and granting the
petitioner a divorce on September 12,2005.
7. On October 14, 2005-during the pendency of this divorce action~the respondent
filed a bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah
("Bankruptcy Court") (case no. 05-39070).
8. Together the parties own a home at 865 East Cascade Drive, Orem, Utah. On
September 8,2001, their monthly mortgage statement showed a balance owing of $163, 562.45,
while on September 8, 2001, the balance was $163,562.45. Shortly before the time of
trial-September 11, 2006~the balance was $151,982.91.
9. Since October 2001 the petitioner has made all of the monthly payments on the
home-a total of $64,700.00.
10. The parties purchased the home for $175,000.00 in 1995, at which time the home
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had 3 finished bedrooms and 2 partially finished bedrooms.
11. During the marriage the respondent attempted to finish portions of the homes,
including putting up, taping and mudding sheetrock, adding electrical outlets, framing closets,
and working on, at least, one bathroom addition. He did the work himself, but was not a licensed
contractor.
12. After the respondent moved out, the petitioner added built-in shelves and hanging
bars in a bedroom, finished some of the electrical work, added all new framing around the
windows and trim, texturized and painted some of the walls, re-did some of the drywall, and
fixed some problems in one bathroom.
13. She also installed an intercom system ($2,413.36, May 3,2002), installed an
outdoor shed $425.00, July 6,2004), replaced the furnace and the water heater ($3,519.00,
November 13, 2003)), and replaced the shake roof with an asphalt-shingled roof ($10,752.00,
September 9 and 13,2005), installing "Sola tubes" ($433.47, October 12, 2005). She also did
other types of repair and home maintenance, as found in Exhibits 3 and 4.
14. A second mortgage or line of equity credit was taken out by the parties in January
2001 for the purpose of refinancing the RV and purchasing the Twin Lab stock. By stipulation of
the parties at a hearing on May 7, 2002, the parties were ordered to sell the Twin Lab stock and
use the proceeds to fix the RV's transmission so that the RV could be sold, using the remainder
of the proceeds to pay on the line of credit. The proceeds from the RV were to be applied to the
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line of credit, as well.
16. The respondent paid $1,200 to repair the RV transmission; that sum did not come
out of the stock proceeds. The RV was eventually sold for $4,000, but the respondent gave the
money to his attorney, who later gave the money to his bankruptcy trustee.
17. The respondent made the payments on the line of credit until October 2005; the
petitioner has been making the payments since then. The debt balance is now approximately
$19,000.
18. The Twin Lab stock (10,000 shares) was purchased in March 2001 by the parties at
the price of $1.3125 per share for a total, minus commissions, of $13,425.00. Its highest value
was in April 2001, when it shot up to $2.6400 per share, for a total value of $26,400.00. It then
began its decline in value, which continued until the parties sold the stock on March 3, 2003 for a
value of $1,209.46. At the time of the May 2, 2002 hearing, the approximate value of the stock
was $7,900, while at the time the order was signed on June 10, 2002, the approximate value of
the stock was $4,400.00.
19. Although the respondent changed the password to the account, the petitioner did
nothing herself-other than several phone calls-to get access to the account or to sell the stock
herself.
20. At the hearing on May 7,2002 the parties also stipulated that the Novell stock
purchased at the same time as the Twin Lab stock was awarded to the petitioner as her sole and
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separate property and that the parties were mutually restrained from dissipating, encumbering, or
hiding assets.
21. In May 2002, the respondent was ordered to maintain health insurance on the
petitioner and the minor children during the pendency of this action. In October 2005, the
respondent cancelled the petitioner's health insurance. The children were also not covered for a
time after April 30, 2006.
22. The respondent failed to pay $1,017.84 in health insurance premiums for August
through November 2006. This court had previously entered judgments for other health
insurance premiums not paid by the respondent.
23. In May 2002 the respondent was ordered to maintain car insurance on all of the
parties' vehicles. From May 5, 2006 through the time of trial, the respondent failed to pay
$85.63 in car insurance premiums.
24. In May 2002 each party was ordered to pay one-half of all unreimbursed medical
and dental expenses, commencing October 23, 2001. From May 2006 through the time of trial,
the respondent failed to pay the petitioner $82.50 for one-half of unreimbursed medical expenses.
25. In May 2002 the Court temporarily awarded the respondent the GMC truck and the
LaSalle trailer. During the pendency of this action, the respondent sold the GMC truck for
$3,500.00 and LaSalle trailer for approximately $1,500.00.
26. During 2003 the petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,116.67, with
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the respondent's average monthly share amounting to $558.33.
27. During 2004 the petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,601.83, with
the respondent's average monthly share amounting to $800.92.
28. During 2005 the petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,503.91, with
the respondent's average monthly share amounting to $751.95.
29. During 2006 petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,246.60, with the
respondent's average monthly share amounting to $623.30.
30. The petitioner travels for her employment approximately once per month for 3-5
days.
31. The petitioner spends approximately $1,194.76 per month on her mortgage
payments, $84.75 on maintaining the residence, $461.84 on food and household supplies,
$104.15 on utilities, $207.93 on clothing, $98.06 on medical and dental, $1,200.96 on child care,
$314.20 on education, $107.28 on entertainment, $45.05 on grooming, $136.51 on gifts, $710.60
on donations, $377.15 on auto expenses, $1,900.00 on installment payments and $87.74 on
computer expenses. She also voluntarily donates $710.60 per month to the LDS Church.
32. The petitioner currently works full-time and makes approximately $6,669 gross per
month in income. She began her new job in November 2003.
33. At the time of the parties' separation, they were living only on the respondent's
income.
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34. The respondent worked for the LDS Church from approximately June 2001 through
October 2003. When he stopped working for the LDS church, he was earning approximately
$2,574.00 gross per two-week pay period, or $5,577.00 gross per month ($66,924.00 per year).
35. The respondent worked for BYU from October 2003 through February 17, 2006.
Before the respondent was terminated from his position at BYU, he grossed approximately
$5,996.00 gross per month ($71,952.00 per year). See Trial Exhibit 23 at p.5.
36. The respondent voluntarily resigned from BYU, because he failed to maintain an
LDS temple recommend as required for employment. He lost his temple recommend because he
was excommunicated.
37. The respondent began his current employment with Medicity in May 2006, where
he earns $5,000.00 gross per month ($60,000.00 per year).
38. The respondent married Brenda Louise Bruni in October 2005.
39. The respondent pays his second wife's monthly house payment of $752.00. He also
pays her $1,500.00 per month to help with living expenses.
40. Ms. Brum's daughter, Sarah, has always lived with them. Her 18th birthday was in
April, 2006, at which time Ms. Brum's child support for Sarah ended. Sarah pays her mother
$360.00 per month (and sometimes less) to help with expenses.
41. Ms. Bruni's older daughter and infant child also lived with them from February
through April 2006, as did Ms. Brum's mother from January or February 2006. Her mother has
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helped her financially at times. Her mother has terminal cancer.
42. In 1997 the petitioner received a gift of CINTAS stock from her uncle; she placed
the CINTAS stock in a private and separate account.
43. The respondent accused her, during a session of marriage counseling, of not being
a "team player"--due to the separate CINTAS stock account. Because of that accusation, she felt
coerced to place the CINTAS stock into a joint account in January 2001.
44. The respondent's name did not appear on the account's monthly statements until
April 2001; however, the respondent had access to the account as early as January 2001.
45. In April 2001 the respondent borrowed against the CINTAS stock to purchase other
stock without the petitioner's permission.
46. Subsequently, on July 19, 2001 the respondent sold the CINTAS stock for
$31,784.98. However, the parties only received approximately $18,000 in cash, as the remaining
amounts had been used by the respondent to purchase other stocks.
47. At approximately the same time the parties separated, the respondent took out a
$1,900.00 quick draw loan. The petitioner never saw this money, but she ultimately paid this
loan back.
I. BANKRUPTCY ISSUES RELATED TO THIS DIVORCE ACTION
On October 14,2005, the respondent filed a bankruptcy petition in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah ("Bankruptcy Court") (Case No. 05-39070). The
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petitioner's claims for alimony, support and/or maintenance will receive a priority payment as
part of distribution of the estate in the bankruptcy case.1 Under Utah case law, said claims may
also include attorneys' fees spent in pursuit of payment for alimony, support, maintenance,
custody and/or visitation.2
Therefore, the petitioner is seeking to have this court categorize as many as possible as
pre-bankruptcy-petition-filing judgments and as an award for alimony, support or maintenance
(or fees incurred in obtaining these judgments) in order to protect her claims in Bankruptcy
Court.
Further, the Bankruptcy Court will not consider any claims against the respondent that
were incurred after his bankruptcy petition was filed, i.e., child support arrearages arising after
October 2005. The Bankruptcy Court will only deal with claims against the respondent that
arose prior to the respondent's filing of his bankruptcy petition.
II. BIFURCATION OF THE DIVORCE AND DATE OF THE DECREE
On April 28, 2005, Respondent filed a Motion to Bifurcate Divorce and an Affidavit in
Support. On May 16, 2005, Commissioner Patton denied Respondent's Motion to Bifurcate. On

1

As of the morning of the first day of trial, the bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction
over the marital home only, leaving all personal property issues and other debt issues to this
court. Therefore, this court makes no decision regarding the disposition of the parties' equity in
the marital home.
2

See Seals v. Condie, 139 P.3d 271,277 (Utah App. 2006) ("Those determinations crest[]
primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court.'" Cites omittedr).
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September 1, 2005, Respondent filed a Motion to Reconsider Ruling for Bifurcated Divorce.
However, as so many attorneys do, the respondent simultaneously submitted a proposed
Bifurcated Divorce Decree. Judge James R. Taylor inadvertently signed the Biiurcated Divorce
Decree on September 12,2005.
Subsequently, on October 7,2005, the parties came before Judge Taylor, who heard
arguments and granted the respondent's motion to reconsider the commissioner's ruling. Later in
the hearing, Judge Taylor discovered the signed Bifurcated Divorce Decree in the file; he then
reprimanded the respondent's attorney for filing a motion to reconsider, instead of an objection to
the commissioner's ruling. Nevertheless, he left his decision in place and granted the motion to
reconsider. He did not order either party to prepare a new order of bifurcation, as neither
attorney brought up that particular subject. There was absolutely no discussion between the
attorneys and the court regarding a change of date for the decree.
This court can now only assume that Judge Taylor was content to leave the previously
signed order in place. Therefore, this court will not amend the date nunc pro tunc (as requested
by the petitioner), but will leave the date of divorce as September 12, 2005.
III. CUSTODY AND VISITATION
Pursuant to an Order and Stipulation entered on July 28, 2006, the respondent shall not
exercise or attempt to exercise visitation with the minor children unless the visitation time is
supervised by a third party professional visitation supervisor such as ACAFS or WillWin. Due
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to the prior sexual abuse issues involving the respondent and the children, the respondent has
permanently waived his right to have unsupervised visitation. Thus, the petitioner is awarded
sole legal and physical custody of the minor children.
Further, while the respondent may attend public functions in which the minor children
are involved, such as plays or sporting events, he is not allowed to visit with the children before,
during or after the events. Also, the respondent may not attend the church where the children are
attending.
The only remaining issue at trial regarding visitation concerned telephonic visitation.
Pursuant to the petitioner's testimony, the parties had previously agreed to the Guardian ad
Litem's recommendation that the respondent be allowed to call the children between 5:00 p.m.
and 8:00 p.m. on Tuesdays and Thursdays. The respondent did not dispute these times for
telephonic visitation, nor did he dispute that he had previously agreed to these times. Further, the
Guardian ad Litem recommended that the children should be allowed to call the respondent
whenever they want. Neither party disputed this recommendation. In fact, when questioned at
trial, the respondent agreed with the recommendation.
Accordingly, the respondent's telephonic visitation shall be set on Tuesdays and
Thursdays between 5:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. or whenever the children want to call the respondent.
IV.

MARITAL HOME
Due to the respondent's pending bankruptcy, this court does not have jurisdiction to
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award either party equity in the marital home. Petitioner urges this court to make a finding that
mortgage payments and home improvement expenses she has paid constitute family support
and/or maintenance, because it was necessary to provide a habitable home for the children.
Further, she urges the court to enter a judgment against the respondent for the amount that the
petitioner spent on the mortgage and improvements.
A. First Mortgage
Petitioner has lived in the family home with the children and has made the payments on
the first mortgage since the parties separated in October 2001. In addition, in May 2002 the court
ordered the petitioner to make the first mortgage payments. See May 2002 Order at ^ 7. On
September8, 2001, the debt on the marital home was $163,562.45. See Trial Exhibit 1. On
December 29, 2001 the debt on the marital home was $162,837.44. Id. Shortly before the time
of trial-September 11, 2006-the debt on the marital home was $ 151,982.91. Id. Thus, in
construing these numbers in a light most favorable to the respondent, the petitioner has paid
approximately $10,855 in principal since the parties separated ($162,837-$ 151,982 = $10,855).
Further, the petitioner testified that she has spent approximately $64,700 on principal
and interest payments from the time the parties separated until the time of trial. Thus, Petitioner
has spent approximately $53,145 on interest payments for this time period ($64,700-$ 10,855 =
$53,845).
Since this court cannot award her any equity in the marital home, the petitioner requests
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that this court enter a judgment against the respondent for the $64,700.00 she has spent on
principal and interest payments for the first mortgage since October 2001. Moreover, the
petitioner requested that this court characterize said judgment as family support and/or
maintenance since providing a home for the children is part of supporting or maintaining the
family. The respondent did not dispute that the petitioner made such payments.
This court agrees with the respondent that the petitioner's argument is without merit.
The petitioner has received the benefit and comfort of living in the home and should not be
granted judgment against the respondent for having made the payments on the home. To grant
her a judgment for the $64,700 that she paid toward the mortgage would be the equivalent of
granting her-or the respondent, for that matter, were the tables turned-credit and a judgment for
paying rent, utilities, phone bills, light bulbs, toilet paper, and all other household necessities.
Although all of those bills and items could be characterized as family support and/or
maintenance (since the children need the benefit of all of those bills and items), the court cannot
find any legal precedent for such a ruling.
In addition, she received (or should have received) support in the way of alimony and
child support. She will receive a judgment for any such support not paid by the respondent
during the pendency of this action. To grant her a judgment for unpaid alimony and child
support, plus her mortgage payments, would, in effect, grant her judgment twice and force the
respondent to pay twice. Such a ruling would be outside the bounds of equity.
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The division of the marital home and any award of equity remains in the domain of the
bankruptcy case. This court will not attempt to make any ruling in that regard, other than to note,
again, that the petitioner has reduced the principal of the first mortgage by $10,855.00 since the
separation of the parties. No evidence was produced which would enable the court to calculate
the reduction of the principal since the time of the bifurcated decree of divorce.
B. Home Improvement
During the marriage the respondent attempted to finish portions of the home, including
putting up, taping and mudding sheetrock, adding electrical outlets, framing closets, and working
on, at least, one bathroom addition. He did the work himself, but was not a licensed contractor.
The parties were, apparently, satisfied to let him attempt these improvements while they were
married.
After the respondent moved out, the petitioner added built-in shelves and hanging bars
in a bedroom, finished some of the electrical work, added all new framing around the windows
and trim, texturized and painted some of the walls, re-did some of the drywall, and fixed some
problems in one bathroom.
She also installed an intercom system ($2,413.36, May 3, 2002), installed an outdoor
shed $425.00, July 6, 2004), replaced the furnace and the water heater ($3,519.00, November 13,
2003)), and replaced the shake roof with an asphalt-shingled roof ($10,752.00, September 9 and
13, 2005), installing "Sola tubes" ($433.47, October 12, 2005). She also did other types of repair
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and home maintenance, as found in Exhibits 3 and 4.
The petitioner claims that the respondent should pay the amount of $21,885.33 for the
work that she did or had done. See Trial Exhibits 3 and 4. However, this court does not believe
that (1) the respondent should pay for all of the appropriate costs, but that the petitioner should
share in the cost; and (2) that the respondent should pay for improvements and maintenance costs
that were optional.
The court finds that the roof replacement ($10,752.00) and the furnace and water heater
replacements ($3,519.00) were necessary and appropriate, as well as the garage door opener
($298.00). However, the installation of an intercom system ($2,413.36) was not necessary and
the respondent should not have to share in that cost. Id. There were many items and costs in
Exhibit 4 which were unexplained or appeared to be for minor repairs. This court views the
normal, ongoing maintenance and repairs as part of the burden born by the party who has the
benefit of living in the home, pending the conclusion of the divorce action.
Therefore, this court is not persuaded that the respondent should have to bear all of the
costs, as outlined in Exhibit 4, nor should he have to pay for costs beyond those larger-ticket
items which improved the value of the home.
Therefore, the parties shall share equally the following costs: roof replacement,
$10,752.00; furnace and water heater, $3,519.00; and garage door opener, $298.00. The court
notes that the petitioner paid for the roof replacement on or about September 20,2005, which
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was when the petitioner paid the balance of the roofing cost. She paid for the fomace and water
heater on November 13,2003, two years before the decree was signed. She paid for the new
garage door opener on January 6,2004. All of these costs were incurred before the filing of the
bankruptcy action.
The total amount to be shared by the parties is $14,569.00. Each party will pay onehalf or $7,284.50. The respondent is ordered to pay a judgment in the amount of $7,284.50 to
petitioner for his share of the improvements to the home. For the purposes of the bankruptcy
proceeding, this court characterizes this judgment as family support and maintenance, because
improvement and maintenance expenses were necessary to provide the children with a habitable
home. All of the $7,284.50 was incurred before the filing of the bankruptcy action.
C, Home Equity Line of Credit/Second Mortgage
A line of credit secured by a mortgage on the marital home was taken out by the parties
in January 2001 for the purpose of refinancing the RV and purchasing the Twin Lab stock. By
stipulation of the parties at a hearing on May 7,2002, the parties were ordered to sell the Twin
Lab stock and use the proceeds to fix the RV's transmission so that the RV could be sold, using
the remainder of the proceeds to pay on the line of credit. The proceeds from the RV were to be
applied to the line of credit, as well.
The respondent paid $1,200 to repair the RV transmission; that sum did not come out
of the stock proceeds. The RV was eventually sold for $4,000. In an order signed on January 5,
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2005 (from a December 2, 2004 hearing), the Court ordered the proceeds from the RV sale to be
placed with the respondent's former attorney, James Faust, to hold in trust "until such time as the
Court makes additional orders, or the parties stipulate in writing to a dispersal of the funds."
At the October 7,2005 hearing before Judge Taylor, the parties stipulated that the RV
proceeds should be applied to the line of credit. The respondent was present, according to the
court's minute entry. However, the respondent gave the $4,000 to his attorney, James Faust, then
retrieved the money, and then gave the money to his new attorney, Theodore Weckel. The court
has no evidence before it that the respondent gave his new attorney any instructions regarding the
disposition of the money. Mr. Weckel gave the $4,000 to the bankruptcy trustee. The court does
not find the respondent in contempt for the transfer of the $4,000 to the bankruptcy trustee,
although the court finds that the respondent should pay an extra $2,800 toward the balance owing
on the line of credit ($4,000 minus the $1,200 to fix the RV).
The respondent made the payments on the line of credit until October 2005; the
petitioner has been making the payments since then. The debt balance is now approximately
$19,000.
The Twin Lab stock (10,000 shares) was purchased in March 2001 by the parties at the
price of $1.3125 per share for a total, minus commissions, of $13,425.00. Its highest value was
in April 2001, when it shot up to $2.6400 per share, for a total value of $26,400.00. It then began
its decline in value, which continued until the parties sold the stock on March 3, 2003 for a value
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of $1,209.46 and applied the proceeds to the line of credit. At the time of the May 2, 2002
hearing, the approximate value of the stock was $7,900, while at the time the order was signed on
June 10, 2002, the approximate value of the stock was $4,400.00.
Although the respondent changed the password to the account, the petitioner did
nothing herself-other than several phone calls-to get access to the account or to sell the stock
herself. Both parties had the power to sell the stock, while neither party had the power to control
the stock market and the value of the stock. Although the stock's value declined from May 2001
to the time of the May 2002 hearing, neither party sold the stock while its value remained higher
than the original purchase price. By the time of the May 2002 hearing, the stock was already
worth less than the parties had paid for it. Unfortunately, neither party possessed the prophetic
powers necessary to out-guess the stock market, and neither party moved to sell the stock at an
advantageous moment. The court holds neither party responsible for the low value of the stock
when it was finally sold and awards neither party a judgment on this issue.
Therefore, the court divides the remaining balance on the line of equity equally
between the parties ($9,500 each), but orders the respondent to pay an extra $2,800 for the
proceeds of the RV which were not paid toward the line of credit. The court orders the
respondent to pay a judgment in the amount of $12,300.00 for his share of the remaining balance
on the line of credit.
The court rejects a finding of contempt against the respondent with regard to either the
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Twin Lab stock or the RV proceeds. All of the $12,300.00 judgment was incurred before the
filing of the bankruptcy action.
V. HEALTH INSURANCE
A. Respondent's Failure to Maintain Health Insurance
In May 2002, Respondent was ordered to maintain health insurance on the petitioner
and the minor children during the pendency of this action. See May 2002 Order at f 4.
However, in October 2005, the respondent cancelled the petitioner's health insurance. See Trial
Exhibit 6.
The court already found that the petitioner made a prima facie case for contempt
regarding the respondent's failure to maintain health insurance for the petitioner as ordered by
the court. See Petitioner's May 2006 Order to Show Cause and Order on May 2006 hearing.
Respondent reserved his right to argue at trial "that he should not be held in contempt,
notwithstanding Petitioner making her prima facie case." Id.
Although the respondent testified at trial that he cancelled the petitioner's health
insurance because he was planning to remarry, the Order states he was required to maintain her
health insurance "during the pendency of this action"—not until he remarried. The respondent
further testified that he was not aware of any changes to this Order. Thus, the respondent failed
to meet his burden of showing why he should not be held in contempt for failing to maintain the
petitioner's health insurance.
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In addition, it is undisputed that the respondent lost insurance for the children on April
30, 2006. See also Trial Exhibit 6. The petitioner requested that the respondent be found in
contempt for failing to maintain insurance on the children as ordered by the court. The
respondent did not provide any evidence that he provided the children with new insurance
immediately following the loss of coverage on April 30, 2006. In fact, the respondent admitted
that he did not inform the petitioner about her COBRA options for the children when he learned
about them in February.
Accordingly, the court finds the respondent in contempt for failing to maintain health
insurance on the petitioner and the children. The petitioner is awarded her attorneys' fees and
costs incurred in obtaining this finding. Further, this court makes a finding that maintaining
health insurance is necessary for family support and maintenance in order to keep the children in
good health.
B. Respondent's Failure to Pay Health Insurance Premiums
Respondent was ordered to pay all costs of premiums associated with health insurance.
See May 2002 Order at f 4. The petitioner testified that she obtained health insurance once she
learned that the respondent had failed to maintain said insurance, yet the respondent failed to pay
anything toward these premiums. On June 16,2006, the court ordered the respondent to pay
$1050.73 in medical insurance premiums owed as of May 5,2006.3 See June 16,2006 Order at f
1. In addition, on August 28, 2006, the court ordered the respondent to pay health insurance

3

The respondent objected to the commissioner's ruling, but the objection was overruled
by Judge Taylor.
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premiums for June and July 2006, which totaled $509.00.4 See August 28, 2006 Order at T[ 2.
See also Trial Exhibit 5.
At trial, the petitioner testified that respondent owed her an additional $1,017.84 in
health insurance premiums for August through November 2006. Petitioner requested that the
court enter a judgment against respondent for this amount. The respondent failed to provide any
evidence that he had been paying insurance premiums to the petitioner.
Further, the petitioner requested that the respondent be found in contempt for his
failure to pay any medical insurance premiums since insurance was cancelled for the petitioner
and the children. Again, the respondent failed to provide any evidence that he had been paying
insurance premiums during this time period.
Accordingly, a judgment will enter against the respondent for $1,017.84 for unpaid
health insurance premiums. In addition, the court finds the respondent in contempt for failing to
pay insurance premiums after the petitioner's and the children's insurance was cancelled.
Further, these judgments and any fees incurred in obtaining these judgments will be characterized
as family support and/or maintenance, because health insurance premiums are necessary to keep
the children in good health. Moreover, the petitioner is award her attorneys' fees and costs
incurred in obtaining these judgments.
C. Future Health Insurance
The petitioner testified that she would like to be the primary insurer for the children
because of the difficulties she has faced in obtaining insurance coverage information from the
4

The court can find no objection in the file to this ruling.
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respondent. The petitioner also requested that the respondent be required to pay one-half of the
children's health insurance premiums under her plan. The court finds that these are reasonable
requests, as the respondent has failed in the past to insure the children and to notify the petitioner
when coverage ceased. It will be more beneficial to the children for the petitioner to be in charge
of the insurance coverage and their health care. The court orders that the petitioner's insurance
will be the primary coverage for the children and that the respondent will pay one-half of the
cost.
If the respondent can obtain a secondary health insurance, which would, in effect, cover
all health costs for the children which are not covered by the petitioner's insurance, the petitioner
will pay for one-half of the cost of such insurance. Otherwise, the parties will simply pay onehalf each of all uncovered health care costs for the children.
VI. CAR INSURANCE
A. Respondent's Failure to Maintain Car Insurance
In May 2002, the respondent was ordered to maintain car insurance on all of the
parties' vehicles. See May 2002 Order at f 5. The respondent testified that he was not aware of
any changes to this Order. However, the petitioner testified that beginning in February 2005 the
respondent failed to make full car insurance premium payments. Thus, on June 16, 2006, the
Court ordered the respondent to pay $1,063.11 in car insurance premiums owed as of May 5,
2006. See June 16, 2006 Order at K 1.
From the time of this judgment until the time of trial, the respondent failed to pay
$85.63 in car insurance premiums. The respondent failed to provide any evidence to demonstrate
22
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that the Order to maintain car insurance had changed or that he had, indeed, made all the
necessary payments. In addition, the court finds no reason to modify the previous order.
Accordingly, the petitioner is granted a judgment against the respondent in the amount
of $85.63 for car insurance premiums. The court also finds that car insurance premiums are
necessary for the support and/or maintenance of the family to allow them to get around and live
their lives. Further, pursuant to the petitioner's request, the court finds the respondent in
contempt for failing to obey this court order regarding car insurance. The court awards the
petitioner her attorneys' fees and costs incurred in obtaining this judgment.
B. Future Car Insurance
The petitioners requests that the court order the respondent to pay for one-half of any
future car insurance premiums for the children. The court agrees with the respondent that driving
is a privilege and that such support is not mandatory for minors. This request is denied.
VII. MEDICAL EXPENSES
A. Respondent's Failure to Pay Medical Expenses
In May 2002, each party was ordered to pay one-half of all unreimbursed medical and
dental expenses, commencing October 23, 2001. See May 2002 Order at f 4. The respondent
testified that to his knowledge this Order has not been changed. In September 2004, the
petitioner was awarded judgment against the respondent in the amount of $231.00 for his share
of medical costs. See September 2004 Order at % 4. In addition, on June 16,2006, the court
ordered the respondent to pay $1,589.60 for his share of medical expenses as of May 5, 2006.
See June 16, 2006 Order at T[ 1. The court found the petitioner made a prima facie case for the
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respondent's contempt in failing to pay medical expenses for 2003 through 2005. See May 2006
Order at f 5.
Also, the petitioner testified that currently the respondent owes her $82.50 for one-half
of unreimbursed medical expenses from May 2006 to the time of trial. The respondent failed to
provide any evidence that he did not owe this amount or that he had paid this amount. Petitioner
requested the Court to find the respondent in contempt for failing to pay medical expenses in
2006.
Accordingly, a judgment shall enter against the respondent in the amount of $82.50 for
unreimbursed medical expenses and the court finds him in contempt for failing to pay such.
Further, all judgments awarded to the petitioner in this case regarding unreimbursed medical
expenses, including attorneys' fees and costs incurred in obtaining these judgments, shall be
classified as family support and/or maintenance because such expenses are necessary for the
children's health. Moreover, the petitioner is awarded her attorneys' fees and costs incurred in
obtaining these judgments. Also, since the September 2004 order entered before the respondent
filed for bankruptcy, the $231.00 shall be classified as a pre-bankruptcy petition claim. In
addition, $1,197.18 of the June 2006 judgment shall be classified as a pre-bankruptcy petition
claim.
B. Future Medical Expenses
If the respondent obtains secondary insurance, which would in effect, cover all health
costs for the children which are not covered by the petitioner's insurance, the petitioner will pay
for one-half of the cost of such insurance. Otherwise, each party shall be responsible for one-half
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of all future unreimbursed medical and dental expenses reasonably incurred by the minor
children, including co-pays, deductibles and prescriptions, which are not paid by a medical
insurance carrier.
If the respondent does obtain secondary insurance, the respondent must pay his share of
the bills within 30 days after the secondary insurance rejects any costs. If the respondent chooses
not to obtain secondary insurance, then the parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide
written verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30
days of payment. Within 30 days of receiving written verification of medical expense, the parent
receiving verification shall pay one-half of the medical expense.
VIII. PERSONAL PROPERTY
On May 7, 2002, the court temporarily awarded the respondent the Subaru, GMC truck
and LaSalle trailer. See May 2002 Order at f 10. The respondent testified that he understood
this court order and that he was not aware of any changes to this order. Nonetheless, the
respondent admitted that he sold the GMC truck and LaSalle trailer in violation of this Court
order. The respondent sold the GMC truck for approximately $3,500.00 and the LaSalle trailer
for approximately $ 1,500.00.
The court awards the petitioner a $2,500.00 judgment against the respondent in the
amount of one-half of the proceeds from the sale of the truck and trailer. Further, the petitioner
had already established a prima facie case of the respondent's contempt for disposing of marital
assets. Respondent failed to provide any evidence that the May 2602 order had been modified or
should have been modified. Thus, this court finds the respondent in contempt for selling these
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items of marital personal property. Moreover, the petitioner is awarded her attorneys' fees and
costs incurred in obtaining this judgment.
B. Exercise Equipment and Entertainment Center
In May 2002 the court temporarily awarded the respondent some exercise equipment
and an entertainment center that were marital property. During the petitioner's testimony
regarding these items, the court received the impression that these items were of great value,
although the petitioner offered no evidence as to their value. Much to the court's surprise, the
only evidence as to value camefromthe respondent, who testified that he purchased the used
exercise equipment at an auction through Alpine School District at $20.00 per item for a total of
$180.00. It would have been worth even less than that at the time the parties separated. His
testimony was that the entertainment center was worth $75.00.
The court is stunned at the time, effort, and attorney's fees that the petitioner expended
in arguing this issue. These items were not worth an hour's time in attorney's fees. The court
does not find the defendant in contempt for leaving the exercise equipment in Montana or giving
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the cheap entertainment center to his new wife. The court will not award attorney's fees for this
issue.
D. Remaining Marital Personal Property
At the beginning of this trial, the Bankruptcy Court retained jurisdiction over the
parties' personal property. However, on the third day of trial, December 19, 2006, the trustee in
the respondent's bankruptcy case abandoned all of the personal property. See Trial Exhibit 27.
Thus, this court obtained jurisdiction over the remaining marital personal property.
Despite petitioner's testimony that the respondent has had multiple opportunities to go
through the home and take whatever property he wanted, the court finds that, given the incredible
acrimony between these parties and the existence of a protective order which prevents the
respondent from going near the marital home, the respondent was wise in waiting for trial to
request the return of just a few items.
Therefore, the court orders the petitioner to return the following items to the
respondent: a punching bag, a DeWalt compound miter saw, a DeWalt router, a Milwaukee
Sawzall, an electric planer, a 24-foot ladder, and the sewing machines which were gifts from his
grandmother. The attorneys for the parties can aid in transferring these items from one party to
the other.
IX, CHILD CARE EXPENSES
A. Respondent's Failure to Pay Child-Care Expenses
In May 2002, each party was ordered to pay one-half of &ny work-related daycare
expenses for the children. See May 2002 Order at *§ 14. In September 2004, the petitioner was
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awarded judgment against the respondent for his one-half share of daycare expenses, including
$4,560.00 for the year 2003 and $3,030.00 for January 1, 2004 through August 31, 2004. See
September 2004 Order at ff 5-6. In addition, on August 28, 2006, the court ordered the
respondent to pay $1,000.00 in child-care costs for the months of June and July 2006. See
August 28, 2006 Order at K 2. Of course, these judgments still stand, minus the garnishments of
$8,425.39 already taken by the petitioner.
In September 2004 the respondent was ordered to pay $340.00 per month during the
school year and $500.00 per month during the summer months, for a total amount of $4,560.00
per year.5 Commencing with September 2004 and ending November 22, 2006 (the first day of
trial), the respondent owed $1,360.00 for 2004; $4,560.00 for 2005; and $4,136.00 for 2006 for a
total owing of $10,056.00. Judgment has already been given to the petitioner for June and July
2006 for $1,000.00, leaving a total of $9,056.00 for the court's calculations.
According to Exhibit 16, from October 2004 through November 22, 2006 the
respondent paid $7,280.00 (as well as other arrearages through garnishments).
B. Judgment and Contempt
The court grants judgment to the petitioner for the amount of $1,776.00 in unpaid
child-care expenses, pursuant to the September 2004 order of $340.00 and $500.00, for the
months and years listed above. The court finds the respondent in contempt for his failure to pay
the $1,776.00 pursuant to the September 2004 order and awards petitioner her reasonable
attorney's fees for this issue.
5

At that time both parties reserved the right to argue as to the reasonableness of that order.

This judgment6 for child-care expenses and attorneys fees incurred in obtaining
judgments for child-care expenses shall be classified as family support and/or maintenance,
because it directly relates to taking care of the children. Also, pursuant to the petitioner's
testimony and Exhibit 16, $978.00 of this judgment shall be classified as a pre-bankruptcy
petition judgment-the total due from September through December 2004 of $1,360.00, plus
January through October 14,2005 of $3,710.00, minus the amount the respondent paid during
this time period ($1,020, plus $3,072 for a total of $4,092.00.7
C. Petitioner's Request for Increased Child-Care Expenses, Past and Future
The court has looked at the petitioner's testimony and Exhibit 16 very carefully and
makes the following observations:
1. During 2003 the petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,116.67, with
the respondent's share amounting to $558.33.
2. During 2004 the petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,601.83, with

6

In the petitioner's suggested memorandum decision, her calculations included her figures
for the larger amount she seeks for child-care expenses, as well as the past judgments and past
garnishments. The court will not attempt to run those calculations at this time, as those
judgments and garnishments were not truly before the court at trial. However, for purposes of
the bankruptcy action, the court will find that all judgments awarded to the petitioner for amounts
incurred before October 14, 2005 should be considered pre-bankruptcy in nature and should also
be classified as family support and/or maintenance.
7

Exhibit 16 failed to provide monthly amounts paid by the respondent, so the court has
assumed some logical facts in order to bring finality to this issue. The court has arrived at the
September through December 2004 credits for the respondent by noting that the $1,020 paid in
2004 is exactly 3 months at $340.00. Apparently, the respondent finally made some payments
after Commissioner Patton lowered the amounts. As for 2005, the court simply took the annual
total of $4,560.00, divided it by 12, and multiplied that result by 9.5 months.
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the respondent's share amounting to $800.92.
3. During 2005 the petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,503.91, with
the respondent's share amounting to $751.95.
4. During 2006 petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,246.60, with the
respondent's share amounting to $623.30.
5. The petitioner urges the court to award her an ongoing child-care amount of $400
per week ($20,000 per year/$ 1,666.67 per month/$833.34 respondent's share)8 for "nanny" care,
which she deems necessary, because she travels approximately once per month for 3-5 business
days.
6. The petitioner now works at a job which brings her approximately $80,000.00
annual salary, which is more than the respondent now makes.
The parties' minor children are now 16, 13, 12, 9 and 7 years of age; the two older
children are 19 and 24 years of age.9 The petitioner's argument is that, because of her occasional
travel for work, the respondent should help her pay for full-time nanny care. The court finds this
unreasonable. All of the children are in school full-time, so there is no need for full-time care
during the school year, and only two of the children are still in elementary school. The older
children certainly can be expected to help with the younger children; indeed, the oldest boy does
not have football practice after school year-round. The infrequency of the petitioner's workrelated travel does not justify the request that the respondent pay $833.34 per month for his share

8

The court calculated this with a 50-week work year.

9

As of the time of this decision-not the time of trial.
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of the child-care expenses. Although the petitioner is correct in asserting that the respondent
offered no other reasonable suggested costs for child-care expenses, neither did the petitioner.
Therefore, the court finds that the amounts previously ordered are within the realm of
reason and also within this court's experience on the bench. The court will order the respondent
to pay ongoing child-care expenses of $340.00 per month during the nine months of the school
year and $500.00 per month during the three months of the summer vacation, for a total of
$4,560.00 per year. With the petitioner paying equal amounts, this should be quite adequate for
the children's needs.
X. ALIMONY
A. Respondent's Failure to Pay Two Months' Alimony
The respondent was ordered to pay $230 per month in alimony, beginning April 1,
2002. See May 2002 Order at % 3. At a hearing on May 15, 2006 the parties stipulated that the
petitioner made a prima facie case on her order to show cause regarding alimony payments for
March and April 2006. See Order and Stipulation signed July 28, 2006 at *([ 5.
At a hearing on June 15, 2006, the respondent failed to present any evidence that he
paid these amounts or that he was justified in failing to pay these amounts. Thus, the court
makes a finding that the respondent was in contempt for failing to pay two months of alimony
payments. On June 15, 2006, the court ordered the respondent to pay $460.00 in alimony
arrearages incurred as of April 13,2006. See Order signed July 28. 2006 at f 1. The court
awards the petitioner her attorneys' fees and costs incurred in obtaining these judgments.
As of the time of trial, the respondent was current on his alimony obligations.
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The court file is replete with the respondent's early efforts to reduce the temporary
alimony obligation of $230.00 per month. He filed 3 verified motions to have his support orders
reduced or adjusted. These motions were finally heard at a hearing on June 24, 2004, at which
Commissioner Patton took care of some issues, including child support, but reserved all other
matters for trial, including alimony. Therefore, the court finds that the respondent did properly
preserve his right to argue for retroactive adjustment (and possible credit) of alimony as of
August 6,2003, which is when the second motion (which mentioned alimony specifically) was
filed with the court. Petitioner reserved the same right in May 2002. The court will make any
adjustments for retroactivity after determining the correct income to be attributed to the parties.
B. Past and Future Alimony
The petitioner requests that the respondent be ordered to pay future alimony, while the
respondent requests that his alimony obligations cease. He has withdrawn his request for
alimony from the petitioner. In determining whether to award alimony, the court considers:
(I) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support...
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
U.C.A. § 30-3-5(8).
1. The Financial Condition and Needs of Petitioner
The petitioner spends approximately $1,194.76 per month on her mortgage payments,
$84.75 on maintaining the residence, $461.84 on food and household supplies, $104.15 on
utilities, $207.93 on clothing, $98.06 on medical and dental, $1,200.96 on child care, $314.20 on
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education, $107.28 on entertainment, $45.05 on grooming, $136.51 on gifts, $710.60 on
donations, $377.15 on auto expenses, $1,900.00 on installment payments and $87.74 on
computer expenses. See also Trial Exhibit 9.
Petitioner also testified that her current net monthly gross income is $6,669.08. The
court notes, with some surprise, that the petitioner declares no exemptions and, thereby, increases
the amount of taxes taken from her gross income. Therefore, her nk income is an artificially low
$4,121.30. Id- She also voluntarily donates $710.60 per month to the LDS Church. Therefore,
without the inclusion of the church donation, the alimony and child support she is currently
receiving, minus deductions and expenses as outlined above, the petitioner is deficient
approximately $2,548.75 per month. Id.
2. The Recipient's Earning Capacity or Ability to Produce Income
The petitioner is currently working full-time and makes approximately $6,669 gross per
month in income. Id. The respondent did not provide any evidence that the petitioner is working
below her earning capacity or that she is able to produce more income. Thus, the court finds that
the petitioner is able to earn $6,669 gross per month. At the time of the parties' separation, they
were living only on the respondent's income. She began her new job in November 2003.
3. The Ability of Respondent to Provide Support
Respondent worked at Novell from August 1998 through approximately June 2001.
From January 2001 through about June 15,2001 he grossed $47,879.77. See Trial Exhibit 18.
Thus, in construing this amount in a light most favorable to the respondent, he grossed
approximately $7,979 per month ($47,879 for 6 months) while working at Novell.
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The court finds credible the respondent's testimony that he voluntarily left this
employment at Novell for a lower paying job, because he was afraid he would be laid off before
finding another job.10 The court is persuaded by the respondent's argument that the computer
industry is volatile with regard to steady employment and that it was reasonable for the
respondent to protect his family and his income by finding a new job before being laid off. In
addition, this change of employment occurred before the parties' separation and the filing of this
divorce.11 This court refuses to delve into decisions made by the parties before the time of the
separation, as it is not the duty of this court to revise decisions made by the parties before this
court had jurisdiction. Thus, the court makes no finding as to respondent's income at Novell and
will not include the income at Novell in its calculations and decision regarding imputation of
income.
After leaving Novell, the respondent secured employment with the Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop ("LDS Church"). He worked for the LDS Church from approximately June
2001 through October 2003. When he stopped working for the LDS church, he was earning
approximately $2,574.00 gross per two-week pay period, or $5,577.00 gross per month
($66,924.00 per year). See Trial Exhibit 21.
While employed with the LDS church, the respondent was recruited by Brigham Young
University ("BYU"). He worked for BYU from October 2003 through February 17, 2006.

I0

The many reductions in the employee force at Novell through the last decade have been
front-page news in this community.
u

The petitioner's testimony was that she opposed his change of employment, while the
respondent testified that it was a mutual decision.
34

Before the respondent was terminated from his position at BYU, he grossed approximately
$5,996.00 gross per month ($71,952.00 per year). See Trial Exhibit 23 at p.5. The respondent
voluntarily resigned from BYU, because he failed to maintain an LDS temple recommend as
required for employment.12 He lost his temple recommend because he was excommunicated.
The respondent began his current employment with Medicity in May 2006, where he
earns $5,000.00 gross per month ($60,000.00 per year).
The petitioner urges the Court to make a finding that the respondent has the ability to
earn his previous BYU income ($5,996 per month) since he volimtanly acted in such a way as to
cause him to lose his employment. In contrast, the respondent requests that the court use his
current income of $5,000 per month in determining alimony, if any.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a), if the respondent is voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed, income may be imputed to him. "Income may not be imputed to
a parent unless the parent... is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed." U.C.A. § 78.457.5(7)(a).

Utah case law suggests that a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed if,

at least, some evidence suggests that the parent's current, diminished income level resulted from
12

At the August 24, 2006 hearing before Judge Taylor, the court ordered that the
petitioner could depose the respondent regarding the "temple recommend issue." See Order,
signed November 13, 2006. The petitioner claims that, due to the respondent's subsequent
discovery delays, the petitioner was not able to depose the respondent on this matter.
The petitioner cites a November 2006 Order on Motion for Default Judgment, stating that
it "provides that if 'Petitioner is unable to present the necessary evidence based on Respondent's
failure to provide necessary evidence through discovery, Respondent will be precluded from
defending on such issues.'" The court can not find such order in the file, nor does the court recall
the petitioner asserting this theory in trial. In addition, testimony was taken from the respondent
in which he explained that he voluntarily resigned, rather than allowing himself to be fired by
BYU.
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"his personal preference or voluntary decisions," instead of from "events beyond his control."
Hall v. Hall9 858 P.2d 1018,1025 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
The court has already indicated that it will not consider the pre-separation income from
Novell; therefore, the court will consider the incomes earned by the respondent at the LDS
Church, BYU, and Medicity. Again, those monthly incomes are: (1) $5,577.00 gross per month
($66,924.00 per year) at the LDS Church; (2) $5,996.00 gross per month ($71,952.00 per year) at
BYU; (3) $5,000.00 gross per month ($60,000.00 per year) at Medicity.
The highest income of the three is the BYU income at $5,996.00 gross per month. This
is income which the respondent lost, because of activities which resulted in his excommunication
from the LDS Church and his subsequent inability to hold a temple recommend. Unlike his
voluntary departure from Novell for a lower-paying job in lieu of a possible layoff, his voluntary
resignation from BYU was the result of his own actions. Therefore, the court finds that the
respondent could, most likely, still be earning this income today, had he not voluntarily failed to
satisfy the requirements for continued employment at BYU. Thus, the court finds that the
respondent is voluntarily underemployed pursuant to U.C.A. § 78.45-7.5(7)(a).
Accordingly, the court finds that respondent has the ability to earn $5,996.00 gross per
month ($71,952.00 per year).
The respondent married Brenda Louise Bruni in October 2005. As pairt of a pre-nuptial
agreement signed by the respondent and Ms. Bruni, he pays her monthly house payment of
$752.00. See Trial Exhibit 30 and 35. He also pays her $1,500.00 per month to help with living
expenses.
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Ms. Brum's daughter, Sarah, has always lived with them. Ms. Bruni no longer receives
any child support for Sarah, but Sarah pays her mother $360.00 per month (and sometimes less)
to help with expenses. Ms. Bruni does not consider this regular income, as Sarah does not
always have the money to pay. Ms. Brum's older daughter and infant child also lived with them
from February through April 2006, as did Ms. Brum's mother from January or February 2006.
Her mother has helped her financially at times, but it is not income that can be depended upon.
Her mother has terminal cancer.
"In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not be
considered, except... [t]he court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share
living expenses . . . . " U.C.A. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(iii)(A). This court does not find that Ms. Brum's
medical history, recent work history, and spotty income from her daughter justify great reliance
upon Ms. Brum's income for determining the appropriateness of alimony. The occasional gifts
of money from Ms. Bruni's mother cannot be considered income for purposes of this
determination.

It is clear to this court that the respondent wouldfyaveto pay at least $752.00

per month to rent a decent place to live for himself, were he not remarried and living in Ms.
Brum's home. The payment of $1,500 per month by the respondent to Ms. Bruni to help defray
living expenses is certainly not unreasonable, given today's economy and the monthly expenses
claimed by both the petitioner and the respondent. The money she brought from Oregon after her
divorce is now gone, so she no longer has any reserve cash to supplement her income.
The court finds that, pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(iii)(A), there is no steady
income from Ms. Bruni that the court can include in its calculations. Ms. Bruni is not capable of
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sharing the living expenses with the respondent, other than the $360.00 from her daughter, which
only covers Sarah's expenses in the home (food, utilities, etc.).
4. Length of Marriage
The parties were married on November 22,1986 and divorced on September 12,2005.
Thus, the parties were married two months short of 19 years.
5. Whether Petitioner has Custody of the Minor Children
As set forth above, the petitioner has full physical and legal custody of five minor
children that require support. The respondent will be ordered to pay child support based upon his
imputed income of $5,996.00.
6. The Fault of the Parties
Although the petitioner only alleged "irreconcilable differences" her divorce petition,
she testified that the divorce was caused by the respondent, because he sexually abused the
children. She never amended the petition, and neither party testified as to when the sexual abuse
of the children occurred.
The petitioner also testified that in January 2001 she placed the CINTAS stock into a
joint account, due to pressure from the respondent during marriage counseling sessions, which
had begun in December 2000. Neither party offered an explanation for their participation in
marriage counseling at that time, which was many months prior to the parties' final separation in
October 2001.
Therefore, the court finds that it does not have enough clear testimony to place all of
the blame on the respondent for this divorce, despite the unopposed testimony regarding the
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sexual abuse of the children. Thus, this court makes no finding that the respondent alone caused
the marriage to terminate.
7. Analysis under U.C.A. § 30-3-5(8)
The petitioner requests that the court order the respondent to pay future alimony in the
amount of $3,259 per month for 19 years. The respondent withdrew his request for future
alimony, but requested a credit for the alimony he has paid since the petitioner became employed
in the spring of 2003.
While this is a marriage of almost 19 years' duration, the court can see no reason to
award the petitioner alimony for another 19 years, especially when she is making more money
than the respondent makes-even using the court-imputed income of $5,996.00 per month for the
respondent. Their incomes differ by $673.00 per month and $8,076.00 per year-with the
advantage going to the petitioner. In addition, the parties had chosen to have the petitioner stay
at home to raise the children and were living on only one income When they separated in October
2001. She did not return to full-time work until the spring of 2003 and later that year obtained
her current employment with an income now of $80,000.00 per year. Together they are bringing
in $151,952.00 per year (his imputed income of $71,952.00, plus her income of $80,000.00),
compared to the $66,924.00 per year the respondent was making at the LDS Church when they
separated in October 2001. Their collective income has more thari doubled since their
separation.
In addition, since the petitioner has the physical custody of the children, she will also
be receiving $4,560.00 per year from the respondent for child-care expenses, along with child
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support of $16,728.00 per year ($1,394.00 per month). This is a total of $21,288.00, above and
beyond her annual salary of $80,000.00.
Were this court to award the petitioner the monthly alimony of $3,259.00 she seeks,
plus the monthly average child-care cost of $380.00 awarded to her by the court (for a total of
$3,639.00), the respondent, according to his financial declaration, would have $73.46 left of his
net income to pay child support and the rest of his monthly expenses. See Exhibit 35. B This
would be an unconscionable award to the petitioner.
So, does the petitioner deserve any alimony at all? This court finds that she did-during
the time after the filing of this action before she obtained her new well-paying job. The parties'
agreement in May 2002 was $230 per month, which the parties, obviously, thought was
appropriate at the time. The court also finds that $230 per month was appropriate until the
petitioner began her new job in November 2003. Therefore, the court awards the respondent a
credit against other amounts due under this Memorandum Decision (or other judgments already
awarded) from November 2003 through the time of trial, November 2006, inclusive. That
would be calculated at $230.00 x 37 months, for a total of $8,510.00. Therefore, the respondent
will receive a credit of $8,510.00 for alimony already paid.
Because the parties' income and living circumstances are comparatively even and their
collective income has more than doubled since the time of their separation in October 2001, the
13

The court has imputed income $996.00 above what the respondent used in his financial
declaration, so the court is not able to correctly estimate what his net income would be. He lost
29% of his real income through deductions; if the court used that same 29% and subtracted it
from his imputed monthly income, that would leave him $4,257.16 of his imputed income, for an
increase of $691.62 net. This is still not enough for him to live on and pay child support.
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court denies the petitioner her request for future alimony and makes no order regarding future
alimony.
XI.

CHILD SUPPORT
A. Respondent's Contempt for Unilaterally Changing Child Support
In May 2002, the respondent was ordered to pay $1,797.00 per month in child support

beginning April 1,2002. See May 2002 Order at f 3. This amount was agreed upon by the
parties, stipulated to in court, and based upon their incomes at the time.
At a hearing on June 24, 2004, the court ordered that the respondent's child support
obligation would be reduced to $1,169.00 per month for six children based upon the parties'
current incomes. See Order signed August 5, 2004 at f 4. This order was based upon
petitioner's income of $6,250.00 per month gross ($75,000.00 per year) and respondent's income
of $5,750.00 per month ($69,000.00 per year). The new amount was effective July 1, 2004.
No evidence was presented to the court that this order was ever modified, nor can the
court find any orders of modification in the file.
From November 2005 through February 2006, the respondent paid child support of
only $1,090. See also Trial Exhibit 10. From March 2006 through May 2006 he only paid $45
per month. Id. Finally, the respondent only paid $840 per month in child support from June
2006 through August 2006. Id.
At a hearing on May 15, 2006, the parties stipulated that the petitioner had established
a prima facie case regarding the respondent's contempt for underpaying his monthly child
support obligations without leave of the Court. See Order signed July 28, 2006 at % 5. The
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respondent reserved his right to dispute the contempt issue. At trial the respondent admitted that
he was aware of the court orders regarding child support, and he failed to provide any evidence
that the June 2004 order ever changed. Accordingly, the court holds the respondent in contempt
for underpaying his child support payments without leave of the court.
B. Respondent's Failure to Pay Child Support
Respondent's child support obligation of $1,169.00 per month was originally
calculated for six minor children based on Petitioner's gross income of $6,250 per month and
Respondent's gross income of $5,750 per month. See Order signed August 5, 2004 at f 4.
Although it is undisputed that one of the minor children turned 18 in October 2005, such does
not automatically entitle the respondent to unilaterally reduce his child support obligations
without a court order. Not only did the number of minor children change, but the parties' gross
monthly incomes were also different at that time. If the court allowed a party to unilaterally
make changes to court-ordered obligations every time he or she determined a change in
circumstance had occurred, it would nullify the authority of the court and render petitions to
modify meaningless. Thus, the respondent did not have authority to unilaterally change (and
underpay) his child support obligations.
As a result, on June 16, 2006, the court awarded the petitioner a judgment of $2,248.00
in child support arrearages as of April 13,2006. See Order signed July 28, 2006 at K 1. In
addition, on August 28,2006, the court awarded the petitioner a judgment of $2,103.00 in child
support arrearages. See Order signed November 21, 2006 at <| 2.
Further, pursuant to the petitioner's testimony at trial, the court awards the petitioner a
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judgment against the respondent for $489.68 in additional child support arrearages.
The court also finds that these judgments (and attorney's fees spent in obtaining these
judgments) are classified as family support and/or maintenance, because child support is
necessary to provide the children with a living. Moreover, the petitioner is awarded her
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in obtaining these judgments against the respondent regarding
child support and as a sanction for the respondent's contempt.
The respondent requested a credit for child support he paid while the petitioner was
working from the spring of 2003 until it was actually reduced in July 2004. He also requested to
have child support recalculated from October 2005 to the present. However, the respondent
failed to present any evidence regarding the petitioner's varying incomes during these time
periods.
Therefore, the court has no evidentiary basis for determining what credit, if any, to
which the respondent would be entitled. Rather than recalculating years of child support and
attempting to determine both parties' income over the course of those months and years, the
court in its discretion will simply determine child support from the time of trial going forward.
Accordingly, the respondent is not entitled to a credit for child support paid from the spring of
2003 through July 2004, nor is he entitled to a recalculation of child support from October 2005
to the present.14
C. Child Support from October 2001 through April 2002

14

Indeed, given the income imputed to the respondent, he might be less than satisfied with
the result, were the court to recalculate all child support since the inception of this divorce action.
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Petitioner testified that before the parties separated, the respondent used to deposit his
paycheck into the bill-paying account to cover family expenses. JSee Trial Exhibit 12. However,
from the time the parties separated in October 2001 until the respondent was ordered to pay child
support as of April 1, 2002, the respondent failed to provide any support to the family. Id The
petitioner testified that she was forced to solely provide for all of the children and family living
expenses from her own funds during this time period even though she was not working. She now
asks for back support for that six-month period.
As far as the court can determine, this matter has never been brought before the court
and has not been reserved by the petitioner. The court will not go back to the parties' separation
to award back child support.
D. Future Child Support
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a) allows this court to impute income to the respondent
for purposes of child support if he is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. Using the same
analysis as it did in the above section on alimony, the court finds that the respondent is
voluntarily underemployed pursuant to U.C.A. § 78.45-7.5(7)(a) and income shall be imputed to
him at $5,996.00 gross per month ($71,952.00 per year) for purposes of calculating child support.
Petitioner's income for purposes of child support shall be $6,669 gross per month ($80,000.00
per year). See Trial Exhibit 9. Child support shall be calculated for five minor children.
Since the time of trial, the Utah State Legislature has modified the child support
income tables, effective April 30,2007, for modified and future child support. Rather than
estimating the base child support amount under the prior statute, the court has used the new
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statutory amount established for combined incomes of $12,665.00 per month as a guideline.
Using the above-listed incomes, the court has determined that (1) the combined income of the
parties is $12,665.00 per month; (2) the base child support for their income is $2,967.00; (3) the
petitioner makes 53% of the combined income, while the respondent makes 47% of the
combined income; (4) the parties' respective shares of the child support obligation are: petitioner,
$1,573.00 and respondent, $1,394.00.
The court orders the respondent to pay $1,394.00 for the support of the five minor
children as of the first date of trial, November 22, 2006.
XII.

STOCKS
A. Novell Stock
On May 7, 2002, the court awarded the petitioner the Novell stock as her sole and

separate property, pursuant to a stipulation of the parties. See May 2002 Order at f 9. The
petitioner testified that she sold this stock in December 2004 and used the $14,000.00 she
received for attorney's fees. The respondent testified that he is not making a claim for this stock,
but argues that the court "can consider this stock division in the other property divisions and do
equity in this case." As the respondent provided no support for the petitioner during the early
months of their separation, the court is not inclined to set off this stock and its value against any
other property of the marriage. Thus, the respondent shall not receive a credit for this amount.
B. CINTAS Stock
In 1997 the petitioner received a gift of CINTAS stock from her uncle; she placed the
CINTAS stock in a private and separate account. See Trial Exhibit 2 at January 2001 statement.
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The respondent accused her, during a session of marriage counseling, of not being a "team
player"--due to the separate CINTAS stock account. Because of that accusation, she felt coerced
to place the CINTAS stock into a joint account in January 2001. Id. at April 2001 statement. The
respondent's name did not appear on the account until April 2001; however, the respondent had
access to the account as early as January 2001.
In April 2001 the respondent borrowed against the CINTAS stock to purchase other
stock without the petitioner's permission. Id. Subsequently, on July 19,2001 the respondent
sold the CINTAS stock for $31,784.98. Id. at July 2001 Statement. However, the parties only
received approximately $18,000 in cash, since the remaining proceeds were used to pay off the
respondent's outstanding debt for the purchase of the other stocks. The petitioner has not
successfully demonstrated for the court that she did not receive any benefit from the remaining
monies, which were used to buy other stocks.
The court finds that the CINTAS stock was the petitioner's separate property and that it
retained its separate identity, despite being moved into a joint account. The respondent certainly
did not contribute to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of the stock or its value and
did not, thereby, acquire an equitable interest in it. Oliekan v. Oliekan, 147 P.3d 464, 469 (Utah
Ct. App. 2006), citing Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988). Therefore, the
petitioner is entitled to a judgment of $18,000.00 against the respondent.
The petitioner testified that she used the $18,000 in cash to support the family between
the time the parties separated in October 2001 until the May 2002 Order entered. See also Trial
Exhibit 11 and 12. Since this $18,000.00 was her sole and separate property and marital funds
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should have been used to support the family instead, the court now awards her a judgment for
$18,000.00 and, further, finds that this $18,000 is classified as family support and/or
maintenance, since the funds were spent to support the family. This $18,000.00 debt was
incurred before the filing of the bankruptcy petition judgment.
C. TwinLabs Stock
Refer to "Home Equity Line of Credit/Second Mortgage" category above.
XIII.

MARITAL DEBTS
A. Pre-separation Debt
After the parties separated, the petitioner transferred a joipt, marital MBNA credit card

debt of $2,400.00 into her name only; the respondent does not dispute that the MBNA debt is a
marital debt. The court awards judgment now against the respondent for $1,200.00, as his share
of his marital debt.
B. Debt During Separation
At approximately the same time the parties separated, the respondent took out a
$1,900.00 quick draw loan. The petitioner testified that she never saw this money, but that she
ultimately paid this loan back. The respondent failed to offer any evidence regarding this issue.
The court shall now awards the petitioner a judgment against the respondent for $1,900.00. This
debt was incurred before the filing of the bankruptcy petition judgment.
XIV.

TAX EXEMPTIONS
The respondent requested that the parties split the tax exemptions every year. The

court makes the following order: (1) The parties will split the tax exemptions each year; (2) If
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there is an odd number of children still receiving child support, the parties will alternate the extra
deduction every other year with the petitioner being granted the odd-child exemption on oddnumbered years and the respondent being granted the exemption on even-numbered years.
Therefore, for example, the petitioner will claim the odd-child exemption this year, 2007.
However, the respondent may not claim the children as tax exemptions unless he is
current on his obligations to the children, pursuant to the appropriate statutes which deal with
this issue.
XV.

CONTEMPT
A. Respondent's Contempt for Repeated Discovery Delays (i.e.,
Psychological Records, Financial Records, Changing Position Regarding
Custody) and Failures to Comply with Court Orders
Petitioner requested that the court find the respondent in contempt for his numerous

discovery delays and repeated failures to comply with court orders; she also requested a monetary
judgment against the respondent as a sanction. While the court holds both parties responsible for
their failures to respond adequately to discovery requests, the court will not find the respondent
in contempt for altering his goals in this litigation, i.e., supervised visitation, etc. The nature of
divorce litigation is that, after discovery, court hearings, and negotiations, parties change their
minds about what should be pursued during the litigation. Holding parties in contempt for
changes of strategy would stagnate divorce litigation and prevent settlement. In addition, the
court will not hold the parties in contempt for failure to provide discovery regarding discovery
which would have never been admitted, pursuant to state statutes, i.e., polygraph results. Finally,
the court will not hold the respondent in contempt for filing his bankruptcy petition, as the court
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has no persuasive evidence before it that the only reason for filing the petition was to delay the
divorce proceeding.
On November 8, 2006, the petitioner filed a Motion for Default Judgment and
memorandum in support ("Default Judgment Memorandum"), wherein she outlined a history of
the respondent's repeated discovery delays and failures to comply with court orders. See
November 8, 2006 Default Judgment Memorandum.
Beginning in July 2002, the petitioner served her first discovery request upon the
respondent. See August 2002 Certificate of Service. However, in his August 2002 responses,
the respondent failed to provide, among other things, a financial declaration (not produced until
May 2003), monthly statements from his bank accounts and credit card accounts and complete
information on his life insurance policy. See Respondent's Answers attached to Default
Judgment Memorandum as Exhibit A.
In September 2003, the petitioner served another discovery request upon the respondent
to produce all test results for IS AT, sexual or psychological examinations and any tests with Dr.
C.Y. Roby. See September 2003 Certificate of Delivery of Discovery. After five months the
respondent had failed to respond to this discovery request. See Pleadings. Thus, in March 2004,
the Guardian ad Litem filed a Motion to Compel for the same test results that the petitioner was
seeking. See March 2004 Motion to Compel.
By August 2004, the respondent still had not provided any further discovery. See
Pleadings. Thus, the petitioner filed a Motion to Compel production of the sexual test results and
financial information (i.e., a current financial statement, all bank and credit card information
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from September 2001 through June 2004 and a list of deposits and purchases). See August 19,
2004 Affidavit in Support of Motion to Compel. The respondent filed an opposition
memorandum claiming he had already provided the requested discovery or the documents were
not in his possession. See September 20,2004 Response to Petitioner's Motion to Compel.
The parties came before the court in September 2004 on the petitioner's Motion to
Compel. See September 21, 2004 docket entry. However, the day before the motion to compel
hearing, the respondent provided documents that were partially responsive to the petitioner's first
discovery request from more than two years ago. See Respondent's September 2004 Responses
attached to Default Judgment Memorandum as Exhibit F. Further, the respondent also failed to
produce the psychological and sexual test results as requested in September 2003. Id.
At the September 2004 motion to compel hearing, the court ordered the respondent to
comply with "all [of Petitioner's] requested documents within two weeks", including the
production of signed releases for "all psychosexual records as well as the other requested
discovery." See September 21,2004 Order at K 3. However, the respondent provided the
petitioner only one signed release for Dr. Roby. See Respondent's October 6, 2004 Second
Supplemental Response to Petitioner's Request for Production of Documents attached to Default
Judgment Memorandum as Exhibit H.
In October 2004, more than two weeks after the court's order, the petitioner filed a
notice with the court of the respondent's refusal to sign the remaining releases, including a
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release for ISAT.15 See October 12, 2004 Notice to Court of Willful Refusal. Immediately
thereafter, the respondent filed a notice with the court claiming he had allegedly complied with
the court's order, when in reality he had only signed one release and failed to produce any other
documents. See October 18, 2004 Notice to the Court of Respondent's Compliance.
In March 2005, the petitioner filed a motion on order to ^how cause regarding
discovery issues. See March 2005 Motion in Support of Order to Show Cause. She requested
that the respondent show cause why he should not be sent to jail for his failure to produce, among
other things, a current financial declaration, signed releases for various financial institutions, and
a list of deposits and purchases. Id. atffif3-7.
In April 2005, at the order to show cause hearing, the court again found that the
respondent "has not been forthcoming in his efforts to comply with multiple discovery requests.
However, to strike his pleadings would be a last resort by the Court." See April 18,2005 Order
at f 3. Also, the court again ordered the respondent to sign releases for all requested information
(i.e., financial, psychosexual, etc.). Id. at f 5. Further, the court "ordered Respondent to serve
five (5) days in the Utah County Jail as a direct result of his continued non-compliance with
discovery requests and contempt of court in this matter." Id. at f 8. However, the court stayed
the sentence because the county jail was near capacity "and only for that reason." Id. If the
respondent failed to sign the releases within two weeks of the hearing, he was to be "ordered to
serve these five (5) days in the Utah County Jail at the next hearing." Id.

Petitioner's Notice also indicated that she had not received a release for Dr. Roby. However, Petitioner
filed her Notice on October 8 and Respondent indicates he filed his release for Dr. Roby on October 6. Thus,
Petitioner had not yet received the release for Dr. Roby when she filed this notice.
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The following week, the respondent filed another notice of compliance with the court.
See April 28, 2005 Notice of Compliance. Further, the respondent testified at trial that in a
subsequent review hearing on May 16, 2005, he indicated to the court that all the releases had
been signed and discovery was complete. However, the respondent admitted at trial that he had
actually withdrawn his releases from Dr. Roby on May 9,2005, almost two weeks before the
review hearing at which the respondent indicated all releases had been signed. Although the
respondent claimed at trial that he withdrew his release after "everything had been gotten a hold
of by lawyers", the petitioner testified that she did not receive the documents until November
2005.
In early April 2006, the petitioner sent another discovery request, but the respondent
failed to timely respond. See April 11,2006 Certificate of Service of Discovery. In May 2006,
the parties came before the court for yet another hearing on discovery. See May 15,2006 Docket
Entry.
Also in mid-May 2006, at a pretrial conference, the court ordered the respondent to
respond to the petitioner's discovery requests and trial was rescheduled for August 2006.
Finally, at the end of June, the respondent responded to Petitioner's April 2006 discovery. See
Respondent's June 2006 Responses to Petitioner's Second Set of Interrogatories attached to
Default Judgment Memorandum as Exhibit S. However, his answers to the interrogatories were
incomplete and evasive. Id. For example, in response to Interrogatory No. 4, the respondent
failed to identify the amounts in each account or the account numbers. Id. Also, in response to
Interrogatory No. 5, the respondent did not identify a branch or account location for each
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account. Id. Most significant was the respondent's refusal to answer interrogatories 8-15
because they allegedly went beyond the amount of interrogatories allowed under the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. Id. In addition, the respondent failed to produce any documents. Id.
In mid-July 2006, the petitioner filed a motion to compel the respondent to produce the
remaining discovery. See July 13, 2006 Motion to Compel. Further, because the respondent had
not provided the requested discovery by the end of July 2006, the petitioner was forced to file a
motion to continue the trial. See July 28, 2006 Motion to Continue Trial Date.
At the phone conference, the court agreed to continue the trial again to November
2006. See July 31,2006 Docket Entry. Also, at a subsequent pretrial hearing on August 24,
2006, the court again ordered the respondent to produce specified documents by September 24,
2006. See August 24, 2006 Order. Further, at this hearing, Judge Taylor stated:
Now, if I authorize Mr. Weckel to withdraw, I will not, I will not change these
deadlines
So when you go to hire new counsel, if you go hire new counsel, you
must tell them, 'J have discovery deadlines in place... which will not be moved
unless somebody dies • . . . '
See August 24,2006 Audio Recording.
The parties scheduled the depositions of the respondent and his new wife for October
11. See October, 2, 2006 Notice of Deposition. However, these depositions never took place
due to the respondent's failure to timely produce discovery. On October 17, 2006 the parties had
another phone conference with the court. See October 17, 2006 Docket Entry. Once again the
court ordered the respondent to complete discovery. Id. The respondent's deposition was
rescheduled for November 6, 2006. See October 25, 2006 Notice of Deposition. However, the
respondent failed to timely produce the discovery as ordered by the court. See Pleadings and
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November 14, 2006 Order at Tf 5.
Finally, on November 7,2006 (two weeks before trial) the petitioner filed a Motion for
Default Judgment because she had not yet received discovery from the respondent as ordered by
the Court. See November 7, 2006 Motion for Default Judgment. This motion was ultimately
denied; however, the court found that, because of the respondent's long-term failure to respond
to discovery requests, a sanction of five (5) days in jail was appropriate. In her proposed
memorandum decision, the petition quotes an order which can not be found in the court file;
however, the court's minute entry reflects the order of jail. The respondent was given time to
purge that contempt by replying to the requested discovery. His request to continue the trial, due
to the late entry of his new attorney, was denied. The court finds that, through the efforts of his
new attorney, the respondent substantially complied with the discovery requests by the time of
trial.
Accordingly, the court makes a finding that the respondent has displayed a distinct
pattern of withholding, evading and avoiding discovery and that he has repeatedly failed to
comply with court orders. The petitioner requests a judgment against the respondent in the
amount of $10,000 as a sanction for his behavior. This court does not believe that a $10,000
sanction is appropriate in this matter. However, the court believes that the respondent's
intentional efforts to thwart discovery have increased the petitioner's attorney's fees substantially
and will, therefore, increase her award of attorney's fees accordingly.
B. Petitioner is Not in Contempt
Although not clearly requested, the court infers that the respondent sought to have the

court also find the petitioner in contempt for allegedly failing to comply with discovery. It is
undisputed that in early 2005, the petitioner did not produce documentation for two bank
accounts. The petitioner testified that she did not produce said documents because the
respondent had been using the information to interfere with her accounts. The court ordered on
March 7, 2005 that neither party could use the information received pursuant to discovery to
interfere with any accounts of the other party. See March 7, 2005 Order at f 1. The court also
ordered the petitioner to produce the requested documents within two weeks, but the court never
made a finding that the petitioner was in contempt. Id. at ^ 2.
Subsequently, the respondent testified this same issue arose on February 23, 2006.
However, this was merely a pretrial conference and no motions were pending regarding the
petitioner's discovery. The respondent also testified that this same issue arose in the August 24,
2006 hearing. Yet, the only motion pending for that hearing was Petitioner's Motion to Compel
Respondent to produce discovery. The respondent had not filed any motions claiming the
petitioner failed to comply with discovery; the judge simply ordered the petitioner sua sponte to
produce the same documents that the respondent was ordered to produce.
The court does note that there were delays in this case because the petitioner changed
attorneys-one change resulting in a delay of trial.
Accordingly, the court does not find the petitioner in contempt, but notes that her hands
are not completely clean.
C. Contempt for Individual Issues
Refer to the individual issues above for the court's finding of contempt as to each issue.

XVI.

ATTORNEYS' FEES
A. Fourth District Court Domestic Case
Both parties requested that they be awarded attorneys' fees for this domestic matter.

This court has authority to award attorneys' fees and costs "upon determining that the party
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defenses." U.C.A. § 30-3-3(2). Further, an award of
attorneys' fees must be based on the reasonableness of the fees requested, the financial need of
the receiving spouse and the ability of the other spouse to pay." Wells v. Wells. 871 P.2d 1036,
1040 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted).
Has the petitioner substantially prevailed upon her claims? The court looks at the
overall success of the petitioner on the important issues. The petitioner did successfully obtain
imputation of the respondent's salary, but not the higher level she sought. While she was
awarded somewhat less than she requested for child support, she was not at all successful in her
quest for a exorbitant amount of future alimony. She wasted incredible amounts of time, energy,
and attorney's fees on small issues, such as the gym equipment and the entertainment center. She
was successful in her request regarding the CINTAS stock, but not regarding the Twin Labs
stock. She was not awarded the $64,000 she wanted for making the house payments, but she was
awarded a substantial amount of the money she put into the repair and maintenance of the marital
home. She was also rewarded some reimbursement for the home equity line of credit. She was
not awarded the child-care expenses she sought. Overall, the petitioner was not successful in her
presentation of many of the major issues before this court.
The court must also evaluate the reasonableness of the fees, the financial needs of the
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petitioner, and the ability of the respondent to pay her fees. The court finds that the fees incurred
by the petitioner are not reasonable, but are truly beyond reason for a marital estate of this size.
The court is appalled at the effort that went into minor areas, such as the $180.00 in used gym
equipment and the used $75.00 entertainment center. Some of the petitioner's requests were
absurd, such as the amount requested for alimony and reimbursement for all of the house
payments. The respondent should not have to pay for attorney's fees incurred in pursuing such
unreasonable requests.
However, the court does consider reasonable an award of attorney's fees based upon
the respondent's pattern of obstructing the discovery process. The failure of the respondent to
timely and fully respond to the petitioner's discovery requests has certainly increased her
attorney's fees in this matter. See the discussion on contempt.
As for the financial needs of the petitioner, she makes more money than the respondent
and will be receiving monthly financial help from him. She is more than capable of paying her
own attorney's fees, as is the respondent capable of paying his own fees.
B. Previous Orders to Show Cause
An award of some of the petitioner's attorneys' fees could also be independently based
upon every order to show cause in which she substantially prevailed:
•

In the May 2002 Order, the petitioner was awarded custody, child support, health
insurance, car insurance, Novell stock, child care expenses. See May 7,2002 Order.

•

In the June 2004 Order, the petitioner was awarded reimbursement for reasonable child
care expenses. See June 24, 2004 Order. Also, the respondent's request to alter
alimony was denied because he had not completed psychosexual testing as previously
ordered by the Court. Id.
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•

In the September 2004 Order, the respondent was ordered to produce requested
documents within two weeks and to sign the necessary releases. See September 21,
2004 Order. The petitioner also received a judgment for unpaid child care expenses.
Id.

•

In the December 2004 Order, the respondent was ordered to sell the RV and his request
to stay garnishment proceedings was denied. See December 2,2004 Order.

•

In the August 28,2006 Order, the court entered a judgment against the respondent for
unpaid child support, medical insurance and child care expenses. See August 28, 2006
Order. Further, the court made a finding that "Petitioner's attorney substantially
prevailed on the issues before the court." Id. at f 5.

Since the issue of attorneys' fees was reserved for each of these matters, the court now finds that
the petitioner's general award of attorneys' fees is also based on the petitioner's success in each
of these individual orders to show cause.
Further, the court already awarded the petitioner attorneys' fees in the April 2005 and
June 2006 Orders. See April 18, 2005 Order at If 7 and June 15, 2006 Order at ] 4. Rather than
require an individual affidavit of attorneys' fees for each order to show cause, the court will
accept a final, all-inclusive affidavit of fees incurred by the petitioner throughout this litigation.
C. Conclusion as to Petitioner's Divorce Litigation Fees
The court finds that the petitioner was not substantially successful on the issues she
presented to the court, that the total bill for attorney's fees and costs of $83,349.61 was not
reasonable, and that she makes more money than the respondent and will be receiving financial
help from him on a monthly basis. On the other hand, the respondent's efforts to avoid or delay
discovery have cost the petitioner a great deal in attorney's fees and delays. Therefore, the court
finds it appropriate that the respondent should pay for 15% of the petitioner's attorney's fees, for
a total of $12,502.00. The court will allow the respondent to pay this amount, with the statutory
58
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interest, over the next 10 years at the rate of $1,250.24 per year, plus the appropriate interest.
C. Bankruptcy Attorneys' Fees
Petitioner requested that a judgment enter against the respondent in this matter for
attorneys' fees she has incurred in the Bankruptcy Court. In Condie v. Condie, 139 P.3d 271
(Utah Ct. App. 2006), the Court of Appeals explained that "as a general rule, attorney fees are
not awardable under federal bankruptcy law [in a bankruptcy action] for enforcement of
obligations contained in a divorce decree." Id. at 275. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the
trial court erred in ruling that the wife should have requested her fees in the Bankruptcy Court.
Instead, the Court of Appeals' holding implied that the former wife must seek an award in state
court for attorneys' fees incurred in a bankruptcy action. Id. at 276. See also In re Marriage of
Wright 841 P.2d 358 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
Further, the Court of Appeals explained that the state trial court had authority to award
bankruptcy attorneys' fees to the former wife pursuant to UTAH

CODE. ANN.

§ 30-3-3(2), which

provides that, "[i]n any action to enforce an order of... child support, alimony, or division of
property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon determining that
the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense."
In compliance with U.C.A. § 30-3-3(2), the petitioner testified that she filed an
adversarial proceeding against the respondent in the bankruptcy court in order to save the marital
home. Ms. Drake, the petitioner's bankruptcy attorney, also testified that the petitioner filed the
adversarial proceeding to protect the marital home and to prevent the respondent from
discharging his family debts to the petitioner (e.g., child support, alimony, etc.). Similar to
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Conche, Ms. Drake confirmed that the petitioner will not receive an award of her bankruptcy
attorneys' fees in the Bankruptcy Court.
Using the same analysis as above, this court finds that the petitioner was somewhat
substantially successful on the bankruptcy-related issues of child support, but not on alimony.
The issue of the marital home was not litigated before this court, while the issues of personal
property were-to some small extent.
Accordingly, this court awards the petitioner her attorneys' fees incurred in the
bankruptcy action at the same rate as in the divorce case proper-10%. See U.C.A. § 30-3-3(2).
See also Condie, 139 P.3d at 274-76. In addition, Ms. Drake submitted an affidavit of attorneys'
fees for the bankruptcy case in the amount of $26,401.00 as of December 12, 2006. See Trial
Exhibit 28. Ms. Drake testified about her experience in bankruptcy law and stated that her fees
were reasonable for someone with her experience in Salt Lake County. This court finds that the
bankruptcy attorneys' fees incurred by the petitioner are reasonable. The court orders the
respondent to pay the sum of $3,960.00 in attorney's fees for Ms. Drake's work in the bankruptcy
matter. The court will allow the respondent to pay this amount, with the statutory interest, over
the next 5 years at the rate $792.00per year, plus the appropriate interest.
D. Attorney's Fees for the Respondent
As the respondent has not requested that the petitioner pay his attorney's fees, the court
makes no corresponding order, nor does the court believe that such an order would be
appropriate.
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CONCLUSION
The court believes that it has ruled upon all of the matters presented by the parties. If
the court has madefindingsof fact in its discussions of the issues which were not presented in
the Findings of Fact section of the decision, the court incorporates thosefindingsinto the
Findings of Fact. The court orders the attorney for the respondent to prepare appropriate
findings, conclusions, and order for the court's signature.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that a true copy of the foregoing ruling was transmitted by email on 29 May 2007
to the following:
Douglas B. Thayer
HILL JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ
3319 N. University Ave.
Provo UT 84604
email: MichaelK@hjslaw.com
Scott P. Card
FILLMORE & SPENCER
3301 N. University Ave.
Provo, UT 84604
email: scard@fillmorespencerlaw.com
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

VALERIE J. CONNELL,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. 024400765

HAROLD G. CONNELL,

DATE: 29 May 2007
Defendants.

Judge Claudia Laycock
Division 3

This matter came before the Court for trial on November 22 and December 8, 19 and
20, 2006. Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Douglas B. Thayer and Nancee
Tegeder. Respondent was present and represented by counsel, Spott P. Card. Although there is
also a protective order case pending (Case No. 064401019) between the parties, it is a separate
matter and will not be addressed as part of this divorce case. The Court having heard evidence,
having reviewed the file and the pleadings herein, now hereby enters the following Findings of
Fact.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Valerie J. Connell ("the petitioner") and Harold G. Connell("the respondent") were
married in November 22, 1986.
2. At the time of the marriage, petitioner had one daughter, Heather Stacey Connell,
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bom August 23, 1982. Respondent adopted Heather in 1990.
3. The parties also had six biological children during the course of the marriage:
Meaghan Tovey Connell, born October 22, 1987; Spencer Ward Connell, born January 16, 1991;
Cameron Wenger Connell, bom October 17, 1993; Madison Evans Connell, bom August 19,
1995; Cassidy Ford Connell, bom December 23, 1997; and Caitlyn Phelps Connell, bom April 8,
2000.
4. In 2001 the parties separated several times from the beginning of May through the
summer. They separated on permanent basis in the beginning of Oct 2001.
5. The petitioner filed a petition for divorce on April 4, 2002.
6. Judge James R. Taylor signed an order bifurcating the proceedings and granting the
petitioner a divorce on September 12, 2005.
7. On October 14, 2005-during the pendency of this divorce action-the respondent
filed a bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah
("Bankruptcy Court") (case no. 05-39070).
8. Together the parties own a home at 865 East Cascade Drive, Orem, Utah. On
September 8, 2001, their monthly mortgage statement showed a balance owing of $163, 562.45,
while on September 8, 2001, the balance was $163,562.45. Shortly before the time of
trial-September 11, 2006-the balance was $151,982.91.
9. Since October 2001 the petitioner has made all of the monthly payments on the
home-a total of $64,700.00.
10. The parties purchased the home for $175,000.00 in 1995, at which time the home
had 3 finished bedrooms and 2 partially finished bedrooms.
11. During the marriage the respondent attempted to finish portions of the homes,

including putting up, taping and mudding sheetrock, adding electrical outlets, framing closets,
and working on, at least, one bathroom addition. He did the work himself, but was not a licensed
contractor.
12. After the respondent moved out, the petitioner added built-in shelves and hanging
bars in a bedroom, finished some of the electrical work, added all new framing around the
windows and trim, texturized and painted some of the walls, re-did some of the drywall, and
fixed some problems in one bathroom.
13. She also installed an intercom system ($2,413.36, May 3, 2002), installed an
outdoor shed $425.00, July 6, 2004), replaced the furnace and the water heater ($3,519.00,
November 13, 2003)), and replaced the shake roof with an asphalt-shingled roof ($10,752.00,
September 9 and 13, 2005), installing "Sola tubes" ($433.47, October 12, 2005). She also did
other types of repair and home maintenance, as found in Exhibits 3 and 4.
14. A second mortgage or line of equity credit was taken out by the parties in January
2001 for the purpose of refinancing the RV and purchasing the Twin Lab stock. By stipulation of
the parties at a hearing on May 7, 2002, the parties were ordered to sell the Twin Lab stock and
use the proceeds to fix the RV's transmission so that the RV could be sold, using the remainder
of the proceeds to pay on the line of credit. The proceeds from the RV were to be applied to the
line of credit, as well.
16. The respondent paid $1,200 to repair the RV transmission; that sum did not come
out of the stock proceeds. The RV was eventually sold for $4,000, but the respondent gave the
money to his attorney, who later gave the money to his bankruptcy trustee.
17. The respondent made the payments on the line of credit until October 2005; the
petitioner has been making the payments since then. The debt balance is now approximately

$19,000.
18. The Twin Lab stock (10,000 shares) was purchased in March 2001 by the parties at
the price of $1.3125 per share for a total, minus commissions, of $13,425.00. Its highest value
was in April 2001, when it shot up to $2.6400 per share, for a total value of $26,400.00. It then
began its decline in value, which continued until the parties sold the stock on March 3, 2003 for a
value of $1,209.46. At the time of the May 2, 2002 hearing, the approximate value of the stock
was $7,900, while at the time the order was signed on June 10, 2002, the approximate value of
the stock was $4,400.00.
19. Although the respondent changed the password to the account, the petitioner did
nothing herself-other than several phone calls-to get access to the account or to sell the stock
herself.
20. At the hearing on May 7, 2002 the parties also stipulated that the Novell stock
purchased at the same time as the Twin Lab stock was awarded to the petitioner as her sole and
separate property and that the parties were mutually restrained from dissipating, encumbering, or
hiding assets.
21. In May 2002, the respondent was ordered to maintain health insurance on the
petitioner and the minor children during the pendency of this action. In October 2005, the
respondent cancelled the petitioner's health insurance. The children were also not covered for a
time after April 30, 2006.
22. The respondent failed to pay $1,017.84 in health insurance premiums for August
through November 2006. This court had previously entered judgments for other health
insurance premiums not paid by the respondent.
23. In May 2002 the respondent was ordered to maintain car insurance on all of the
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parties' vehicles. From May 5, 2006 through the time of trial, the respondent failed to pay
$85.63 in car insurance premiums.
24. In May 2002 each party was ordered to pay one-half of all unreimbursed medical
and dental expenses, commencing October 23, 2001. From May 2006 through the time of trial,
the respondent failed to pay the petitioner $82.50 for one-half of unreimbursed medical expenses.
25. In May 2002 the Court temporarily awarded the respondent the GMC truck and the
LaSalle trailer. During the pendency of this action, the respondent sold the GMC truck for
$3,500.00 and LaSalle trailer for approximately $1,500.00.
26. During 2003 the petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,116.67, with
the respondent's average monthly share amounting to $558.33.
27. During 2004 the petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,601.83, with
the respondent's average monthly share amounting to $800.92.
28. During 2005 the petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,503.91, with
the respondent's average monthly share amounting to $751.95.
29. During 2006 petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,246.60, with the
respondent's average monthly share amounting to $623.30.
30. The petitioner travels for her employment approximately once per month for 3-5
days.
31. The petitioner spends approximately $1,194.76 per month on her mortgage
payments, $84.75 on maintaining the residence, $461.84 on food and household supplies,
$104.15 on utilities, $207.93 on clothing, $98.06 on medical and dental, $1,200.96 on child care,
$314.20 on education, $107.28 on entertainment, $45.05 on grooming, $136.51 on gifts, $710.60
on donations, $377.15 on auto expenses, $1,900.00 on installment payments and $87.74 on
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computer expenses. She also voluntarily donates $710.60 per month to the LDS Church.
32. The petitioner currently works full-time and makes approximately $6,669 gross per
month in income. She began her new job in November 2003.
33. At the time of the parties' separation, they were living only on the respondent's
income.
34. The respondent worked for the LDS Church from approximately June 2001 through
October 2003. When he stopped working for the LDS church, he was earning approximately
$2,574.00 gross per two-week pay period, or $5,577.00 gross per month ($66,924.00 per year).
35. The respondent worked for BYU from October 2003 through February 17, 2006.
Before the respondent was terminated from his position at BYU, he grossed approximately
$5,996.00 gross per month ($71,952.00 per year). See Trial Exhibit 23 at p.5.
36. The respondent voluntarily resigned from BYU, because he failed to maintain an
LDS temple recommend as required for employment. He lost his temple recommend because he
was excommunicated.
37. The respondent began his current employment with Medicity in May 2006, where
he earns $5,000.00 gross per month ($60,000.00 per year).
38. The respondent married Brenda Louise Bruni in October 2005.
39. The respondent pays his second wife's monthly house payment of $752.00. He also
pays her $ 1,500.00 per month to help with living expenses.
40. Ms. Brum's daughter, Sarah, has always lived with them. Her 18th birthday was in
April, 2006, at which time Ms. Brum's child support for Sarah ended. Sarah pays her mother
$360.00 per month (and sometimes less) to help with expenses.
41. Ms. Brum's older daughter and infant child also lived with them from February
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through April 2006, as did Ms. Brum's mother from January or February 2006. Her mother has
helped her financially at times. Her mother has terminal cancer.
42. In 1997 the petitioner received a gift of CINTAS stock from her uncle; she placed
the CINTAS stock in a private and separate account.
43. The respondent accused her, during a session of marriage counseling, of not being
a "team player"—due to the separate CINTAS stock account. Because of that accusation, she felt
coerced to place the CINTAS stock into a joint account in January 2001.
44. The respondent's name did not appear on the account's monthly statements until
April 2001; however, the respondent had access to the account as early as January 2001.
45. In April 2001 the respondent borrowed against the CINTAS stock to purchase other
stock without the petitioner's permission.
46. Subsequently, on July 19, 2001 the respondent sold the CINTAS stock for
$31,784.98. However, the parties only received approximately $18,000 in cash, as the remaining
amounts had been used by the respondent to purchase other stocky
47. At approximately the same time the parties separated, the respondent took out a
$1,900.00 quick draw loan. The petitioner never saw this money, but she ultimately paid this
loan back.
I. BANKRUPTCY ISSUES RELATED TO THIS DIVORCE ACTION
48. On October 14, 2005, the respondent filed a bankruptcy petition in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah ("Bankruptcy Court") (Case No. 05-39070).
The petitioner's claims for alimony, support and/or maintenance will receive a priority payment
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as part of distribution of the estate in the bankruptcy case.1 Under Utah case law, said claims
may also include attorneys' fees spent in pursuit of payment for alimony, support, maintenance,
custody and/or visitation.2
49. Therefore, the petitioner is seeking to have this court categorize as many as possible
as pre-bankruptcy-petition-filing judgments and as an award for alimony, support or maintenance
(or fees incurred in obtaining these judgments) in order to protect her claims in Bankruptcy
Court.
50. Further, the Bankruptcy Court will not consider any claims against the respondent
that were incurred after his bankruptcy petition was filed, i.e., child support arrearages arising
after October 2005. The Bankruptcy Court will only deal with claims against the respondent that
arose prior to the respondent's filing of his bankruptcy petition.
II. BIFURCATION OF THE DIVORCE AND DATE OF THE DECREE
51. On April 28, 2005, Respondent filed a Motion to Bifurcate Divorce and an
Affidavit in Support. On May 16, 2005, Commissioner Patton denied Respondent's Motion to
Bifurcate. On September 1, 2005, Respondent filed a Motion to Reconsider Ruling for
Bifurcated Divorce. However, as so many attorneys do, the respondent simultaneously submitted
a proposed Bifurcated Divorce Decree. Judge James R. Taylor inadvertently signed the
Bifurcated Divorce Decree on September 12, 2005.
52. Subsequently, on October 7, 2005, the parties came before Judge Taylor, who
1

As of the morning of the first day of trial, the bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction
over the marital home only, leaving all personal property issues and other debt issues to this
court. Therefore, this court makes no decision regarding the disposition of the parties' equity in
the marital home.
2

See Seals v. Condie, 139 P.3d 271, 277 (Utah App. 2006) ("Those determinations 6rest[]
primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court.5" Cites omitted.).

heard arguments and granted the respondent's motion to reconsider the commissioner's ruling.
Later in the hearing, Judge Taylor discovered the signed Bifurcated Divorce Decree in the file; he
then reprimanded the respondent's attorney for filing a motion to Reconsider, instead of an
objection to the commissioner's ruling. Nevertheless, he left his decision in place and granted
the motion to reconsider. He did not order either party to prepare a new order of bifurcation, as
neither attorney brought up that particular subject. There was absolutely no discussion between
the attorneys and the court regarding a change of date for the decree.
53. This court can now only assume that Judge Taylor was content to leave the
previously signed order in place. Therefore, this court will not amend the date nunc pro tunc (as
requested by the petitioner), but will leave the date of divorce as September 12, 2005.
III. CUSTODY AND VISITATION
54. Pursuant to an Order and Stipulation entered on July 28,2006, the respondent shall
not exercise or attempt to exercise visitation with the minor children unless the visitation time is
supervised by a third party professional visitation supervisor such as ACAFS or WillWin. Due
to the prior sexual abuse issues involving the respondent and the children, the respondent has
permanently waived his right to have unsupervised visitation. Thus, the petitioner is awarded
sole legal and physical custody of the minor children.
55. Further, while the respondent may attend public functions in which the minor
children are involved, such as plays or sporting events, he is not allowed to visit with the children
before, during or after the events. Also, the respondent may not attend the church where the
children are attending.
56. The only remaining issue at trial regarding visitation concerned telephonic
visitation. Pursuant to the petitioner's testimony, the parties had previously agreed to the
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Guardian ad Litem's recommendation that the respondent be allowed to call the children between
5:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. on Tuesdays and Thursdays. The respondent did not dispute these times
for telephonic visitation, nor did he dispute that he had previously agreed to these times. Further,
the Guardian ad Litem recommended that the children should be allowed to call the respondent
whenever they want. Neither party disputed this recommendation. In fact, when questioned at
trial, the respondent agreed with the recommendation.
57. Accordingly, the respondent's telephonic visitation shall be set on Tuesdays and
Thursdays between 5:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. or whenever the children want to call the respondent.
IV. MARITAL HOME
58. Due to the respondent's pending bankruptcy, this court does not have jurisdiction
to award either party equity in the marital home. Petitioner urges this court to make a finding
that mortgage payments and home improvement expenses she has paid constitute family support
and/or maintenance, because it was necessary to provide a habitable home for the children.
Further, she urges the court to enter a judgment against the respondent for the amount that the
petitioner spent on the mortgage and improvements.
A. First Mortgage
59. Petitioner has lived in the family home with the children and has made the
payments on the first mortgage since the parties separated in October 2001. In addition, in May
2002 the court ordered the petitioner to make the first mortgage payments. See May 2002 Order
at^f 7. On September 8, 2001, the debt on the marital home was $163,562.45. See Trial Exhibit
1. On December 29, 2001 the debt on the marital home was $162,837.44. Id. Shortly before the
time of trial-September 11, 2006-the debt on the marital home was $151,982.91. Id. Thus, in
construing these numbers in a light most favorable to the respondent, the petitioner has paid
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approximately $10,855 in principal since the parties separated ($ 162,837-$ 151,982 = $10,855).
60. Further, the petitioner testified that she has spent approximately $64,700 on
principal and interest payments from the time the parties separated until the time of trial. Thus,
Petitioner has spent approximately $53,145 on interest payments for this time period ($64,700$10,855 = $53,845).
61. Since this court cannot award her any equity in the marital home, the petitioner
requests that this court enter a judgment against the respondent for the $64,700.00 she has spent
on principal and interest payments for the first mortgage since October 2001. Moreover, the
petitioner requested that this court characterize said judgment as family support and/or
maintenance since providing a home for the children is part of supporting or maintaining the
family. The respondent did not dispute that the petitioner made such payments.
62. This court agrees with the respondent that the petitioner's argument is without
merit. The petitioner has received the benefit and comfort of living in the home and should not be
granted judgment against the respondent for having made the payments on the home. To grant
her a judgment for the $64,700 that she paid toward the mortgage would be the equivalent of
granting her-or the respondent, for that matter, were the tables turned-credit and a judgment for
paying rent, utilities, phone bills, light bulbs, toilet paper, and all other household necessities.
Although all of those bills and items could be characterized as family support and/or
maintenance (since the children need the benefit of all of those bjlls and items), the court cannot
find any legal precedent for such a ruling.
63. In addition, she received (or should have received) support in the way of alimony
and child support. She will receive a judgment for any such support not paid by the respondent
during the pendency of this action. To grant her a judgment for unpaid alimony and child
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support, plus her mortgage payments, would, in effect, grant her judgment twice and force the
respondent to pay twice. Such a ruling would be outside the bounds of equity.
64. The division of the marital home and any award of equity remains in the domain of
the bankruptcy case. This court will not attempt to make any ruling in that regard, other than to
note, again, that the petitioner has reduced the principal of the first mortgage by $10,855.00 since
the separation of the parties. No evidence was produced which would enable the court to
calculate the reduction of the principal since the time of the bifurcated decree of divorce.
B. Home Improvement
65. During the marriage the respondent attempted to finish portions of the home,
including putting up, taping and mudding sheet rock, adding electrical outlets, framing closets,
and working on, at least, one bathroom addition. He did the work himself, but was not a licensed
contractor. The parties were, apparently, satisfied to let him attempt these improvements while
they were married.
66. After the respondent moved out, the petitioner added built-in shelves and hanging
bars in a bedroom, finished some of the electrical work, added all new framing around the
windows and trim, texturized and painted some of the walls, re-did some of the drywall, and
fixed some problems in one bathroom.
67. She also installed an intercom system ($2,413.36, May 3, 2002), installed an
outdoor shed $425.00, July 6, 2004), replaced the furnace and the water heater ($3,519.00,
November 13, 2003)), and replaced the shake roof with an asphalt-shingled roof ($10,752.00,
September 9 and 13, 2005), installing "Sola tubes" ($433.47, October 12, 2005). She also did
other types of repair and home maintenance, as found in Exhibits 3 and 4.
68. The petitioner claims that the respondent should pay the amount of $21,885.33 for
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the work that she did or had done. See Trial Exhibits 3 and 4. However, this court does not
believe that (1) the respondent should pay for all of the appropriate costs, but that the petitioner
should share in the cost; and (2) that the respondent should pay for improvements and
maintenance costs that were optional.
69. The court finds that the roof replacement ($10,752.00) and the furnace and water
heater replacements ($3,519.00) were necessary and appropriate, as well as the garage door
opener ($298.00). However, the installation of an intercom system ($2,413.36) was not
necessary and the respondent should not have to share in that cost. Id. There were many items
and costs in Exhibit 4 which were unexplained or appeared to be for minor repairs. This court
views the normal, ongoing maintenance and repairs as part of the burden born by the party who
has the benefit of living in the home, pending the conclusion of the divorce action.
70. Therefore, this court is not persuaded that the respondent should have to bear all of
the costs, as outlined in Exhibit 4, nor should he have to pay for costs beyond those larger-ticket
items which improved the value of the home.
71. Therefore, the parties shall share equally the following costs: roof replacement,
$10,752.00; furnace and water heater, $3,519.00; and garage door opener, $298.00. The court
notes that the petitioner paid for the roof replacement on or about September 20, 2005, which
was when the petitioner paid the balance of the roofing cost. She paid for the furnace and water
heater on November 13, 2003, two years before the decree was signed. She paid for the new
garage door opener on January 6, 2004. All of these costs were incurred before the filing of the
bankruptcy action.
72. The total amount to be shared by the parties is $14,569.00. Each party will pay
one-half or $7,284.50. The respondent is ordered to pay a judgment in the amount of $7,284.50
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to petitioner for his share of the improvements to the home. For the purposes of the bankruptcy
proceeding, this court characterizes this judgment as family support and maintenance, because
improvement and maintenance expenses were necessary to provide the children with a habitable
home. All of the $7,284.50 was incurred before the filing of the bankruptcy action.
C. Home Equity Line of Credit/Second Mortgage
73. A line of credit secured by a mortgage on the marital home was taken out by the
parties in January 2001 for the purpose of refinancing the RV and purchasing the Twin Lab
stock. By stipulation of the parties at a hearing on May 7, 2002, the parties were ordered to sell
the Twin Lab stock and use the proceeds to fix the RV's transmission so that the RV could be
sold, using the remainder of the proceeds to pay on the line of credit. The proceeds from the RV
were to be applied to the line of credit, as well.
74. The respondent paid $1,200 to repair the RV transmission; that sum did not come
out of the stock proceeds. The RV was eventually sold for $4,000. In an order signed on January
5, 2005 (from a December 2, 2004 hearing), the Court ordered the proceeds from the RV sale to
be placed with the respondent's former attorney, James Faust, to hold in trust "until such time as
the Court makes additional orders, or the parties stipulate in writing to a dispersal of the funds."
75. At the October 7, 2005 hearing before Judge Taylor, the parties stipulated that the
RV proceeds should be applied to the line of credit. The respondent was present, according to
the court's minute entry. However, the respondent gave the $4,000 to his attorney, James Faust,
then retrieved the money, and then gave the money to his new attorney, Theodore WeckeL The
court has no evidence before it that the respondent gave his new attorney any instructions
regarding the disposition of the money. Mr. Weckel gave the $4,000 to the bankruptcy trustee.
The court does not find the respondent in contempt for the transfer of the $4,000 to the
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bankruptcy trustee, although the court finds that the respondent should pay an extra $2,800
toward the balance owing on the line of credit ($4,000 minus the $1,200 to fix the RV).
76. The respondent made the payments on the line of credit until October 2005; the
petitioner has been making the payments since then. The debt balance is now approximately
$19,000.
77. The Twin Lab stock (10,000 shares) was purchased in March 2001 by the parties at
the price of $1.3125 per share for a total, minus commissions, of $13,425.00. Its highest value
was in April 2001, when it shot up to $2.6400 per share, for a total value of $26,400.00. It then
began its decline in value, which continued until the parties sold the stock on March 3, 2003 for a
value of $1,209.46 and applied the proceeds to the line of credit. At the time of the May 2, 2002
hearing, the approximate value of the stock was $7,900, while at the time the order was signed on
June 10, 2002, the approximate value of the stock was $4,400.00|.
78. Although the respondent changed the password to the account, the petitioner did
nothing herself-other than several phone calls-to get access to the account or to sell the stock
herself. Both parties had the power to sell the stock, while neither party had the power to control
the stock market and the value of the stock. Although the stock's value declined from May 2001
to the time of the May 2002 hearing, neither party sold the stock while its value remained higher
than the original purchase price. By the time of the May 2002 hearing, the stock was already
worth less than the parties had paid for it. Unfortunately, neither party possessed the prophetic
powers necessary to out-guess the stock market, and neither party moved to sell the stock at an
advantageous moment. The court holds neither party responsible for the low value of the stock
when it was finally sold and awards neither party a judgment or^ this issue.
79. Therefore, the court divides the remaining balance on the line of equity equally
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between the parties ($9,500 each), but orders the respondent to pay an extra $2,800 for the
proceeds of the RV which were not paid toward the line of credit. The court orders the
respondent to pay a judgment in the amount of $12,300.00 for his share of the remaining balance
on the line of credit.
80. The court rejects a finding of contempt against the respondent with regard to either
the Twin Lab stock or the RV proceeds. All of the $12,300.00 judgment was incurred before the
filing of the bankruptcy action.
V. HEALTH INSURANCE
A. Respondent's Failure to Maintain Health Insurance
81. In May 2002, Respondent was ordered to maintain health insurance on the
petitioner and the minor children during the pendency of this action. See May 2002 Order at f 4.
However, in October 2005, the respondent cancelled the petitioner's health insurance. See Trial
Exhibit 6.
82. The court already found that the petitioner made a prima facie case for contempt
regarding the respondent's failure to maintain health insurance for the petitioner as ordered by
the court. See Petitioner's May 2006 Order to Show Cause and Order on May 2006 hearing.
Respondent reserved his right to argue at trial "that he should not be held in contempt,
notwithstanding Petitioner making her prima facie case." Id.
83. Although the respondent testified at trial that he cancelled the petitioner's health
insurance because he was planning to remarry, the Order states he was required to maintain her
health insurance "during the pendency of this action"--not until he remarried. The respondent
further testified that he was not aware of any changes to this Order. Thus, the respondent failed
to meet his burden of showing why he should not be held in contempt for failing to maintain the
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petitioner's health insurance.
84. In addition, it is undisputed that the respondent lost insurance for the children on
April 30, 2006. See also Trial Exhibit 6. The petitioner requested that the respondent be found
in contempt for failing to maintain insurance on the children as ordered by the court. The
respondent did not provide any evidence that he provided the children with new insurance
immediately following the loss of coverage on April 30, 2006. In fact, the respondent admitted
that he did not inform the petitioner about her COBRA options for the children when he learned
about them in February.
85. Accordingly, the court finds the respondent in contempt for failing to maintain
health insurance on the petitioner and the children. The petitioner is awarded her attorneys' fees
and costs incurred in obtaining this finding. Further, this court makes a finding that maintaining
health insurance is necessary for family support and maintenance in order to keep the children in
good health.
B. Respondent's Failure to Pay Health Insurance Premiums
86. Respondent was ordered to pay all costs of premiums associated with health
insurance. See May 2002 Order at ^| 4. The petitioner testified that she obtained health insurance
once she learned that the respondent had failed to maintain said insurance, yet the respondent
failed to pay anything toward these premiums. On June 16, 2006, the court ordered the
respondent to pay $1050.73 in medical insurance premiums owed as of May 5, 2006.3 See June
16, 2006 Order at f 1. In addition, on August 28, 2006, the court ordered the respondent to pay

3

The respondent objected to the commissioner's ruling, but the objection was overruled
by Judge Taylor.
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health insurance premiums for June and July 2006, which totaled $509.00.4 See August 28, 2006
Order at ^j 2. See also Trial Exhibit 5.
87. At trial, the petitioner testified that respondent owed her an additional $1,017.84 in
health insurance premiums for August through November 2006. Petitioner requested that the
court enter a judgment against respondent for this amount. The respondent failed to provide any
evidence that he had been paying insurance premiums to the petitioner.
88. Further, the petitioner requested that the respondent be found in contempt for his
failure to pay any medical insurance premiums since insurance was cancelled for the petitioner
and the children. Again, the respondent failed to provide any evidence that he had been paying
insurance premiums during this time period.
89. Accordingly, a judgment will enter against the respondent for $1,017.84 for unpaid
health insurance premiums. In addition, the court finds the respondent in contempt for failing to
pay insurance premiums after the petitioner's and the children's insurance was cancelled.
Further, these judgments and any fees incurred in obtaining these judgments will be characterized
as family support and/or maintenance, because health insurance premiums are necessary to keep
the children in good health. Moreover, the petitioner is award her attorneys' fees and costs
incurred in obtaining these judgments.
C. Future Health Insurance
90. The petitioner testified that she would like to be the primary insurer for the
children because of the difficulties she has faced in obtaining insurance coverage information
from the respondent. The petitioner also requested that the respondent be required to pay onehalf of the children's health insurance premiums under her plan. The court finds that these are
4

The court can find no objection in the file to this ruling.
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reasonable requests, as the respondent has failed in the past to insure the children and to notify
the petitioner when coverage ceased. It will be more beneficial to the children for the petitioner
to be in charge of the insurance coverage and their health care. Tlie court orders that the
petitioner's insurance will be the primary coverage for the childrep and that the respondent will
pay one-half of the cost.
91. If the respondent can obtain a secondary health insurance, which would, in effect,
cover all health costs for the children which are not covered by the petitioner's insurance, the
petitioner will pay for one-half of the cost of such insurance. Otherwise, the parties will simply
pay one-half each of all uncovered health care costs for the children.
VI. CAR INSURANCE
A. Respondent's Failure to Maintain Car Insurance
92. In May 2002, the respondent was ordered to maintain car insurance on all of the
parties' vehicles. See May 2002 Order at f 5. The respondent testified that he was not aware of
any changes to this Order. However, the petitioner testified that beginning in February 2005 the
respondent failed to make full car insurance premium payments. Thus, on June 16, 2006, the
Court ordered the respondent to pay $1,063.11 in car insurance premiums owed as of May 5,
2006. See June 16, 2006 Order at f 1.
93. From the time of this judgment until the time of trial, the respondent failed to pay
$85.63 in car insurance premiums. The respondent failed to provide any evidence to demonstrate
that the Order to maintain car insurance had changed or that he had5 indeed, made all the
necessary payments. In addition, the court finds no reason to modify the previous order.
94. Accordingly, the petitioner is granted a judgment against the respondent in the
amount of $85.63 for car insurance premiums. The court also finds that car insurance premiums
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are necessary for the support and/or maintenance of the family to allow them to get around and
live their lives. Further, pursuant to the petitioner's request, the court finds the respondent in
contempt for failing to obey this court order regarding car insurance. The court awards the
petitioner her attorneys' fees and costs incurred in obtaining this judgment.
B. Future Car Insurance
95. The petitioners requests that the court order the respondent to pay for one-half of
any future car insurance premiums for the children. The court agrees with the respondent that
driving is a privilege and that such support is not mandatory for minors. This request is denied.
VIL MEDICAL EXPENSES
A, Respondent's Failure to Pay Medical Expenses
96. In May 2002, each party was ordered to pay one-half of all unreimbursed medical
and dental expenses, commencing October 23, 2001. See May 2002 Order at f 4. The
respondent testified that to his knowledge this Order has not been changed. In September 2004,
the petitioner was awarded judgment against the respondent in the amount of $231.00 for his
share of medical costs. See September 2004 Order at f 4. In addition, on June 16, 2006, the
court ordered the respondent to pay $1,589.60 for his share of medical expenses as of May 5,
2006. See June 16, 2006 Order at f 1. The court found the petitioner made a prima facie case for
the respondent's contempt in failing to pay medical expenses for 2003 through 2005. See May
2006 Order at f 5.
97. Also, the petitioner testified that currently the respondent owes her $82.50 for onehalf of unreimbursed medical expenses from May 2006 to the time of trial. The respondent
failed to provide any evidence that he did not owe this amount or that he had paid this amount.
Petitioner requested the Court to find the respondent in contempt for failing to pay medical
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expenses in 2006.
98. Accordingly, a judgment shall enter against the respondent in the amount of $82.50
for unreimbursed medical expenses and the court finds him in contempt for failing to pay such.
Further, all judgments awarded to the petitioner in this case regarding unreimbursed medical
expenses, including attorneys' fees and costs incurred in obtaining these judgments, shall be
classified as family support and/or maintenance because such expenses are necessary for the
children's health. Moreover, the petitioner is awarded her attorneys' fees and costs incurred in
obtaining these judgments. Also, since the September 2004 order entered before the respondent
filed for bankruptcy, the $231.00 shall be classified as a pre-bankruptcy petition claim. In
addition, $1,197.18 of the June 2006 judgment shall be classified as a pre-bankruptcy petition
claim.
B. Future Medical Expenses
99. If the respondent obtains secondary insurance, which would in effect, cover all
health costs for the children which are not covered by the petitioner's insurance, the petitioner
will pay for one-half of the cost of such insurance. Otherwise, each party shall be responsible for
one-half of all future unreimbursed medical and dental expenses reasonably incurred by the
minor children, including co-pays, deductibles and prescriptions, which are not paid by a medical
insurance carrier.
100. If the respondent does obtain secondary insurance, the respondent must pay his
share of the bills within 30 days after the secondary insurance rejects any costs. If the respondent
chooses not to obtain secondary insurance, then the parent who incurs medical expenses shall
provide written verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent
within 30 days of payment. Within 30 days of receiving written verification of medical expense,

the parent receiving verification shall pay one-half of the medical expense.
VIII. PERSONAL PROPERTY
101. On May 7, 2002, the court temporarily awarded the respondent the Subaru, GMC
truck and LaSalle trailer. See May 2002 Order at ^f 10. The respondent testified that he
understood this court order and that he was not aware of any changes to this order. Nonetheless,
the respondent admitted that he sold the GMC truck and LaSalle trailer in violation of this Court
order. The respondent sold the GMC truck for approximately $3,500.00 and the LaSalle trailer
for approximately $ 1,500.00.
102. The court awards the petitioner a $2,500.00 judgment against the respondent in
the amount of one-half of the proceeds from the sale of the truck and trailer. Further, the
petitioner had already established a prima facie case of the respondent's contempt for disposing
of marital assets. Respondent failed to provide any evidence that the May 2002 order had been
modified or should have been modified. Thus, this court finds the respondent in contempt for
selling these items of marital personal property. Moreover, the petitioner is awarded her
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in obtaining this judgment.
B. Exercise Equipment and Entertainment Center
103. In May 2002 the court temporarily awarded the respondent some exercise
equipment and an entertainment center that were marital property. During the petitioner's
testimony regarding these items, the court received the impression that these items were of great
value, although the petitioner offered no evidence as to their value. Much to the court's surprise,
the only evidence as to value came from the respondent, who testified that he purchased the used
exercise equipment at an auction through Alpine School District at $20.00 per item for a total of
$180.00. It would have been worth even less than that at the time the parties separated. His
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testimony was that the entertainment center was worth $75.00.
104. The court is stunned at the time, effort, and attorney's fees that the petitioner
expended in arguing this issue. These items were not worth an hour's time in attorney's fees.
The court does not find the defendant in contempt for leaving the exercise equipment in Montana
or giving the cheap entertainment center to his new wife. The court will not award attorney's
fees for this issue.
D. Remaining Marital Personal Property
105. At the beginning of this trial, the Bankruptcy Court retained jurisdiction over the
parties' personal property. However, on the third day of trial, December 19, 2006, the trustee in
the respondent's bankruptcy case abandoned all of the personal property. See Trial Exhibit 27.
Thus, this court obtained jurisdiction over the remaining marital personal property.
106. Despite petitioner's testimony that the respondent has had multiple opportunities
to go through the home and take whatever property he wanted, the court finds that, given the
incredible acrimony between these parties and the existence of a protective order which prevents
the respondent from going near the marital home, the respondent was wise in waiting for trial to
request the return of just a few items.
107. Therefore, the court orders the petitioner to return the following items to the
respondent: a punching bag, a DeWalt compound miter saw, a DeWalt router, a Milwaukee
Sawzall, an electric planer, a 24-foot ladder, and the sewing machines which were gifts from his
grandmother. The attorneys for the parties can aid in transferring these items from one party to
the other.
IX. CHILD CARE EXPENSES
A. Respondent's Failure to Pay Child-Care Expenses
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108. In May 2002, each party was ordered to pay one-half of any work-related daycare
expenses for the children. See May 2002 Order at ^J14. In September 2004, the petitioner was
awarded judgment against the respondent for his one-half share of daycare expenses, including
$4,560.00 for the year 2003 and $3,030.00 for January 1, 2004 through August 31, 2004. See
September 2004 Order at f^ 5-6. In addition, on August 28, 2006, the court ordered the
respondent to pay $1,000.00 in child-care costs for the months of June and July 2006. See
August 28, 2006 Order at ^f 2. Of course, these judgments still stand, minus the garnishments of
$8,425.39 already taken by the petitioner.
109. In September 2004 the respondent was ordered to pay $340.00 per month during
the school year and $500.00 per month during the summer months, for a total amount of
$4,560.00 per year.5 Commencing with September 2004 and ending November 22, 2006 (the
first day of trial), the respondent owed $1,360.00 for 2004; $4,560.00 for 2005; and $4,136.00
for 2006 for a total owing of $10,056.00. Judgment has already been given to the petitioner for
June and July 2006 for $1,000.00, leaving a total of $9,056.00 for the court's calculations.
110. According to Exhibit 16, from October 2004 through November 22, 2006 the
respondent paid $7,280.00 (as well as other arrearages through garnishments).
B. Judgment and Contempt
111. The court grants judgment to the petitioner for the amount of $1,776.00 in unpaid
child-care expenses, pursuant to the September 2004 order of $340.00 and $500.00, for the
months and years listed above. The court finds the respondent in contempt for his failure to pay
the $1,776.00 pursuant to the September 2004 order and awards petitioner her reasonable
attorney's fees for this issue.
5

At that time both parties reserved the right to argue as to the reasonableness of that order.
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112. This judgment6 for child-care expenses and attorneys fees incurred in obtaining
judgments for child-care expenses shall be classified as family support and/or maintenance,
because it directly relates to taking care of the children. Also, pursuant to the petitioner's
testimony and Exhibit 16, $978.00 of this judgment shall be classified as a pre-bankruptcy
petition judgment-the total due from September through December 2004 of $1,360.00, plus
January through October 14, 2005 of $3,710.00, minus the amount the respondent paid during
this time period ($1,020, plus $3,072 for a total of $4,092.00.7
C. Petitioner's Request for Increased Child-Care Expenses, Past and I n«ure
113. The court has looked at the petitioner's testimony and Exhibit 16 very carefully
and makes the following observations:
a. During 2003 the petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,116.67,
with the respondent's share amounting to $558.33.
b. During 2004 the petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,601.83,
with the respondent's share amounting to $800.92.
c. During 2005 the petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,503.91,

6

In the petitioner's suggested memorandum decision, her calculations included her figures
for the larger amount she seeks for child-care expenses, as well as the past judgments and past
garnishments. The court will not attempt to run those calculations at this time, as those
judgments and garnishments were not truly before the court at trial. However, for purposes of
the bankruptcy action, the court will find that all judgments awarded to the petitioner for amounts
incurred before October 14, 2005 should be considered pre-bankruptcy in nature and should also
be classified as family support and/or maintenance.
7

Exhibit 16 failed to provide monthly amounts paid by the respondent, so the court has
assumed some logical facts in order to bring finality to this issue. The court has arrived at the
September through December 2004 credits for the respondent by noting that the $1,020 paid in
2004 is exactly 3 months at $340.00. Apparently, the respondent finally made some payments
after Commissioner Patton lowered the amounts. As for 2005, the court simply took the annual
total of $4,560.00, divided it by 12, and multiplied that result by 9.5 months.
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with the respondent's share amounting to $751.95.
d. During 2006 petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,246.60,
with the respondent's share amounting to $623.30.
e. The petitioner urges the court to award her an ongoing child-care amount of
$400 per week ($20,000 per year/$ 1,666.67 per month/$833.34 respondent's share)8 for "nanny"
care, which she deems necessary, because she travels approximately once per month for 3-5
business days.
f. The petitioner now works at a job which brings her approximately $80,000.00
annual salary, which is more than the respondent now makes.
114. The parties' minor children are now 16, 13, 12, 9 and 7 years of age; the two
older children are 19 and 24 years of age.9 The petitioner's argument is that, because of her
occasional travel for work, the respondent should help her pay for full-time nanny care. The
court finds this unreasonable. All of the children are in school full-time, so there is no need for
full-time care during the school year, and only two of the children are still in elementary school.
The older children certainly can be expected to help with the younger children; indeed, the oldest
boy does not have football practice after school year-round. The infrequency of the petitioner's
work-related travel does not justify the request that the respondent pay $833.34 per month for his
share of the child-care expenses. Although the petitioner is correct in asserting that the
respondent offered no other reasonable suggested costs for child-care expenses, neither did the
petitioner.
115. Therefore, the court finds that the amounts previously ordered are within the
8

The court calculated this with a 50-week work year.

9

As of the time of this decision-not the time of trial.
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realm of reason and also within this court's experience on the bench. The court will order the
respondent to pay ongoing child-care expenses of $340.00 per month during the nine months of
the school year and $500.00 per month during the three months of the summer vacation, for a
total of $4,560.00 per year. With the petitioner paying equal amounts, this should be quite
adequate for the children's needs.
X. ALIMON Y
A. Respondent's Failure to Pay Two Months' Alimony
116. The respondent was ordered to pay $230 per month in alimony, beginning April
1, 2002. See May 2002 Order at f 3. At a hearing on May 15, 2Q06 the parties stipulated that the
petitioner made a prima facie case on her order to show cause regarding alimony payments for
March and April 2006. See Order and Stipulation signed July 28J, 2006 at % 5.
117. At a hearing on June 15, 2006, the respondent failed to present any evidence that
he paid these amounts or that he was justified in failing to pay tnese amounts. Thus, the court
makes a finding that the respondent was in contempt for failing tt) pay two months of alimony
payments. On June 15, 2006, the court ordered the respondent tc^ pay $460.00 in alimony
arrearages incurred as of April 13, 2006. See Order signed July 28, 2006 at ^[ 1. The court
awards the petitioner her attorneys' fees and costs incurred in obtaining these judgments.
118. As of the time of trial, the respondent was current on his alimony obligations.
119. The court file is replete with the respondent's earfy efforts to reduce the
temporary alimony obligation of $230.00 per month. He filed 2 verified motions to have his
support orders reduced or adjusted. These motions were finally heard at a hearing on June 24,
2004, at which Commissioner Patton took care of some issues including child support, but
reserved all other matters for trial, including alimony. Therefore, the court finds that the
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respondent did properly preserve his right to argue for retroactive adjustment (and possible
credit) of alimony as of August 6, 2003, which is when the second motion (which mentioned
alimony specifically) was filed with the court. Petitioner reserved the same right in May 2002.
The court will make any adjustments for retroactivity after determining the correct income to be
attributed to the parties.
B. Past and Future Alimony
120. The petitioner requests that the respondent be ordered to pay future alimony,
while the respondent requests that his alimony obligations cease. He has withdrawn his request
for alimony from the petitioner. In determining whether to award alimony, the court considers:
(I) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support...
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
U.C.A. § 30-3-5(8).
1. The Financial Condition and Needs of Petitioner
121. The petitioner spends approximately $ 1,194.76 per month on her mortgage
payments, $84.75 on maintaining the residence, $461.84 on food and household supplies,
$104.15 on utilities, $207.93 on clothing, $98.06 on medical and dental, $1,200.96 on child care,
$314.20 on education, $107.28 on entertainment, $45.05 on grooming, $136.51 on gifts, $710.60
on donations, $377.15 on auto expenses, $1,900.00 on installment payments and $87.74 on
computer expenses. See also Trial Exhibit 9.
122. Petitioner also testified that her current net monthly gross income is $6,669.08.
The court notes, with some surprise, that the petitioner declares no exemptions and, thereby,
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increases the amount of taxes taken from her gross income. Therefore, her net income is an
artificially low $4,121.30. Id. She also voluntarily donates $710.^0 per month to the LDS
Church. Therefore, without the inclusion of the church donation, the alimony and child support
she is currently receiving, minus deductions and expenses as outl^ed above, the petitioner is
deficient approximately $2,548.75 per month. Id.
!

I lie Hi npii'iirs I inning < npiHil'i in \ 11 ihty to Produce Income

123. The petitioner is currently working full-time and i^iakes approximately $6,669
gross per month in income. Id. The respondent did not provide any evidence that the petitioner
is working below her earning capacity or that she is able to produce more income. Thus, the
court finds that the petitioner is able to earn $6,669 gross per moi^th. At the time of the parties'
separation, they were living only on the respondent's income. She began her new job in
November 2003.
3, The Ability of Respondent to Provide Support
124. Respondent worked at Novell from August 1998 through approximately June
2001. From January 2001 through about June 15, 2001 he grossed $47,879.77. See Trial
Exhibit 18. Thus, in construing this amount in a light most favorable to the respondent, he
grossed approximately $7,979 per month ($47,879 for 6 months) while working at Novell.
125. The court finds credible the respondent's testimohy that he voluntarily left this
employment at Novell for a lower paying job, because he was atjraid he would be laid off before
finding another job.10 The court is persuaded by the respondent's argument that the computer
industry is volatile with regard to steady employment and that it was reasonable for the
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The many reductions in the employee force at Novell through the last decade have been
front-page news in this community.
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respondent to protect his family and his income by finding a new job before being laid off. In
addition, this change of employment occurred before the parties' separation and the filing of this
divorce.11 This court refuses to delve into decisions made by the parties before the time of the
separation, as it is not the duty of this court to revise decisions made by the parties before this
court had jurisdiction. Thus, the court makes no finding as to respondent's income at Novell and
will not include the income at Novell in its calculations and decision regarding imputation of
income.
126. After leaving Novell, the respondent secured employment with the Corporation of
the Presiding Bishop ("LDS Church"). He worked for the LDS Church from eipproximately June
2001 through October 2003. When he stopped working for the LDS church, he was earning
approximately $2,574.00 gross per two-week pay period, or $5,577.00 gross per month
($66,924.00 per year). See Trial Exhibit 21.
127. While employed with the LDS church, the respondent was recruited by Brigham
Young University ("BYU"). He worked for BYU from October 2003 through February 17,
2006. Before the respondent was terminated from his position at BYU, he grossed
approximately $5,996.00 gross per month ($71,952.00 per year). See Trial Exhibit 23 at p.5.
The respondent voluntarily resigned from BYU, because he failed to maintain an LDS temple
recommend as required for employment.12 He lost his temple recommend because he was
11

The petitioner's testimony was that she opposed his change of employment, while the
respondent testified that it was a mutual decision.
12

At the August 24, 2006 hearing before Judge Taylor, the court ordered that the
petitioner could depose the respondent regarding the "temple recommend issue." See Order,
signed November 13, 2006. The petitioner claims that, due to the respondent's subsequent
discovery delays, the petitioner was not able to depose the respondent on this matter.
The petitioner cites a November 2006 Order on Motion for Default Judgment, stating that
it "provides that if 'Petitioner is unable to present the necessary evidence based on Respondent's
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excommunicated.
128. The respondent began his current employment witli Medicity in May 2006, where
he earns $5,000.00 gross per month ($60,000.00 per year).
129. The petitioner urges the Court to make a finding that the respondent has the
ability to earn his previous BYU income ($5,996 per month) since he voluntarily acted in such a
way as to cause him to lose his employment. In contrast, the respondent requests that the court
use his current income of $5,000 per month in determining alimony, if any.
130. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a), if the respondent is voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed, income may be imputed to him. "Income may not be imputed to
a parent unless the parent... is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed." U.C.A. § 78.457.5(7)(a).

Utah case law suggests that a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed if,

at least, some evidence suggests that the parent's current, diminished income level resulted from
"his personal preference or voluntary decisions," instead of from "events beyond his control."
Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018, 1025 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
131. The court has already indicated that it will not consider the pre-separation income
from Novell; therefore, the court will consider the incomes earned by the respondent at the LDS
Church, BYU, and Medicity. Again, those monthly incomes are] (1) $5,577.00 gross per month
($66,924.00 per year) at the LDS Church; (2) $5,996.00 gross per month ($71,952.00 per year) at
BYU; (3) $5,000.00 gross per month ($60,000.00 per year) at Medicity.
132. The highest income of the three is the BYU income at $5,996.00 gross per month.
failure to provide necessary evidence through discovery, Respondent will be precluded from
defending on such issues.'" The court can not find such order inithe file, nor does the court recall
the petitioner asserting this theory in trial. In addition, testimony was taken from the respondent
in which he explained that he voluntarily resigned, rather than allowing himself to be fired by
BYU.

This is income which the respondent lost, because of activities which resulted in his
excommunication from the LDS Church and his subsequent inability to hold a temple
recommend. Unlike his voluntary departure from Novell for a lower-paying job in lieu of a
possible layoff, his voluntary resignation from BYU was the result of his own actions.
Therefore, the court finds that the respondent could, most likely, still be earning this income
today, had he not voluntarily failed to satisfy the requirements for continued employment at
BYU. Thus, the court finds that the respondent is voluntarily underemployed pursuant to U.C.A.
§ 78.45-7.5(7)(a).
133. Accordingly, the court finds that respondent has the ability to earn $5,996.00
gross per month ($71,952.00 per year).
134. The respondent married Brenda Louise Bruni in October 2005, As part of a prenuptial agreement signed by the respondent and Ms. Bruni, he pays her monthly house payment
of $752.00. See Trial Exhibit 30 and 35. He also pays her $1,500.00 per monlh to help with
living expenses.
135. Ms. Bruni's daughter, Sarah, has always lived with them. Ms. Bruni no longer
receives any child support for Sarah, but Sarah pays her mother $360.00 per month (and
sometimes less) to help with expenses. Ms. Bruni does not consider this regular income, as
Sarah does not always have the money to pay. Ms. Bruni's older daughter and infant child also
lived with them from February through April 2006, as did Ms. Brum's mother from January or
February 2006. Her mother has helped her financially at times, but it is not income that can be
depended upon. Her mother has terminal cancer.
136. "In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may
not be considered, except. . . [t]he court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to

share living expenses . . . ." U.C.A. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(iii)(A). This court does not find that Ms.
Brum's medical history, recent work history, and spotty income from her daughter justify great
reliance upon Ms. Bruni's income for determining the appropriateness of alimony. The
occasional gifts of money from Ms. Bruni's mother cannot be considered income for purposes of
this determination.

It is clear to this court that the respondent would have to pay at least

$752.00 per month to rent a decent place to live for himself, were he not remarried and living in
Ms. Bruni's home. The payment of $ 1,500 per month by the respondent to Ms. Bruni to help
defray living expenses is certainly not unreasonable, given today's economy and the monthly
expenses claimed by both the petitioner and the respondent. The money she brought from
Oregon after her divorce is now gone, so she no longer has any reserve cash to supplement her
income.
137. The court finds that, pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(iii)(A), there is no steady
income from Ms. Bruni that the court can include in its calculations. Ms. Bruni is not capable of
sharing the living expenses with the respondent, other than the $360.00 from her daughter, which
only covers Sarah's expenses in the home (food, utilities, etc.).
4 II <ength of Mai riage
138. The parties were married on November 22, 1986 and divorced on September 12,
2005. Thus, the parties were married two months short of 19 years.
5. Wiifilii'i IVf it in ii cr has Custody of the Minor Children
139. As set forth above, the petitioner has full physical and legal custody of five minor
children that require support. The respondent will be ordered to pay child support based upon his
imputed income of $5,996.00.
6. The Fault of the Parties
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140. Although the petitioner only alleged "irreconcilable differences" her divorce
petition, she testified that the divorce was caused by the respondent, because he sexually abused
the children. She never amended the petition, and neither party testified as to when the sexual
abuse of the children occurred.
141. The petitioner also testified that in January 2001 she placed the CINTAS stock
into a joint account, due to pressure from the respondent during marriage counseling sessions,
which had begun in December 2000. Neither party offered an explanation for their participation
in marriage counseling at that time, which was many months prior to the parties' final separation
in October 2001.
142. Therefore, the court finds that it does not have enough clear testimony to place all
of the blame on the respondent for this divorce, despite the unopposed testimony regarding the
sexual abuse of the children. Thus, this court makes no finding that the respondent alone caused
the marriage to terminate.
7. Analysis under U.C.A. § 30-3-5(8)
143. The petitioner requests that the court order the respondent to pay future alimony
in the amount of $3,259 per month for 19 years. The respondent withdrew his request for future
alimony, but requested a credit for the alimony he has paid since the petitioner became employed
in the spring of 2003.
144. While this is a marriage of almost 19 years' duration, the court can see no reason
to award the petitioner alimony for another 19 years, especially when she is making more money
than the respondent makes-even using the court-imputed income of $5,996.00 per month for the
respondent. Their incomes differ by $673.00 per month and $8,076.00 per year-with the
advantage going to the petitioner. In addition, the parties had chosen to have the petitioner stay
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at home to raise the children and were living on only one income \^hen they separated in October
2001. She did not return to full-time work until the spring of 2003 and later that year obtained
her current employment with an income now of $80,000.00 per year. Together they are bringing
in $151,952.00 per year (his imputed income of $71,952.00, plus her income of $80,000.00),
compared to the $66,924.00 per year the respondent was making 4t the LDS Church when they
separated in October 2001. Their collective income has more thar* doubled since their
separation.
145. In addition, since the petitioner has the physical custody of the children, she will
also be receiving $4,560.00 per year from the respondent for chilcj-care expenses, along with
child support of $16,728.00 per year ($1,394.00 per month). This is a total of $21,288.00, above
and beyond her annual salary of $80,000.00.
146. Were this court to award the petitioner the monthly alimony of $3,259.00 she
seeks, plus the monthly average child-care cost of $380.00 awarded to her by the court (for a total
of $3,639.00), the respondent, according to his financial declaration, would have $73.46 left of
his net income to pay child support and the rest of his monthly expenses. See Exhibit 35.13 This
would be an unconscionable award to the petitioner.
147. So, does the petitioner deserve any alimony at all? This court finds that she
did-during the time after the filing of this action before she obtained her new well-paying job.
The parties' agreement in May 2002 was $230 per month, which the parties, obviously, thought
was appropriate at the time. The court also finds that $230 per month was appropriate until the
13

The court has imputed income $996.00 above what the respondent used in his financial
declaration, so the court is not able to correctly estimate what his net income would be. He lost
29% of his real income through deductions; if the court used that same 29% and subtracted it
from his imputed monthly income, that would leave him $4,257.16 of his imputed income, for an
increase of $691.62 net. This is still not enough for him to live dm and pay child support.
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petitioner began her new job in November 2003. Therefore, the court awards the respondent a
credit against other amounts due under these findings (or other judgments already awarded) from
November 2003 through the time of trial, November 2006, inclusive. That would be calculated
at $230.00 x 37 months, for a total of $8,510.00. Therefore, the respondent will receive a credit
of $8,510.00 for alimony already paid.
148. Because the parties' income and living circumstances are comparatively even and
their collective income has more than doubled since the time of their separation in October 2001,
the court denies the petitioner her request for future alimony and makes no order regarding future
alimony.
XI. CHILD SUPPORT
A. Respondent's Contempt for Unilaterally Changing Child Support
149. In May 2002, the respondent was ordered to pay $1,797.00 per month in child
support beginning April 1,2002, See May 2002 Order at f 3. This amount was agreed upon by
the parties, stipulated to in court, and based upon their incomes at the time.
150. At a hearing on June 24, 2004, the court ordered that the respondent's child
support obligation would be reduced to $1,169.00 per month for six children based upon the
parties' current incomes. See Order signed August 5, 2004 at f 4. This order was based upon
petitioner's income of $6,250.00 per month gross ($75,000.00 per year) and respondent's income
of $5,750.00 per month ($69,000.00 per year).

The new amount was effective July 1, 2004.

151. No evidence was presented to the court that this order was ever modified, nor can
the court find any orders of modification in the file.
152. From November 2005 through February 2006, the respondent paid child support
of only $1,090. See also Trial Exhibit 10. From March 2006 through May 2006 he only paid

$45 per month. Id. Finally, the respondent only paid $840 per month in child support from June
2006 through August 2006. Id.
153. At a hearing on May 15, 2006, the parties stipulated that the petitioner had
established a prima facie case regarding the respondent's contempt for underpaying his monthly
child support obligations without leave of the Court. See Order signed July 28, 2006 at f 5. The
respondent reserved his right to dispute the contempt issue. At trial the respondent admitted that
he was aware of the court orders regarding child support, and he failed to provide any evidence
that the June 2004 order ever changed. Accordingly, the court holds the respondent in contempt
for underpaying his child support payments without leave of the court.
B. Respondent's Failure to Pay Child Support
154. Respondent's child support obligation of $ 1,169.00 per month was originally
calculated for six minor children based on Petitioner's gross income of $6,250 per month and
Respondent's gross income of $5,750 per month. See Order signed August 5, 2004 at ^ 4.
Although it is undisputed that one of the minor children turned 18 in October 2005, such does
not automatically entitle the respondent to unilaterally reduce his child support obligations
without a court order. Not only did the number of minor children change, but the parties' gross
monthly incomes were also different at that time. If the court allowed a party to unilaterally
make changes to court-ordered obligations every time he or she determined a change in
circumstance had occurred, it would nullify the authority of the court and render petitions to
modify meaningless. Thus, the respondent did not have authority to unilaterally change (and
underpay) his child support obligations.
155. As a result, on June 16, 2006, the court awarded the petitioner a judgment of
$2,248.00 in child support arrearages as of April 13, 2006. See Order signed July 28, 2006 at f
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L In addition, on August 28, 2006, the court awarded the petitioner a judgment of $2,103.00 in
child support arrearages. See Order signed November 21, 2006 at % 2.
156. Further, pursuant to the petitioner's testimony at trial, the court awards the
petitioner a judgment against the respondent for $489.68 in additional child support arrearages.
157. The court also finds that these judgments (and attorney's fees spent in obtaining
these judgments) are classified as family support and/or maintenance, because child support is
necessary to provide the children with a living. Moreover, the petitioner is awarded her
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in obtaining these judgments against the respondent regarding
child support and as a sanction for the respondent's contempt.
158. The respondent requested a credit for child support he paid while the petitioner
was working from the spring of 2003 until it was actually reduced in July 2004. He also
requested to have child support recalculated from October 2005 to the present. However, the
respondent failed to present any evidence regarding the petitioner's varying incomes during these
time periods.
159. Therefore, the court has no evidentiary basis for determining what credit, if any,
to which the respondent would be entitled. Rather than recalculating years of child support and
attempting to determine both parties' income over the course of those months and years, the
court in its discretion will simply determine child support from the time of trial going forward.
Accordingly, the respondent is not entitled to a credit for child support paid from the spring of
2003 through July 2004, nor is he entitled to a recalculation of child support from October 2005
to the present.14

l4

Indeed, given the income imputed to the respondent, he might be less than satisfied with
the result, were the court to recalculate all child support since the inception of this divorce action.
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160. Petitioner testified that before the parties separated, the respondent used to
deposit his paycheck into the bill-paying account to cover family expenses. See Trial Exhibit 12.
However, from the time the parties separated in October 2001 until the respondent was ordered
to pay child support as of April 1, 2002, the respondent failed to provide any support to the
family. Id. The petitioner testified that she was forced to solely provide for all of the children
and family living expenses from her own funds during this time period even though she was not
working. She now asks for back support for that six-month period.
161. As far as the court can determine, this matter has never been brought before the
court and has not been reserved by the petitioner. The court will not go back to the parties'
separation to award back child support.
D. Future Child Support
162. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a) allows this court to impute income to the
respondent for purposes of child support if he is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
Using the same analysis as it did in the above section on alimony, the court finds that the
respondent is voluntarily underemployed pursuant to U.C.A. § 78.45-7.5(7)(a) and income shall
be imputed to him at $5,996.00 gross per month ($71,952.00 per year) for purposes of calculating
child support. Petitioner's income for purposes of child support shall be $6,669 gross per month
($80,000.00 per year). See Trial Exhibit 9. Child support shall be calculated for five minor
children.
163. Since the time of trial, the Utah State Legislature has modified the child support
income tables, effective April 30, 2007, for modified and future child support. Rather than
estimating the base child support amount under the prior statute, the court has used the new
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statutory amount established for combined incomes of $12,665.00 per month as a guideline.
Using the above-listed incomes, the court has determined that (1) the combined income of the
parties is $12,665.00 per month; (2) the base child support for their income is $2,967.00; (3) the
petitioner makes 53% of the combined income, while the respondent makes 47% of the
combined income; (4) the parties' respective shares of the child support obligation are: petitioner,
$1,573.00 and respondent, $1,394.00.
164. The court orders the respondent to pay $1,394.00 for the support of the five minor
children as of the first date of trial, November 22, 2006.
XII. STOCKS
A. Novell Stock
165. On May 7, 2002, the court awarded the petitioner the Novell stock as her sole and
separate property, pursuant to a stipulation of the parties. See May 2002 Order at ^f 9. The
petitioner testified that she sold this stock in December 2004 and used the $14,000.00 she
received for attorney's fees. The respondent testified that he is not making a claim for this stock,
but argues that the court "can consider this stock division in the other property divisions and do
equity in this case." As the respondent provided no support for the petitioner during the early
months of their separation, the court is not inclined to set off this stock and its value against any
other property of the marriage. Thus, the respondent shall not receive a credit for this amount.
B. CINTAS Stock
166. In 1997 the petitioner received a gift of CINTAS stock from her uncle; she placed
the CINTAS stock in a private and separate account. See Trial Exhibit 2 at January 2001
statement. The respondent accused her, during a session of marriage counseling, of not being a
"team player"--due to the separate CINTAS stock account. Because of that accusation, she felt
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coerced to place the CINTAS stock into a joint account in January 2001. Id. at April 2001
statement. The respondent's name did not appear on the account until April 2001; however, the
respondent had access to the account as early as January 2001.
167. In April 2001 the respondent borrowed against the CINTAS stock to purchase
other stock without the petitioner's permission. Id. Subsequently, on July 19, 2001 the
respondent sold the CINTAS stock for $31,784.98. Id. at July 2001 Statement. However, the
parties only received approximately $18,000 in cash, since the remaining proceeds were used to
pay off the respondent's outstanding debt for the purchase of the other stocks. The petitioner has
not successfully demonstrated for the court that she did not receive any benefit from the
remaining monies, which were used to buy other stocks.
168. The court finds that the CINTAS stock was the petitioner's separate property and
that it retained its separate identity, despite being moved into a joint account. The respondent
certainly did not contribute to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of the stock or its
value and did not, thereby, acquire an equitable interest in it. Oliekan v. Oliekan, 147 P.3d 464,
469 (Utah Ct. App. 2006), citing Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988).
Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to a judgment of $18,000.00 against the respondent.
169. The petitioner testified that she used the $ 18,000 in cash to support the family
between the time the parties separated in October 2001 until the May 2002 Order entered. See
also Trial Exhibit 11 and 12. Since this $18,000.00 was her sole and separate property and
marital funds should have been used to support the family instead, the court now awards her a
judgment for $18,000.00 and, further, finds that this $18,000 is classified as family support
and/or maintenance, since the funds were spent to support the family. This $18,000.00 debt was
incurred before the filing of the bankruptcy petition judgment.
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C. TwinLabs Stock
170. Refer to "Home Equity Line of Credit/Second Mortgage" category above.
XIII. MARITAL DEBTS
A. Pre-separation Debt
171. After the parties separated, the petitioner transferred a joint, marital MBNA credit
card debt of $2,400.00 into her name only; the respondent does not dispute that the MBNA debt
is a marital debt. The court awards judgment now against the respondent for $1,200.00, as his
share of his marital debt.
B. Debt During Separation
172. At approximately the same time the parties separated, the respondent took out a
$1,900.00 quick draw loan. The petitioner testified that she never saw this money, but that she
ultimately paid this loan back. The respondent failed to offer any evidence regarding this issue.
The court shall now awards the petitioner a judgment against the respondent for $1,900.00. This
debt was incurred before the filing of the bankruptcy petition judgment.
XIV. TAX EXEMPTIONS
173. The respondent requested that the parties split the tax exemptions every year.
The court makes the following order: (1) The parties will split the tax exemptions each year; (2)
If there is an odd number of children still receiving child support, the parties will alternate the
extra deduction every other year with the petitioner being granted the odd-child exemption on
odd-numbered years and the respondent being granted the exemption on even-numbered years.
Therefore, for example, the petitioner will claim the odd-child exemption this year, 2007.
174. However, the respondent may not claim the children as tax exemptions unless he
is current on his obligations to the children, pursuant to the appropriate statutes which deal with
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this issue.
XV. CONTEMPT
A. Respondent's Contempt for Repeated Discovery Delays (i.e.,
Psychological Records, Financial Records, Changing Position Regarding
Custody) and Failures to Comply with Court Orders
175. Petitioner requested that the court find the respondent in contempt for his
numerous discovery delays and repeated failures to comply with court orders; she also requested
a monetary judgment against the respondent as a sanction. While the court holds both parties
responsible for their failures to respond adequately to discovery requests, the court will not find
the respondent in contempt for altering his goals in this litigation, i.e., supervised visitation, etc.
The nature of divorce litigation is that, after discovery, court hearings, and negotiations, parties
change their minds about what should be pursued during the litigation. Holding parties in
contempt for changes of strategy would stagnate divorce litigation and prevent settlement. In
addition, the court will not hold the parties in contempt for failure to provide discovery regarding
discovery which would have never been admitted, pursuant to state statutes, i.e., polygraph
results. Finally, the court will not hold the respondent in contempt for filing his bankruptcy
petition, as the court has no persuasive evidence before it that the only reason for filing the
petition was to delay the divorce proceeding.
176. On November 8, 2006, the petitioner filed a Motion for Default Judgment and
memorandum in support ("Default Judgment Memorandum"), wherein she outlined a history of
the respondent's repeated discovery delays and failures to comply with court orders. See
November 8, 2006 Default Judgment Memorandum.
177. Beginning in July 2002, the petitioner served her first discovery request upon the
respondent. See August 2002 Certificate of Service. However, in his August 2002 responses,
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the respondent failed to provide, among other things, a financial declaration (not produced until
May 2003), monthly statements from his bank accounts and credit card accounts and complete
information on his life insurance policy. See Respondent's Answers attached to Default
Judgment Memorandum as Exhibit A.
178. In September 2003, the petitioner served another discovery request upon the
respondent to produce all test results for ISAT, sexual or psychological examinations and any
tests with Dr. C.Y. Roby. See September 2003 Certificate of Delivery of Discovery. After five
months the respondent had failed to respond to this discovery request. See Pleadings. Thus, in
March 2004, the Guardian ad Litem filed a Motion to Compel for the same test results that the
petitioner was seeking. See March 2004 Motion to Compel.
179. By August 2004, the respondent still had not provided any further discovery. See
Pleadings. Thus, the petitioner filed a Motion to Compel production of the sexual test results and
financial information (i.e., a current financial statement, all bank and credit card information
from September 2001 through June 2004 and a list of deposits and purchases). See August 19,
2004 Affidavit in Support of Motion to Compel. The respondent filed an opposition
memorandum claiming he had already provided the requested discovery or the documents were
not in his possession. See September 20, 2004 Response to Petitioner's Motion to Compel.
180. The parties came before the court in September 2004 on the petitioner's Motion
to Compel. See September 21, 2004 docket entry. However, the day before the motion to
compel hearing, the respondent provided documents that were partially responsive to the
petitioner's first discovery request from more than two years ago. See Respondent's September
2004 Responses attached to Default Judgment Memorandum as Exhibit F. Further, the
respondent also failed to produce the psychological and sexual test results as requested in
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September 2003. Id.
181. At the September 2004 motion to compel hearing, the court ordered the
respondent to comply with "all [of Petitioner's] requested documents within two weeks",
including the production of signed releases for "all psychosexual records as well as the other
requested discovery." See September 21, 2004 Order at ^j 3. However, the respondent provided
the petitioner only one signed release for Dr. Roby. See Respondent's October 6, 2004 Second
Supplemental Response to Petitioner's Request for Production of Documents attached to Default
Judgment Memorandum as Exhibit H.
182. In October 2004, more than two weeks after the court's order, the petitioner filed
a notice with the court of the respondent's refusal to sign the remaining releases, including a
release for ISAT.15 See October 12, 2004 Notice to Court of Willful Refusal. Immediately
thereafter, the respondent filed a notice with the court claiming he had allegedly complied with
the court's order, when in reality he had only signed one release and failed to produce any other
documents. See October 18, 2004 Notice to the Court of Respondent's Compliance.
183. In March 2005, the petitioner filed a motion on order to show cause regarding
discovery issues. See March 2005 Motion in Support of Order to Show Cause. She requested
that the respondent show cause why he should not be sent to jail for his failure to produce, among
other things, a current financial declaration, signed releases for various financial institutions, and
a list of deposits and purchases. Id. at ^ 3-7.
184. In April 2005, at the order to show cause hearing, the court again found that the
respondent "has not been forthcoming in his efforts to comply with multiple discovery requests.

Petitioner's Notice also indicated that she had not received a release for Dr. Roby. However, Petitioner
filed her Notice on October 8 and Respondent indicates he filed his release for Dr. Roby on October 6. Thus,
Petitioner had not yet received the release for Dr. Roby when she filed this notice.
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However, to strike his pleadings would be a last resort by the Court." See April 18, 2005 Order
at 1[ 3. Also, the court again ordered the respondent to sign releases for all requested information
(i.e., financial, psychosexual, etc.). Id. at f 5. Further, the court "ordered Respondent to serve
five (5) days in the Utah County Jail as a direct result of his continued non-compliance with
discovery requests and contempt of court in this matter." Id. at % 8. However, the court stayed
the sentence because the county jail was near capacity "and only for that reason." Id. If the
respondent failed to sign the releases within two weeks of the hearing, he was to be "ordered to
serve these five (5) days in the Utah County Jail at the next hearing." Id.
185. The following week, the respondent filed another notice of compliance with the
court. See April 28, 2005 Notice of Compliance. Further, the respondent testified at trial that in
a subsequent review hearing on May 16, 2005, he indicated to the court that all the releases had
been signed and discovery was complete. However, the respondent admitted at trial that he had
actually withdrawn his releases from Dr. Roby on May 9, 2005, almost two weeks before the
review hearing at which the respondent indicated all releases had been signed. Although the
respondent claimed at trial that he withdrew his release after "everything had been gotten a hold
of by lawyers", the petitioner testified that she did not receive the documents until November
2005.
186. In early April 2006, the petitioner sent another discovery request, but the
respondent failed to timely respond. See April 11, 2006 Certificate of Service of Discovery. In
May 2006, the parties came before the court for yet another hearing on discovery. See May 15,
2006 Docket Entry.
187. Also in mid-May 2006, at a pretrial conference, the court ordered the respondent
to respond to the petitioner's discovery requests and trial was rescheduled for August 2006.

Finally, at the end of June, the respondent responded to Petitioner's April 2006 discovery. See
Respondent's June 2006 Responses to Petitioner's Second Set of Interrogatories attached to
Default Judgment Memorandum as Exhibit S. However, his answers to the interrogatories were
incomplete and evasive. Id. For example, in response to Interrogatory No. 4, the respondent
failed to identify the amounts in each account or the account numbers. Id. Also, in response to
Interrogatory No. 5, the respondent did not identify a branch or account location for each
account. Id. Most significant was the respondent's refusal to answer interrogatories 8-15
because they allegedly went beyond the amount of interrogatories allowed under the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. Id. In addition, the respondent failed to produce any documents. Id.
188. In mid-July 2006, the petitioner filed a motion to compel the respondent to
produce the remaining discovery. See July 13, 2006 Motion to Compel Further, because the
respondent had not provided the requested discovery by the end of July 2006, the petitioner was
forced to file a motion to continue the trial. See July 28, 2006 Motion to Continue Trial Date.
189. At the phone conference, the court agreed to continue the trial again to November
2006. See July 31, 2006 Docket Entry. Also, at a subsequent pretrial hearing on August 24,
2006, the court again ordered the respondent to produce specified documents by September 24,
2006. See August 24, 2006 Order. Further, at this hearing, Judge Taylor stated:
Now, if I authorize Mr. Weckel to withdraw, I will not, I will not change these
deadlines.... So when you go to hire new counsel, if you go hire new counsel, you
must tell them, ' J have discovery deadlines in place... which will not be moved
unless somebody dies....'
See August 24, 2006 Audio Recording.
190. The parties scheduled the depositions of the respondent and his new wife for
October 11. See October, 2, 2006 Notice of Deposition. However, these depositions never took

place due to the respondent's failure to timely produce discovery. On October 17, 2006 the
parties had another phone conference with the court. See October 17, 2006 Docket Entry. Once
again the court ordered the respondent to complete discovery. Id. The respondent's deposition
was rescheduled for November 6, 2006. See October 25, 2006 Notice of Deposition. However,
the respondent failed to timely produce the discovery as ordered by the court. See Pleadings and
November 14, 2006 Order at | 5.
191. Finally, on November 7, 2006 (two weeks before trial) the petitioner filed a
Motion for Default Judgment because she had not yet received discovery from the respondent as
ordered by the Court. See November 7, 2006 Motion for Default Judgment. This motion was
ultimately denied; however, the court found that, because of the respondent's long-term failure to
respond to discovery requests, a sanction of five (5) days in jail was appropriate. In her proposed
memorandum decision, the petition quotes an order which can not be found in the court file;
however, the court's minute entry reflects the order of jail. The respondent was given time to
purge that contempt by replying to the requested discovery. His request to continue the trial, due
to the late entry of his new attorney, was denied. The court finds that, through the efforts of his
new attorney, the respondent substantially complied with the discovery requests by the time of
trial.
192. Accordingly, the court makes a finding that the respondent has displayed a
distinct pattern of withholding, evading and avoiding discovery and that he has repeatedly failed
to comply with court orders. The petitioner requests a judgment against the respondent in the
amount of $10,000 as a sanction for his behavior. This court does not believe that a $10,000
sanction is appropriate in this matter. However, the court believes that the respondent's
intentional efforts to thwart discovery have increased the petitioner's attorney's fees substantially

and will, therefore, increase her award of attorney's fees accordingly.
B. Petitioner is Not in Contempt
193. Although not clearly requested, the court infers that the respondent sought to have
the court also find the petitioner in contempt for allegedly failing to comply with discovery. It is
undisputed that in early 2005, the petitioner did not produce documentation for two bank
accounts. The petitioner testified that she did not produce said documents because the
respondent had been using the information to interfere with her accounts. The court ordered on
March 7, 2005 that neither party could use the information received pursuant to discovery to
interfere with any accounts of the other party. See March 7, 2005 Order at ^| 1. The court also
ordered the petitioner to produce the requested documents within two weeks, but the court never
made a finding that the petitioner was in contempt. Id. at ^[ 2.
194. Subsequently, the respondent testified this same issue arose on February 23,
2006. However, this was merely a pretrial conference and no motions were pending regarding
the petitioner's discovery. The respondent also testified that this same issue arose in the August
24, 2006 hearing. Yet, the only motion pending for that hearing was Petitioner's Motion to
Compel Respondent to produce discovery. The respondent had not filed any motions claiming
the petitioner failed to comply with discovery; the judge simply ordered the petitioner sua sponte
to produce the same documents that the respondent was ordered to produce.
195. The court does note that there were delays in this case because the petitioner
changed attorneys-one change resulting in a delay of trial.
196. Accordingly, the court does not find the petitioner in contempt, but notes that her
hands are not completely clean.
C. Contempt for Individual Issues
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197. Refer to the individual issues above for the court's finding of contempt as to each
issue. XVI.
ATTORNEYS'FEES
A. Fourth District Court Domestic Case
198. Both parties requested that they be awarded attorneys' fees for this domestic
matter.

This court has authority to award attorneys' fees and costs "upon determining that the

party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defenses." U.C.A. § 30-3-3(2). Further, an award
of attorneys' fees must be based on the reasonableness of the fees requested, the financial need of
the receiving spouse and the ability of the other spouse to pay." Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036,
1040 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted).
199. Has the petitioner substantially prevailed upon her claims? The court looks at the
overall success of the petitioner on the important issues. The petitioner did successfully obtain
imputation of the respondent's salary, but not the higher level she sought. While she was
awarded somewhat less than she requested for child support, she was not at all successful in her
quest for a exorbitant amount of future alimony. She wasted incredible amounts of time, energy,
and attorney's fees on small issues, such as the gym equipment and the entertainment center. She
was successful in her request regarding the CINTAS stock, but not regarding the Twin Labs
stock. She was not awarded the $64,000 she wanted for making the house payments, but she was
awarded a substantial amount of the money she put into the repair and maintenance of the marital
home. She was also rewarded some reimbursement for the home equity line of credit. She was
not awarded the child-care expenses she sought. Overall, the petitioner was not successful in her
presentation of many of the major issues before this court.
200. The court must also evaluate the reasonableness of the fees, the financial needs of

the petitioner, and the ability of the respondent to pay her fees. The court finds that the fees
incurred by the petitioner are not reasonable, but are truly beyond reason for a marital estate of
this size. The court is appalled at the effort that went into minor areas, such as the $180.00 in
used gym equipment and the used $75.00 entertainment center. Some of the petitioner's requests
were absurd, such as the amount requested for alimony and reimbursement for all of the house
payments. The respondent should not have to pay for attorney's fees incurred in pursuing such
unreasonable requests.
201. However, the court does consider reasonable an award of attorney's fees based
upon the respondent's pattern of obstructing the discovery process. The failure of the
respondent to timely and fully respond to the petitioner's discovery requests has certainly
increased her attorney's fees in this matter. See the discussion on contempt.
202. As for the financial needs of the petitioner, she makes more money than the
respondent and will be receiving monthly financial help from him. She is more than capable of
paying her own attorney's fees, as is the respondent capable of paying his own fees.
B. Previous Orders to Show Cause
203. An award of some of the petitioner's attorneys' fees could also be independently
based upon every order to show cause in which she substantially prevailed:
•

In the May 2002 Order, the petitioner was awarded custody, child support, health
insurance, car insurance, Novell stock, child care expenses. See May 7, 2002 Order.
In the June 2004 Order, the petitioner was awarded reimbursement for reasonable child
care expenses. See June 24, 2004 Order. Also, the respondent's request to alter
alimony was denied because he had not completed psychosexual testing as previously
ordered by the Court. Id.

•

In the September 2004 Order, the respondent was ordered to produce requested
documents within two weeks and to sign the necessary releases. See September 21,
2004 Order. The petitioner also received a judgment for unpaid child care expenses.

Id.
•

In the December 2004 Order, the respondent was ordered to sell the RV and his request
to stay garnishment proceedings was denied. See December 2, 2004 Order.

•

In the August 28, 2006 Order, the court entered a judgment against the respondent for
unpaid child support, medical insurance and child care expenses. See August 28, 2006
Order. Further, the court made a finding that "Petitioner's attorney substantially
prevailed on the issues before the court." Id. at f 5.

Since the issue of attorneys' fees was reserved for each of these matters, the court now finds that
the petitioner's general award of attorneys' fees is also based on the petitioner's success in each
of these individual orders to show cause.
204. Further, the court already awarded the petitioner attorneys' fees in the April 2005
and June 2006 Orders. See April 18, 2005 Order at f 7 and June 15, 2006 Order at f 4. Rather
than require an individual affidavit of attorneys' fees for each order to show cause, the court will
accept a final, all-inclusive affidavit of fees incurred by the petitioner throughout this litigation.
C. Conclusion as to Petitioner's Divorce Litigation Fees
205. The court finds that the petitioner was not substantially successful on the issues
she presented to the court, that the total bill for attorney's fees and costs of $83,349.61 was not
reasonable, and that she makes more money than the respondent and will be receiving financial
help from him on a monthly basis. On the other hand, the respondent's efforts to avoid or delay
discovery have cost the petitioner a great deal in attorney's fees and delays. Therefore, the court
finds it appropriate that the respondent should pay for 15% of the petitioner's attorney's fees, for
a total of $12,502.00. The court will allow the respondent to pay this amount, with the statutory
interest, over the next 10 years at the rate of $1,250.24 per year, plus the appropriate interest.
C. Bankruptcy Attorneys' Fees
206. Petitioner requested that a judgment enter against the respondent in this matter for

attorneys' fees she has incurred in the Bankruptcy Court. In Condie v. Condie, 139 P.3d 271
(Utah Ct. App. 2006), the Court of Appeals explained that "as a general rule, attorney fees are
not awardable under federal bankruptcy law [in a bankruptcy action] for enforcement of
obligations contained in a divorce decree." Id. at 275. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the
trial court erred in ruling that the wife should have requested her fees in the Bankruptcy Court.
Instead, the Court of Appeals' holding implied that the former wife must seek an award in state
court for attorneys' fees incurred in a bankruptcy action. Id. at 276. See also In re Marriage of
Wright 841 P.2d 358 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
207. Further, the Court of Appeals explained that the state trial court had authority to
award bankruptcy attorneys' fees to the former wife pursuant to UTAH CODE. ANN. § 30-3-3(2),
which provides that, "[i]n any action to enforce an order of.. . child support, alimony, or
division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon
determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense."
208. In compliance with U.C.A. § 30-3-3(2), the petitioner testified that she filed an
adversarial proceeding against the respondent in the bankruptcy court in order to save the marital
home. Ms. Drake, the petitioner's bankruptcy attorney, also testified that the petitioner filed the
adversarial proceeding to protect the marital home and to prevent the respondent from
discharging his family debts to the petitioner (e.g., child support, alimony, etc.). Similar to
Condie, Ms. Drake confirmed that the petitioner will not receive an award of her bankruptcy
attorneys' fees in the Bankruptcy Court.
209. Using the same analysis as above, this court finds that the petitioner was
somewhat substantially successful on the bankruptcy-related issues of child support, but not on
alimony. The issue of the marital home was not litigated before ihis court, while the issues of

personal property were-to some small extent.
210. Accordingly, this court awards the petitioner her attorneys' fees incurred in the
bankruptcy action at the same rate as in the divorce case proper-10%. See U.C.A. § 30-3-3(2).
See also Condie, 139 P.3d at 274-76. In addition, Ms. Drake submitted an affidavit of attorneys'
fees for the bankruptcy case in the amount of $26,401.00 as of December 12, 2006. See Trial
Exhibit 28. Ms. Drake testified about her experience in bankruptcy law and stated that her fees
were reasonable for someone with her experience in Salt Lake County. This court finds that the
bankruptcy attorneys' fees incurred by the petitioner are reasonable. The court orders the
respondent to pay the sum of $3,960.00 in attorney's fees for Ms. Drake's work in the bankruptcy
matter. The court will allow the respondent to pay this amount, with the statutory interest, over
the next 5 years at the rate $792.00per year, plus the appropriate interest.
D. Attorney's Fees for the Respondent
211. As the respondent has not requested that the petitioner pay his attorney's fees, the
court makes no corresponding order, nor does the court believe that such an order would be
appropriate.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Court concludes that it has both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over
the issues, children and parties in this action.
2. The Court concludes that the parties are entitled to orders relating to real property,
personal property, debts and obligations, alimony, property rights, issues relating to the children
including but not limited to child support, day care, visitation, and tax exemptions; and
attorney's fees as more fully set forth in the foregoing Findings of Fact.
DATED this c*>\ day of

WvJL

, 2008.

CLAUDIA;LAYCOC4_ ,
Fourth Disfridt\pourt Judge '

U.R.C.R RULE 7(f) NOTICE
The foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law has been submitted to the Court for
execution and entry. Rule 7(f), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allows five (5) days
following hand-delivery, or five (5) days plus three (3) days for mailing if service by mail, for
opposing counsel or opposing parties to submit notice of objection. If such objection as to form
is not received within the prescribed time period, the Order will be submitted for signing by the
Court.
DATED this
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE

VALERIE J. CONNELL,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. 024400765

HAROLD G. CONNELL,

DATE: 29 May 2007
Judge Claudia Laycock

Defendants.

Division 3
This matter came before the Court for trial on November 22 and December 8,19 and
20, 2006. Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Douglas B. Thayer and Nancee
Tegeder. Respondent was present and represented by counsel, Scott P. Card. Although there is
also a protective order case pending (Case No. 064401019) between the parties, it is a separate
matter and will not be addressed as part of this divorce case. The Court having heard evidence,
having reviewed the file and the pleadings herein, and having entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law now hereby enters the following Decree of Divorce.
DECREE OF DIVORCE
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FACTS
1. Valerie J. Connell ("the petitioner") and Harold G. Connell("the respondent") were
married in November 22, 1986.
2. At the time of the marriage, petitioner had one daughter, Heather Stacey Connell,
bom August 23, 1982. Respondent adopted Heather in 1990.
3. The parties also had six biological children during the course of the marriage:
Meaghan Tovey Connell, born October 22, 1987; Spencer Ward Connell, born January 16, 1991;
Cameron Wenger Connell, bom October 17, 1993; Madison Evans Connell, born August 19,
1995; Cassidy Ford Connell, bom December 23, 1997; and Caitlyn Phelps Connell, born April 8,
2000.
4. In 2001 the parties separated several times from the beginning of May through the
summer. They separated on permanent basis in the beginning of Oct 2001.
5. The petitioner filed a petition for divorce on April 4, 2002.
6. Judge James R. Taylor signed an order bifurcating the proceedings and granting the
petitioner a divorce on September 12, 2005.
7. On October 14, 2005-during the pendency of this divorce action—the respondent
filed a bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah
("Bankruptcy Court") (case no. 05-39070).
8. Together the parties own a home at 865 East Cascade Drive, Orem, Utah. On
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September 8, 2001, their monthly mortgage statement showed a balance owing of $163, 562.45,
while on September 8, 2001, the balance was $163,562.45. Shortly before the time of
trial-September 11, 2006-the balance was $151,982.91.
9. Since October 2001 the petitioner has made all of the monthly payments on the
home-a total of $64,700.00.
10. The parties purchased the home for $175,000.00 in 1995, at which time the home
had 3 finished bedrooms and 2 partially finished bedrooms.
11. During the marriage the respondent attempted to finish portions of the homes,
including putting up, taping and mudding sheetrock, adding electrical outlets, framing closets,
and working on, at least, one bathroom addition. He did the work himself, but was not a licensed
contractor.
12. After the respondent moved out, the petitioner added built-in shelves and hanging
bars in a bedroom, finished some of the electrical work, added all new framing around the
windows and trim, texturized and painted some of the walls, re-did some of the drywall, and
fixed some problems in one bathroom.
13. She also installed an intercom system ($2,413.36, May 3, 2002), installed an
outdoor shed $425.00, July 6, 2004), replaced the furnace and the water heater ($3,519.00,
November 13, 2003)), and replaced the shake roof with an asphalt-shingled roof ($10,752.00,
September 9 and 13, 2005), installing "Sola tubes" ($433.47, October 12, 2005). She also did
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other types of repair and home maintenance, as found in Exhibits 3 and 4.
14. A second mortgage or line of equity credit was taken out by the parties in January
2001 for the purpose of refinancing the RV and purchasing the Twin Lab stock. By stipulation of
the parties at a hearing on May 7, 2002, the parties were ordered to sell the Twin Lab stock and
use the proceeds to fix the RV's transmission so that the RV could be sold, using the remainder
of the proceeds to pay on the line of credit. The proceeds from the RV were to be applied to the
line of credit, as well.
16. The respondent paid $1,200 to repair the RV transmission; that sum did not come
out of the stock proceeds. The RV was eventually sold for $4,000, but the respondent gave the
money to his attorney, who later gave the money to his bankruptcy trustee.
17. The respondent made the payments on the line of credit until October 2005; the
petitioner has been making the payments since then. The debt balance is now approximately
$19,000.
18. The Twin Lab stock (10,000 shares) was purchased in March 2001 by the parties at
the price of $1.3125 per share for a total, minus commissions, of $13,425.00. Its highest value
was in April 2001, when it shot up to $2.6400 per share, for a total value of $26,400.00. It then
began its decline in value, which continued until the parties sold the stock on March 3, 2003 for a
value of $1,209.46. At the time of the May 2, 2002 hearing, the approximate value of the stock
was $7,900, while at the time the order was signed on June 10, 2002, the approximate value of
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the stock was $4,400.00.
19. Although the respondent changed the password to the account, the petitioner did
nothing herself-other than several phone calls-to get access to me account or to sell the stock
herself.
20. At the hearing on May 7, 2002 the parties also stipulated that the Novell stock
purchased at the same time as the Twin Lab stock was awarded to the petitioner as her sole and
separate property and that the parties were mutually restrained from dissipating, encumbering, or
hiding assets.
21. In May 2002, the respondent was ordered to maintain health insurance on the
petitioner and the minor children during the pendency of this acuun. m October 2005, the
respondent cancelled the petitioner's health insurance. The children were also not covered for a
time after April 30, 2006.
22. The respondent failed to pay $1,017.84 in health insurance premiums for August
through November 2006. This court had previously entered judgments for other health
insurance premiums not paid by the respondent.
23. In May 2002 the respondent was ordered to maintain car insurance on all of the
parties' vehicles. From May 5, 2006 through the time of trial, the respondent failed to pay
$85.63 in car insurance premiums.
24. In May 2002 each party was ordered to pay one-half of all unreimbursed medical
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and dental expenses, commencing October 23, 2001. From May 2006 through the time of trial,
the respondent failed to pay the petitioner $82.50 for one-half of unreimbursed medical expenses.
25. In May 2002 the Court temporarily awarded the respondent the GMC truck and the
LaSalle trailer. During the pendency of this action, the respondent sold the GMC truck for
$3,500.00 and LaSalle trailer for approximately $1,500.00.
26. During 2003 the petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,116.67, with
the respondent's average monthly share amounting to $558.33.
27. During 2004 the petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,601.83, with
the respondent's average monthly share amounting to $800.92.
28. During 2005 the petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,503.91, with
the respondent's average monthly share amounting to $751.95.
29. During 2006 petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,246.60, with the
respondent's average monthly share amounting to $623.30.
30. The petitioner travels for her employment approximately once per month for 3-5
days.
31. The petitioner spends approximately $1,194.76 per month on her mortgage
payments, $84.75 on maintaining the residence, $461.84 on food and household supplies,
$104.15 on utilities, $207.93 on clothing, $98.06 on medical and dental, $1,200.96 on child care,
$314.20 on education, $107.28 on entertainment, $45.05 on grooming, $136.51 on gifts, $710.60
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on donations, $377.15 on auto expenses, $1,900.00 on installment payments and $87.74 on
computer expenses. She also voluntarily donates $710.60 per month to the LDS Church.
32. The petitioner currently works full-time and makes approximately $6,669 gross per
month in income. She began her new job in November 2003.
33. At the time of the parties' separation, they were living only on the respondent's
income.
34. The respondent worked for the LDS Church from approximately June 2001 through
October 2003. When he stopped working for the LDS church, he was earning approximately
$2,574.00 gross per two-week pay period, or $5,577.00 gross per month ($66,924.00 per year).
35. The respondent worked for BYU from October 2003 through February 17, 2006.
Before the respondent was terminated from his position at BYU, he grossed approximately
$5,996.00 gross per month ($71,952.00 per year). See Trial Exhibit 23 at p.5.
36. The respondent voluntarily resigned from BYU, because he failed to maintain an
LDS temple recommend as required for employment. He lost his temple recommend because he
was excommunicated.
37. The respondent began his current employment with Medicity in May 2006, where
he earns $5,000.00 gross per month ($60,000.00 per year).
38. The respondent married Brenda Louise Bruni in October 2005.
39. The respondent pays his second wife's monthly house payment of $752.00. He also

7

2z

pays her $1,500.00 per month to help with living expenses.
40. Ms. Bruni's daughter, Sarah, has always lived with them. Her 18th birthday was in
April, 2006, at which time Ms. Bruni's child support for Sarah ended. Sarah pays her mother
$360.00 per month (and sometimes less) to help with expenses.
41. Ms. Bruni's older daughter and infant child also lived with them from February
through April 2006, as did Ms. Bruni's mother from January or February 2006. Her mother has
helped her financially at times. Her mother has terminal cancer.
42. In 1997 the petitioner received a gift of CINTAS stock from her uncle; she placed
the CINTAS stock in a private and separate account.
43. The respondent accused her, during a session of marriage counseling, of not being
a "team player"—due to the separate CINTAS stock account. Because of that accusation, she felt
coerced to place the CINTAS stock into a joint account in January 2001.
44. The respondent's name did not appear on the account's monthly statements until
April 2001; however, the respondent had access to the account as early as January 2001.
45. In April 2001 the respondent borrowed against the CINTAS stock to purchase other
stock without the petitioner's permission.
46. Subsequently, on July 19, 2001 the respondent sold the CINTAS stock for
$31,784.98. However, the parties only received approximately $18,000 in cash, as the remaining
amounts had been used by the respondent to purchase other stocks.
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47. At approximately the same time the parties separated, the respondent took out a
$1,900.00 quick draw loan. The petitioner never saw this money, hut she ultimately paid this
loan back.
I. BANKRUPTCY ISSUES RELATED TO THIS DIVORCE ACTION
48. On October 14, 2005, the respondent filed a bankruptcy petition in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah ("Bankruptcy Court") (Case No. 05-39070).
The petitioner's claims for alimony, support and/or maintenance will receive a priority payment
as part of distribution of the estate in the bankruptcy case.1 Under Utah case law, said claims
may also include attorneys' fees spent in pursuit of payment for alimony, support, maintenance,
custody and/or visitation.2
49. Therefore, the petitioner is seeking to have this court categorize as many as possible
as pre-bankruptcy-petition-filing judgments and as an award for alimony, support or maintenance
(or fees incurred in obtaining these judgments) in order to protectf her claims in Bankruptcy
Court.
50. Further, the Bankruptcy Court will not consider any claims against the respondent

1

As of the morning of the first day of trial, the bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction
over the marital home only, leaving all personal property issues and other debt issues to this
court. Therefore, this court makes no decision regarding the disposition of the parties' equity in
the marital home.
2

See Seals v. Condie, 139 P.3d 271, 277 (Utah App. 2006) ("Those determinations 'restQ
primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court.'" Cites omitted.).
9
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that were incurred after his bankruptcy petition was filed, i.e., child support arrearages arising
after October 2005. The Bankruptcy Court will only deal with claims against the respondent that
arose prior to the respondent's filing of his bankruptcy petition.
II. BIFURCATION OF THE DIVORCE AND DATE OF THE DECREE
51. On April 28, 2005, Respondent filed a Motion to Bifurcate Divorce and an
Affidavit in Support. On May 16, 2005, Commissioner Patton denied Respondent's Motion to
Bifurcate. On September 1, 2005, Respondent filed a Motion to Reconsider Ruling for
Bifurcated Divorce. However, as so many attorneys do, the respondent simultaneously submitted
a proposed Bifurcated Divorce Decree. Judge James R. Taylor inadvertently signed the
Bifurcated Divorce Decree on September 12, 2005.
52. Subsequently, on October 7, 2005, the parties came before Judge Taylor, who
heard arguments and granted the respondent's motion to reconsider the commissioner's ruling.
Later in the hearing, Judge Taylor discovered the signed Bifurcated Divorce Decree in the file; he
then reprimanded the respondent's attorney for filing a motion to reconsider, instead of an
objection to the commissioner's ruling. Nevertheless, he left his decision in place and granted
the motion to reconsider. He did not order either party to prepare a new order of bifurcation, as
neither attorney brought up that particular subject. There was absolutely no discussion between
the attorneys and the court regarding a change of date for the decree.
53. This court can now only assume that Judge Taylor was content to leave the
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previously signed order in place. Therefore, this court will not amend the date nunc pro tunc (as
requested by the petitioner), but will leave the date of divorce as September 12, 2005.
III. CUSTODY AND VISITATION
54. Pursuant to an Order and Stipulation entered on July 28, 2006, the respondent shall
not exercise or attempt to exercise visitation with the minor children unless the visitation time is
supervised by a third party professional visitation supervisor such as ACAFS or WillWin. Due
to the prior sexual abuse issues involving the respondent and the children, the respondent has
permanently waived his right to have unsupervised visitation. Thus, the petitioner is awarded
sole legal and physical custody of the minor children.
55. Further, while the respondent may attend public Junctions in which the minor
children are involved, such as plays or sporting events, he is not allowed to visit with the children
before, during or after the events. Also, the respondent may not attend the church where the
children are attending.
56. The only remaining issue at trial regarding visitation concerned telephonic
visitation. Pursuant to the petitioner's testimony, the parties had previously agreed to the
Guardian ad Litem's recommendation that the respondent be allowed to call the children between
5:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. on Tuesdays and Thursdays. The respondent did not dispute these times
for telephonic visitation, nor did he dispute that he had previously agreed to these times. Further,
the Guardian ad Litem recommended that the children should be allowed to call the respondent
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whenever they want. Neither party disputed this recommendation. In fact, when questioned at
trial, the respondent agreed with the recommendation.
57. Accordingly, the respondent's telephonic visitation shall be set on Tuesdays and
Thursdays between 5:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. or whenever the children want to call the respondent.
IV. MARITAL HOME
58. Due to the respondent's pending bankruptcy, this court does not have jurisdiction
to award either party equity in the marital home. Petitioner urges this court to make a finding
that mortgage payments and home improvement expenses she has paid constitute family support
and/or maintenance, because it was necessary to provide a habitable home for the children.
Further, she urges the court to enter a judgment against the respondent for the amount that the
petitioner spent on the mortgage and improvements.
A. First Mortgage
59. Petitioner has lived in the family home with the children and has made the
payments on the first mortgage since the parties separated in October 2001. In addition, in May
2002 the court ordered the petitioner to make the first mortgage payments. See May 2002 Order
at T| 7. On September 8, 2001, the debt on the marital home was $163,562.45. See Trial Exhibit
1. On December 29, 2001 the debt on the marital home was $162,837.44. Id. Shortly before the
time of trial-September 11, 2006-the debt on the marital home was $151,982.91. Id. Thus, in
construing these numbers in a light most favorable to the respondent, the petitioner has paid
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approximately $10,855 in principal since the parties separated ($ 162,837-$ 151,982 = $10,855).
60. Further, the petitioner testified that she has spent approximately $64,700 on
principal and interest payments from the time the parties separated until the time of trial. Thus,
Petitioner has spent approximately $53,145 on interest payments for this time period ($64,700$10,855 = $53,845).
61. Since this court cannot award her any equity in the marital home, the petitioner
requests that this court enter a judgment against the respondent for the $64,700.00 she has spent
on principal and interest payments for the first mortgage since Octooer 2001. Moreover, the
petitioner requested that this court characterize said judgment as family support and/or
maintenance since providing a home for the children is part of supporting or maintaining the
family. The respondent did not dispute that the petitioner made such payments.
62. This court agrees with the respondent that the petitioner's argument is without
merit. The petitioner has received the benefit and comfort of living in the home and should not be
granted judgment against the respondent for having made the payments on the home. To grant
her a judgment for the $64,700 that she paid toward the mortgage would be the equivalent of
granting her-or the respondent, for that matter, were the tables turned-credit and a judgment for
paying rent, utilities, phone bills, light bulbs, toilet paper, and all other household necessities.
Although all of those bills and items could be characterized as family support and/or
maintenance (since the children need the benefit of all of those bills and items), the court cannot
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find any legal precedent for such a ruling.
63. In addition, she received (or should have received) support in the way of alimony
and child support. She will receive a judgment for any such support not paid by the respondent
during the pendency of this action. To grant her a judgment for unpaid alimony and child
support, plus her mortgage payments, would, in effect, grant her judgment twice and force the
respondent to pay twice. Such a ruling would be outside the bounds of equity.
64. The division of the marital home and any award of equity remains in the domain of
the bankruptcy case. This court will not attempt to make any ruling in that regard, other than to
note, again, that the petitioner has reduced the principal of the first mortgage by $10,855.00 since
the separation of the parties. No evidence was produced which would enable the court to
calculate the reduction of the principal since the time of the bifurcated decree of divorce.
B. Home Improvement
65. During the marriage the respondent attempted to finish portions of the home,
including putting up, taping and mudding sheet rock, adding electrical outlets, framing closets,
and working on, at least, one bathroom addition. He did the work himself, but was not a licensed
contractor. The parties were, apparently, satisfied to let him attempt these improvements while
they were married.
66. After the respondent moved out, the petitioner added built-in shelves and hanging
bars in a bedroom, finished some of the electrical work, added all new framing around the
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windows and trim, texturized and painted some of the walls, re-did some of the drywall, and
fixed some problems in one bathroom.
67. She also installed an intercom system ($2,413.36, May 3, 2002), installed an
outdoor shed $425.00, July 6, 2004), replaced the furnace and the water heater ($3,519.00,
November 13, 2003)), and replaced the shake roof with an asphalt-shingled roof ($10,752.00,
September 9 and 13, 2005), installing "Sola tubes" ($433.47, October 12, 2005). She also did
other types of repair and home maintenance, as found in Exhibits 3 and 4.
68. The petitioner claims that the respondent should pay the amount of $21,885.33 for
the work that she did or had done. See Trial Exhibits 3 and 4. However, this court does not
believe that (1) the respondent should pay for all of the appropriate costs, but that the petitioner
should share in the cost; and (2) that the respondent should pay for improvements and
maintenance costs that were optional.
69. The court finds that the roof replacement ($10,752.00) and the furnace and water
heater replacements ($3,519.00) were necessary and appropriate, as well as the garage door
opener ($298.00). However, the installation of an intercom system ($2,413.36) was not
necessary and the respondent should not have to share in that cost. Id. There were many items
and costs in Exhibit 4 which were unexplained or appeared to be for minor repairs. This court
views the normal, ongoing maintenance and repairs as part of the burden born by the party who
has the benefit of living in the home, pending the conclusion of the divorce action.
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70. Therefore, this court is not persuaded that the respondent should have to bear all of
the costs, as outlined in Exhibit 4, nor should he have to pay for costs beyond those larger-ticket
items which improved the value of the home.
71. Therefore, the parties shall share equally the following costs: roof replacement,
$10,752.00; furnace and water heater, $3,519.00; and garage door opener, $298.00. The court
notes that the petitioner paid for the roof replacement on or about September 20, 2005, which
was when the petitioner paid the balance of the roofing cost. She paid for the furnace and water
heater on November 13, 2003, two years before the decree was signed. She paid for the new
garage door opener on January 6, 2004. All of these costs were incurred before the filing of the
bankruptcy action.
72. The total amount to be shared by the parties is $14,569.00. Each party will pay
one-half or $7,284.50. The respondent is ordered to pay a judgment in the amount of $7,284.50
to petitioner for his share of the improvements to the home. For the purposes of the bankruptcy
proceeding, this court characterizes this judgment as family support and maintenance, because
improvement and maintenance expenses were necessary to provide the children with a habitable
home. All of the $7,284.50 was incurred before the filing of the bankruptcy action.
C. Home Equity Line of Credit/Second Mortgage
73. A line of credit secured by a mortgage on the marital home was taken out by the
parties in January 2001 for the purpose of refinancing the RV and purchasing the Twin Lab
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stock. By stipulation of the parties at a hearing on May 7, 2002, the parties were ordered to sell
the Twin Lab stock and use the proceeds to fix the RV's transmission so that the RV could be
sold, using the remainder of the proceeds to pay on the line of credit. The proceeds from the RV
were to be applied to the line of credit, as well.
74. The respondent paid $1,200 to repair the RV transmission; that sum did not come
out of the stock proceeds. The RV was eventually sold for $4,000. In an order signed on January
5, 2005 (from a December 2, 2004 hearing), the Court ordered the proceeds from the RV sale to
be placed with the respondent's former attorney, James Faust, to hold in trust "until such time as
the Court makes additional orders, or the parties stipulate in writing to a dispersal of the funds."
75. At the October 7, 2005 hearing before Judge Taylor, the parties stipulated that the
RV proceeds should be applied to the line of credit. The respondent was present, according to
the court's minute entry. However, the respondent gave the $4,000 to his attorney, James Faust,
then retrieved the money, and then gave the money to his new attorney, Theodore Weckel. The
court has no evidence before it that the respondent gave his new attorney any instructions
regarding the disposition of the money. Mr. Weckel gave the $4,000 to the bankruptcy trustee.
The court does not find the respondent in contempt for the transfer of the $4,000 to the
bankruptcy trustee, although the court finds that the respondent should pay an extra $2,800
toward the balance owing on the line of credit ($4,000 minus the $1,200 to fix the RV).
76. The respondent made the payments on the line of credit until October 2005; the
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petitioner has been making the payments since then. The debt balance is now approximately
$19,000.
77. The Twin Lab stock (10,000 shares) was purchased in March 2001 by the parties at
the price of $1.3125 per share for a total, minus commissions, of $13,425.00. Its highest value
was in April 2001, when it shot up to $2.6400 per share, for a total value of $26,400.00. It then
began its decline in value, which continued until the parties sold the stock on March 3, 2003 for a
value of $1,209.46 and applied the proceeds to the line of credit. At the time of the May 2, 2002
hearing, the approximate value of the stock was $7,900, while at the time the order was signed on
June 10, 2002, the approximate value of the stock was $4,400.00.
78. Although the respondent changed the password to the account, the petitioner did
nothing herself-other than several phone calls-to get access to the account or to sell the stock
herself. Both parties had the power to sell the stock, while neither party had the power to control
the stock market and the value of the stock. Although the stock's value declined from May 2001
to the time of the May 2002 hearing, neither party sold the stock while its value remained higher
than the original purchase price. By the time of the May 2002 hearing, the stock was already
worth less than the parties had paid for it. Unfortunately, neither party possessed the prophetic
powers necessary to out-guess the stock market, and neither party moved to sell the stock at an
advantageous moment. The court holds neither party responsible for the low value of the stock
when it was finally sold and awards neither party a judgment on this issue.
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79. Therefore, the court divides the remaining balance on the line of equity equally
between the parties ($9,500 each), but orders the respondent to pay an extra $2,800 for the
proceeds of the RV which were not paid toward the line of credit. The court orders the
respondent to pay a judgment in the amount of $12,300.00 for his share of the remaining balance
on the line of credit
80. The court rejects a finding of contempt against the respondent with regard to either
the Twin Lab stock or the RV proceeds. All of the $12,300.00 judgment was incurred before the
filing of the bankruptcy action.
V. HEALTH INSURANCE
A. Respondent's Failure to Maintain Health Insurance
81. In May 2002, Respondent was ordered to maintain health insurance on the
petitioner and the minor children during the pendency of this action. See May 2002 Order at f 4.
However, in October 2005, the respondent cancelled the petitioner's health insurance. See Trial
Exhibit 6.
82. The court already found that the petitioner made a prima facie case for contempt
regarding the respondent's failure to maintain health insurance for the petitioner as ordered by
the court. See Petitioner's May 2006 Order to Show Cause and Order on May 2006 hearing.
Respondent reserved his right to argue at trial "that he should not be held in contempt,
notwithstanding Petitioner making her prima facie case." Id.
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83. Although the respondent testified at trial that he cancelled the petitioner's health
insurance because he was planning to remarry, the Order states he was required to maintain her
health insurance "during the pendency of this action"—not until he remarried. The respondent
further testified that he was not aware of any changes to this Order. Thus, the respondent failed
to meet his burden of showing why he should not be held in contempt for failing to maintain the
petitioner's health insurance.
84. In addition, it is undisputed that the respondent lost insurance for the children on
April 30, 2006. See also Trial Exhibit 6. The petitioner requested that the respondent be found
in contempt for failing to maintain insurance on the children as ordered by the court. The
respondent did not provide any evidence that he provided the children with new insurance
immediately following the loss of coverage on April 30, 2006. In fact, the respondent admitted
that he did not inform the petitioner about her COBRA options for the children when he learned
about them in February.
85. Accordingly, the court finds the respondent in contempt for failing to maintain
health insurance on the petitioner and the children. The petitioner is awarded her attorneys' fees
and costs incurred in obtaining this finding. Further, this court makes a finding that maintaining
health insurance is necessary for family support and maintenance in order to keep the children in
good health.
B. Respondent's Failure to Pay Health Insurance Premiums
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86. Respondent was ordered to pay all costs of premiums associated with health
insurance. See May 2002 Order at % 4. The petitioner testified that she obtained health insurance
once she learned that the respondent had failed to maintain said insurance, yet the respondent
failed to pay anything toward these premiums. On June 16, 2006, the court ordered the
respondent to pay $1050.73 in medical insurance premiums owed as of May 5, 2006.3 See June
16, 2006 Order at 1J1. In addition, on August 28, 2006, the court ordered the respondent to pay
health insurance premiums for June and July 2006, which totaled $509.00.4 See August 28, 2006
Order at f 2. See also Trial Exhibit 5.
87. At trial, the petitioner testified that respondent owed her an additional $1,017.84 in
health insurance premiums for August through November 2006. Petitioner requested that the
court enter a judgment against respondent for this amount. The respondent failed to provide any
evidence that he had been paying insurance premiums to the petitioner.
88. Further, the petitioner requested that the responded be found in contempt for his
failure to pay any medical insurance premiums since insurance was cancelled for the petitioner
and the children. Again, the respondent failed to provide any evidence that he had been paying
insurance premiums during this time period.
89. Accordingly, a judgment will enter against the respondent for $1,017.84 for unpaid
3

The respondent objected to the commissioner's ruling, but the objection was overruled
by Judge Taylor.
4

The court can find no objection in the file to this ruling.
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health insurance premiums. In addition, the court finds the respondent in contempt for failing to
pay insurance premiums after the petitioner's and the children's insurance was cancelled.
Further, these judgments and any fees incurred in obtaining these judgments will be characterized
as family support and/or maintenance, because health insurance premiums are necessary to keep
the children in good health. Moreover, the petitioner is award her attorneys' fees and costs
incurred in obtaining these judgments.
C. Future Health Insurance
90. The petitioner testified that she would like to be the primary insurer for the
children because of the difficulties she has faced in obtaining insurance coverage information
from the respondent. The petitioner also requested that the respondent be required to pay onehalf of the children's health insurance premiums under her plan. The court finds that these are
reasonable requests, as the respondent has failed in the past to insure the children and to notify
the petitioner when coverage ceased. It will be more beneficial to the children for the petitioner
to be in charge of the insurance coverage and their health care. The court orders that the
petitioner's insurance will be the primary coverage for the children and that the respondent will
pay one-half of the cost.
91. If the respondent can obtain a secondary health insurance, which would, in effect,
cover all health costs for the children which are not covered by the petitioner's insurance, the
petitioner will pay for one-half of the cost of such insurance. Otherwise, the parties will simply
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pay one-half each of all uncovered health care costs for the childrejn.
VI. CAR INSURANCE
A. Respondent's Failure to Maintain Car Insurance
92. In May 2002, the respondent was ordered to maintain car insurance on all of the
parties' vehicles. See May 2002 Order at f 5. The respondent testified that he was not aware of
any changes to this Order. However, the petitioner testified that beginning in February 2005 the
respondent failed to make full car insurance premium payments. Thus, on June 16, 2006, the
Court ordered the respondent to pay $1,063.11 in car insurance premiums owed as of May 5,
2006. See June 16, 2006 Order at ^ 1.
93. From the time of this judgment until the time of trial, the respondent failed to pay
$85.63 in car insurance premiums. The respondent failed to provide any evidence to demonstrate
that the Order to maintain car insurance had changed or that he had, indeed, made all the
necessary payments. In addition, the court finds no reason to modify the previous order.
94. Accordingly, the petitioner is granted a judgment against the respondent in the
amount of $85.63 for car insurance premiums. The court also finds that car insurance premiums
are necessary for the support and/or maintenance of the family to allow them to get around and
live their lives. Further, pursuant to the petitioner's request, the court finds the respondent in
contempt for failing to obey this court order regarding car insurance. The court awards the
petitioner her attorneys' fees and costs incurred in obtaining this judgment.
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B. Future Car Insurance
95. The petitioners requests that the court order the respondent to pay for one-half of
any future car insurance premiums for the children. The court agrees with the respondent that
driving is a privilege and that such support is not mandatory for minors. This request is denied.
VII. MEDICAL EXPENSES
A. Respondent's Failure to Pay Medical Expenses
96. In May 2002, each party was ordered to pay one-half of all unreimbursed medical
and dental expenses, commencing October 23, 2001. See May 2002 Order at % 4. The
respondent testified that to his knowledge this Order has not been changed. In September 2004,
the petitioner was awarded judgment against the respondent in the amount of $231.00 for his
share of medical costs. See September 2004 Order at f 4. In addition, on June 16, 2006, the
court ordered the respondent to pay $1,589.60 for his share of medical expenses as of May 5,
2006. See June 16, 2006 Order at f 1. The court found the petitioner made a prima facie case for
the respondent's contempt in failing to pay medical expenses for 2003 through 2005. See May
2006 Order at 1 5 .
97. Also, the petitioner testified that currently the respondent owes her $82.50 for onehalf of unreimbursed medical expenses from May 2006 to the time of trial. The respondent
failed to provide any evidence that he did not owe this amount or that he had paid this amount.
Petitioner requested the Court to find the respondent in contempt for failing to pay medical
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expenses in 2006.
98. Accordingly, a judgment shall enter against the respondent in the amount of $82.50
for unreimbursed medical expenses and the court finds him in coritempt for failing to pay such.
Further, all judgments awarded to the petitioner in this case regarding unreimbursed medical
expenses, including attorneys' fees and costs incurred in obtaining these judgments, shall be
classified as family support and/or maintenance because such expenses are necessary for the
children's health. Moreover, the petitioner is awarded her attorneys' fees and costs incurred in
obtaining these judgments. Also, since the September 2004 order entered before the respondent
filed for bankruptcy, the $231.00 shall be classified as a pre-bankruptcy petition claim. In
addition, $1,197.18 of the June 2006 judgment shall be classified as a pre-bankruptcy petition
claim.
B. Future Medical Expenses
99. If the respondent obtains secondary insurance, which would in effect, cover all
health costs for the children which are not covered by the petitioner's insurance, the petitioner
will pay for one-half of the cost of such insurance. Otherwise, each party shall be responsible for
one-half of all future unreimbursed medical and dental expenses reasonably incurred by the
minor children, including co-pays, deductibles and prescriptions, which are not paid by a medical
insurance carrier.
100. If the respondent does obtain secondary insurance, the respondent must pay his

25

share of the bills within 30 days after the secondary insurance rejects any costs. If the respondent
chooses not to obtain secondary insurance, then the parent who incurs medical expenses shall
provide written verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent
within 30 days of payment. Within 30 days of receiving written verification of medical expense,
the parent receiving verification shall pay one-half of the medical expense.
VIII. PERSONAL PROPERTY
101. On May 7, 2002, the court temporarily awarded the respondent the Subaru, GMC
truck and LaSalle trailer. See May 2002 Order at ^ 10. The respondent testified that he
understood this court order and that he was not aware of any changes to this order. Nonetheless,
the respondent admitted that he sold the GMC truck and LaSalle trailer in violation of this Court
order. The respondent sold the GMC truck for approximately $3,500.00 and the LaSalle trailer
for approximately $ 1,500.00.
102. The court awards the petitioner a $2,500.00 judgment against the respondent in
the amount of one-half of the proceeds from the sale of the truck and trailer. Further, the
petitioner had already established a prima facie case of the respondent's contempt for disposing
of marital assets. Respondent failed to provide any evidence that the May 2002 order had been
modified or should have been modified. Thus, this court finds the respondent in contempt for
selling these items of marital personal property. Moreover, the petitioner is awarded her
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in obtaining this judgment.
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B. Exercise Equipment and Entertainment Center
103. In May 2002 the court temporarily awarded the respondent some exercise
equipment and an entertainment center that were marital property. During the petitioner's
testimony regarding these items, the court received the impression that these items were of great
value, although the petitioner offered no evidence as to their value. Much to the court's surprise,
the only evidence as to value came from the respondent, who testified that he purchased the used
exercise equipment at an auction through Alpine School District at $20.00 per item for a total of
I

i

$ 180.00. It would have been worth even less than that at the time the parties separated. His
testimony was that the entertainment center was worth $75.00.
104. The court is stunned at the time, effort, and attorney's fees that the petitioner
expended in arguing this issue. These items were not worth an hour's time in attorney's fees.
The court does not find the defendant in contempt for leaving the exercise equipment in Montana
or giving the cheap entertainment center to his new wife. The court will not award attorney's
fees for this issue.
D. Remaining Marital Personal Property
105. At the beginning of this trial, the Bankruptcy Court retained jurisdiction over the
parties' personal property. However, on the third day of trial, December 19, 2006, the trustee in
the respondent's bankruptcy case abandoned all of the personal property. See Trial Exhibit 27.
Thus, this court obtained jurisdiction over the remaining marital personal property.
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106. Despite petitioner's testimony that the respondent has had multiple opportunities
to go through the home and take whatever property he wanted, the court finds that, given the
incredible acrimony between these parties and the existence of a protective order which prevents
the respondent from going near the marital home, the respondent was wise in waiting for trial to
request the return of just a few items.
107. Therefore, the court orders the petitioner to return the following items to the
respondent: a punching bag, a DeWalt compound miter saw, a DeWalt router, a Milwaukee
Sawzall, an electric planer, a 24-foot ladder, and the sewing machines which were gifts from his
grandmother. The attorneys for the parties can aid in transferring these items from one party to
the other.
IX. CHILD CARE EXPENSES
A. Respondent's Failure to Pay Child-Care Expenses
108. In May 2002, each party was ordered to pay one-half of any work-related daycare
expenses for the children. See May 2002 Order at % 14. In September 2004, the petitioner was
awarded judgment against the respondent for his one-half share of daycare expenses, including
$4,560.00 for the year 2003 and $3,030.00 for January 1, 2004 through August 31, 2004. See
September 2004 Order atffl[5-6. In addition, on August 28, 2006, the court ordered the
respondent to pay $1,000.00 in child-care costs for the months of June and July 2006. See
August 28, 2006 Order at ^f 2. Of course, these judgments still stand, minus the garnishments of
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$8,425.39 already taken by the petitioner.
109. In September 2004 the respondent was ordered to pay $340.00 per month during
the school year and $500.00 per month during the summer months, for a total amount of
$4,560.00 per year.5 Commencing with September 2004 and endipg November 22, 2006 (the
first day of trial), the respondent owed $1,360.00 for 2004; $4,560.00 for 2005; and $4,136.00
for 2006 for a total owing of $10,056.00. Judgment has already been given to the petitioner for
June and July 2006 for $1,000.00, leaving a total of $9,056.00 for the court's calculations.
110. According to Exhibit 16, from October 2004 through November 22, 2006 the
respondent paid $7,280.00 (as well as other arrearages through garnishments).
B. Judgment and Contempt
111. The court grants judgment to the petitioner for the amount of $ 1,776.00 in unpaid
child-care expenses, pursuant to the September 2004 order of $340.00 and $500.00, for the
months and years listed above. The court finds the respondent in contempt for his failure to pay
the $1,776.00 pursuant to the September 2004 order and awards petitioner her reasonable
attorney's fees for this issue.
112. This judgment6 for child-care expenses and attorneys fees incurred in obtaining
5

At that time both parties reserved the right to argue as to the reasonableness of that order.

6

In the petitioner's suggested memorandum decision, her calculations included her figures
for the larger amount she seeks for child-care expenses, as well as the past judgments and past
garnishments. The court will not attempt to run those calculations at this time, as those
judgments and garnishments were not truly before the court at trial. However, for purposes of
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judgments for child-care expenses shall be classified as family support and/or maintenance,
because it directly relates to taking care of the children. Also, pursuant to the petitioner's
testimony and Exhibit 16, $978.00 of this judgment shall be classified as a pre-bankruptcy
petition judgment-the total due from September through December 2004 of $1,360.00, plus
January through October 14, 2005 of $3,710.00, minus the amount the respondent paid during
this time period ($1,020, plus $3,072 for a total of $4,092.00.7
C. Petitioner's Request for Increased Child-Care Expenses, Past and Future
113. The court has looked at the petitioner's testimony and Exhibit 16 very carefully
and makes the following observations:
a. During 2003 the petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,116.67,
with the respondent's share amounting to $5 5 8.3 3.
b. During 2004 the petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,601.83,
with the respondent's share amounting to $800.92.
c. During 2005 the petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,503.91,

the bankruptcy action, the court will find that all judgments awarded to the petitioner for amounts
incurred before October 14,2005 should be considered pre-bankruptcy in nature and should also
be classified as family support and/or maintenance.
7

Exhibit 16 failed to provide monthly amounts paid by the respondent, so the court has
assumed some logical facts in order to bring finality to this issue. The court has arrived at the
September through December 2004 credits for the respondent by noting that the $ 1,020 paid in
2004 is exactly 3 months at $340.00. Apparently, the respondent finally made some payments
after Commissioner Patton lowered the amounts. As for 2005, the court simply took the annual
total of $4,560.00, divided it by 12, and multiplied that result by 9.5 months.
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with the respondent's share amounting to $751.95.
d. During 2006 petitioner's average monthly child-care cost was $1,246.60,
with the respondent's share amounting to $623.30.
e. The petitioner urges the court to award her an ongoing child-care amount of
$400 per week ($20,000 per year/$ 1,666.67 per month/$833.34 respondent's share)8 for "nanny"
care, which she deems necessary, because she travels approximately once per month for 3-5
business days.
f. The petitioner now works at a job which brings her approximately $80,000.00
annual salary, which is more than the respondent now makes.
114. The parties' minor children are now 16, 13,12, 9 and 7 years of age; the two
older children are 19 and 24 years of age.9 The petitioner's argument is that, because of her
occasional travel for work, the respondent should help her pay for full-time nanny care. The
i

court finds this unreasonable. All of the children are in school full-time, so there is no need for
full-time care during the school year, and only two of the children are still in elementary school.
The older children certainly can be expected to help with the younger children; indeed, the oldest
boy does not have football practice after school year-round. The infrequency of the petitioner's
work-related travel does not justify the request that the respondent pay $833.34 per month for his

8

The court calculated this with a 50-week work year.

9

As of the time of this decision-not the time of trial.
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share of the child-care expenses. Although the petitioner is correct in asserting that the
respondent offered no other reasonable suggested costs for child-care expenses, neither did the
petitioner.
115. Therefore, the court finds that the amounts previously ordered are within the
realm of reason and also within this court's experience on the bench. The court will order the
respondent to pay ongoing child-care expenses of $340.00 per month during the nine months of
the school year and $500.00 per month during the three months of the summer vacation, for a
total of $4,560.00 per year. With the petitioner paying equal amounts, this should be quite
adequate for the children's needs.
X. ALIMONY
A. Respondent's Failure to Pay Two Months' Alimony
116. The respondent was ordered to pay $230 per month in alimony, beginning April
1, 2002. See May 2002 Order at If 3. At a hearing on May 15, 2006 the parties stipulated that the
petitioner made a prima facie case on her order to show cause regarding alimony payments for
March and April 2006. See Order and Stipulation signed July 28, 2006 at ^ 5.
117. At a hearing on June 15, 2006, the respondent failed to present any evidence that
he paid these amounts or that he was justified in failing to pay these amounts. Thus, the court
makes a finding that the respondent was in contempt for failing to pay two months of alimony
payments. On June 15, 2006, the court ordered the respondent to pay $460.00 in alimony
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arrearages incurred as of April 13, 2006. See Order signed July 28, 2006 at T[ 1. The court
awards the petitioner her attorneys' fees and costs incurred in obtaining these judgments.
118. As of the time of trial, the respondent was current 6n his alimony obligations.
119. The court file is replete with the respondent's early efforts to reduce the
temporary alimony obligation of $230.00 per month. He filed 3 verified motions to have his
support orders reduced or adjusted. These motions were finally heard at a hearing on June 24,
2004, at which Commissioner Patton took care of some issues, including child support, but
reserved all other matters for trial, including alimony. Therefore, ttie court finds that the
respondent did properly preserve his right to argue for retroactive adjustment (and possible
credit) of alimony as of August 6, 2003, which is when the second motion (which mentioned
alimony specifically) was filed with the court. Petitioner reserved the same right in May 2002.
The court will make any adjustments for retroactivity after determining the correct income to be
attributed to the parties.
B. Past and Future Alimony
120. The petitioner requests that the respondent be ordered to pay future alimony,
while the respondent requests that his alimony obligations cease. He has withdrawn his request
for alimony from the petitioner. In determining whether to award alimony, the court considers:
(I) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
33

(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support...
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
U.C.A. § 30-3-5(8).
1. The Financial Condition and Needs of Petitioner
121. The petitioner spends approximately $ 1,194.76 per month on her mortgage
payments, $84.75 on maintaining the residence, $461.84 on food and household supplies,
$104.15 on utilities, $207.93 on clothing, $98.06 on medical and dental, $1,200.96 on child care,
$314.20 on education, $107.28 on entertainment, $45.05 on grooming, $136.51 on gifts, $710.60
on donations, $377.15 on auto expenses, $1,900.00 on installment payments and $87.74 on
computer expenses. See also Trial Exhibit 9.
122. Petitioner also testified that her current net monthly gross income is $6,669.08.
The court notes, with some surprise, that the petitioner declares no exemptions and, thereby,
increases the amount of taxes taken from her gross income. Therefore, her net income is an
artificially low $4,121.30. Id. She also voluntarily donates $710.60 per month to the LDS
Church. Therefore, without the inclusion of the church donation, the alimony and child support
she is currently receiving, minus deductions and expenses as outlined above, the petitioner is
deficient approximately $2,548.75 per month. Id.
2. The Recipient's Earning Capacity or Ability to Produce Income
123. The petitioner is currently working full-time and makes approximately $6,669
gross per month in income. Id. The respondent did not provide any evidence that the petitioner
34

21

is working below her earning capacity or that she is able to produce more income. Thus, the
court finds that the petitioner is able to earn $6,669 gross per month. At the time of the parties'
separation, they were living only on the respondent's income. She began her new job in
November 2003.
3. The Ability of Respondent to Provide Support
124. Respondent worked at Novell from August 1998 uuuugn approximately June
2001. From January 2001 through about June 15, 2001 he grossed $47,879.77. See Trial
Exhibit 18. Thus, in construing this amount in a light most favorable to the respondent, he
grossed approximately $7,979 per month ($47,879 for 6 months) while working at Novell.
125. The court finds credible the respondent's testimony that he voluntarily left this
employment at Novell for a lower paying job, because he was afraid he would be laid off before
finding another job.10 The court is persuaded by the respondent's argument that the computer
industry is volatile with regard to steady employment and that h was reasonable for the
respondent to protect his family and his income by finding a new job before being laid off. In
addition, this change of employment occurred before the parties' separation and the filing of this
divorce.11 This court refuses to delve into decisions made by the parties before the time of the

The many reductions in the employee force at Novell through the last decade have been
front-page news in this community.
u

The petitioner's testimony was that she opposed his change of employment, while the
respondent testified that it was a mutual decision.
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separation, as it is not the duty of this court to revise decisions made by the parties before this
court had jurisdiction. Thus, the court makes no finding as to respondent's income at Novell and
will not include the income at Novell in its calculations and decision regarding imputation of
income.
126. After leaving Novell, the respondent secured employment with the Corporation of
the Presiding Bishop ("LDS Church"). He worked for the LDS Church from approximately June
2001 through October 2003. When he stopped working for the LDS church, he was earning
approximately $2,574.00 gross per two-week pay period, or $5,577.00 gross per month
($66,924.00 per year). See Trial Exhibit 21.
127. While employed with the LDS church, the respondent was recruited by Brigham
Young University ("BYU"). He worked for BYU from October 2003 through February 17,
2006. Before the respondent was terminated from his position at BYU, he grossed
approximately $5,996.00 gross per month ($71,952.00 per year). See Trial Exhibit 23 at p.5.
The respondent voluntarily resigned from BYU, because he failed to maintain an LDS temple
recommend as required for employment.12 He lost his temple recommend because he was
12

At the August 24, 2006 hearing before Judge Taylor, the court ordered that the
petitioner could depose the respondent regarding the "temple recommend issue." See Order,
signed November 13, 2006. The petitioner claims that, due to the respondent's subsequent
discovery delays, the petitioner was not able to depose the respondent on this matter.
The petitioner cites a November 2006 Order on Motion for Default Judgment, stating that
it "provides that if 'Petitioner is unable to present the necessary evidence based on Respondent's
failure to provide necessary evidence through discovery, Respondent will be precluded from
defending on such issues.'" The court can not find such order in the file, nor does the court recall
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excommunicated.
128. The respondent began his current employment with Medicity in May 2006, where
he earns $5,000.00 gross per month ($60,000.00 per year).
129. The petitioner urges the Court to make a finding that the respondent has the
ability to earn his previous BYU income ($5,996 per month) since he voluntarily acted in such a
way as to cause him to lose his employment. In contrast, the respondent requests that the court
use his current income of $5,000 per month in determining alimony, if any.
130. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a), if the respondent is voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed, income may be imputed to him. "Income may not be imputed to
a parent unless the parent... is voluntarily unemployed or undeivmployed." U.C.A. § 78.457.5(7)(a).

Utah case law suggests that a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed if,

at least, some evidence suggests that the parent's current, diminished income level resulted from
"his personal preference or voluntary decisions," instead of from "events beyond his control."
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
131. The court has already indicated that it will not consider the pre-separation income
from Novell; therefore, the court will consider the incomes earned by the respondent at the LDS
Church, BYU, and Medicity. Again, those monthly incomes are: (1) $5,577.00 gross per month

the petitioner asserting this theory in trial. In addition, testimony was taken from the respondent
in which he explained that he voluntarily resigned, rather than allowing himself to be fired by
BYU.
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($66,924.00 per year) at the LDS Church; (2) $5,996.00 gross per month ($71,952.00 per year) at
BYU; (3) $5,000.00 gross per month ($60,000.00 per year) at Medicity.
132. The highest income of the three is the BYU income at $5,996.00 gross per month.
This is income which the respondent lost, because of activities which resulted in his
excommunication from the LDS Church and his subsequent inability to hold a temple
recommend. Unlike his voluntary departure from Novell for a lower-paying job in lieu of a
possible layoff, his voluntary resignation from BYU was the result of his own actions.
Therefore, the court finds that the respondent could, most likely, still be earning this income
today, had he not voluntarily failed to satisfy the requirements for continued employment at
BYU. Thus, the court finds that the respondent is voluntarily underemployed pursuant to U.C.A.
§ 78.45-7.5(7)(a).
133. Accordingly, the court finds that respondent has the ability to earn $5,996.00
gross per month ($71,952.00 per year).
134. The respondent married Brenda Louise Bruni in October 2005. As part of a prenuptial agreement signed by the respondent and Ms. Bruni, he pays her monthly house payment
of $752.00. See Trial Exhibit 30 and 35. He also pays her $1,500.00 per month to help with
living expenses.
135. Ms. Brum's daughter, Sarah, has always lived with them. Ms. Bruni no longer
receives any child support for Sarah, but Sarah pays her mother $360.00 per month (and
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sometimes less) to help with expenses. Ms. Bruni does not consider this regular income, as
Sarah does not always have the money to pay. Ms. Bruni's older daughter and infant child also
lived with them from February through April 2006, as did Ms. Brum's mother from January or
February 2006. Her mother has helped her financially at times, but it is not income that can be
depended upon. Her mother has terminal cancer.
136. uIn determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may
not be considered, except.. . [t]he court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to
share living expenses . . .." U.C.A. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(iii)(A). This ciourt does not find that Ms.
Brum's medical history, recent work history, and spotty income from her daughter justify great
reliance upon Ms. Bruni's income for determining the appropriateness of alimony. The
occasional gifts of money from Ms. Brum's mother cannot be considered income for purposes of
this determination.

It is clear to this court that the respondent would have to pay at least

$752.00 per month to rent a decent place to live for himself, were he not remarried and living in
Ms. Brum's home. The payment of $1,500 per month by the respondent to Ms. Bruni to help
defray living expenses is certainly not unreasonable, given today's economy and the monthly
expenses claimed by both the petitioner and the respondent The money she brought from
Oregon after her divorce is now gone, so she no longer has any reserve cash to supplement her
income.
137. The court finds that, pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(iii)(A), there is no steady
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income from Ms. Bruni that the court can include in its calculations. Ms. Bruni is not capable of
sharing the living expenses with the respondent, other than the $360.00 from her daughter, which
only covers Sarah's expenses in the home (food, utilities, etc.).
4. Length of Marriage
138. The parties were married on November 22, 1986 and divorced on September 12,
2005. Thus, the parties were married two months short of 19 years.
5. Whether Petitioner has Custody of the Minor Children
139. As set forth above, the petitioner has full physical and legal custody of five minor
children that require support. The respondent will be ordered to pay child support based upon his
imputed income of $5,996.00.
6. The Fault of the Parties
140. Although the petitioner only alleged "irreconcilable differences" her divorce
petition, she testified that the divorce was caused by the respondent, because he sexually abused
the children. She never amended the petition, and neither party testified as to when the sexual
abuse of the children occurred.
141. The petitioner also testified that in January 2001 she placed the CINTAS stock
into a joint account, due to pressure from the respondent during marriage counseling sessions,
which had begun in December 2000. Neither party offered an explanation for their participation
in marriage counseling at that time, which was many months prior to the parties' final separation
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in October 2001.
142. Therefore, the court finds that it does not have enough clear testimony to place all
of the blame on the respondent for this divorce, despite the unopposed testimony regarding the
sexual abuse of the children. Thus, this court makes no finding that the respondent alone caused
the marriage to terminate.
7. Analysis under U.C.A. § 30-3-5(8)
143. The petitioner requests that the court order the respondent to pay future alimony
in the amount of $3,259 per month for 19 years. The respondent withdrew his request for future
alimony, but requested a credit for the alimony he has paid since the petitioner became employed
in the spring of 2003.
144. While this is a marriage of almost 19 years' duration, the court can see no reason
to award the petitioner alimony for another 19 years, especially when she is making more money
than the respondent makes-even using the court-imputed income of $5,996.00 per month for the
respondent. Their incomes differ by $673.00 per month and $8,076.00 per year-with the
advantage going to the petitioner. In addition, the parties had chosen to have the petitioner stay
at home to raise the children and were living on only one income when they separated in October
2001. She did not return to full-time work until the spring of 2003 and later that year obtained
her current employment with an income now of $80,000.00 per year. Together they are bringing
in $151,952.00 per year (his imputed income of $71,952.00, plus her income of $80,000.00),
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compared to the $66,924.00 per year the respondent was making at the LDS Church when they
separated in October 2001. Their collective income has more than doubled since their
separation.
145. In addition, since the petitioner has the physical custody of the children, she will
also be receiving $4,560.00 per year from the respondent for child-care expenses, along with
child support of $16,728.00 per year ($1,394.00 per month). This is a total of $21,288.00, above
and beyond her annual salary of $80,000.00.
146. Were this court to award the petitioner the monthly alimony of $3,259.00 she
seeks, plus the monthly average child-care cost of $380.00 awarded to her by the court (for a total
of $3,639,00), the respondent, according to his financial declaration, would have $73.46 left of
his net income to pay child support and the rest of his monthly expenses. See Exhibit 35.13 This
would be an unconscionable award to the petitioner.
147. So, does the petitioner deserve any alimony at all? This court finds that she
did-during the time after the filing of this action before she obtained her new well-paying job.
The parties' agreement in May 2002 was $230 per month, which the parties, obviously, thought
was appropriate at the time. The court also finds that $230 per month was appropriate until the

13

The court has imputed income $996.00 above what the respondent used in his financial
declaration, so the court is not able to correctly estimate what his net income would be. He lost
29% of his real income through deductions; if the court used that same 29% and subtracted it
from his imputed monthly income, that would leave him $4,257.16 of his imputed income, for an
increase of $691.62 net. This is still not enough for him to live on and pay child support.
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petitioner began her new job in November 2003. Therefore, the court awards the respondent a
credit against other amounts due under these findings (or other judgments already awarded) from
November 2003 through the time of trial, November 2006, inclusive. That would be calculated
at $230.00 x 37 months, for a total of $8,510.00. Therefore, the respondent will receive a credit
of $8,510.00 for alimony already paid.
148. Because the parties' income and living circumstances are comparatively even and
their collective income has more than doubled since the time of their separation in October 2001,
the court denies the petitioner her request for future alimony and makes no order regarding future
alimony.
XL CHILD SUPPORT
A. Respondent's Contempt for Unilaterally Changihg Child Support
149. In May 2002, the respondent was ordered to pay $1,797.00 per month in child
support beginning April 1,2002. See May 2002 Order at ^ 3. This amount was agreed upon by
the parties, stipulated to in court, and based upon their incomes at the time.
150. At a hearing on June 24, 2004, the court ordered that the respondent's child
support obligation would be reduced to $1,169.00 per month for six children based upon the
parties' current incomes. See Order signed August 5, 2004 at f 4. This order was based upon
petitioner's income of $6,250.00 per month gross ($75,000.00 per year) and respondent's income
of $5,750.00 per month ($69,000.00 per year). The new amount was effective July 1, 2004.
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151. No evidence was presented to the court that this order was ever modified, nor can
the court find any orders of modification in the file.
152. From November 2005 through February 2006, the respondent paid child support
of only $1,090. See also Trial Exhibit 10. From March 2006 through May 2006 he only paid
$45 per month. IcL Finally, the respondent only paid $840 per month in child support from June
2006 through August 2006. Id.
153. At a hearing on May 15, 2006, the parties stipulated that the petitioner had
established a prima facie case regarding the respondent's contempt for underpaying his monthly
child support obligations without leave of the Court. See Order signed July 28, 2006 at Tf 5. The
respondent reserved his right to dispute the contempt issue. At trial the respondent admitted that
he was aware of the court orders regarding child support, and he failed to provide any evidence
that the June 2004 order ever changed. Accordingly, the court holds the respondent in contempt
for underpaying his child support payments without leave of the court.
B. Respondent's Failure to Pay Child Support
154. Respondent's child support obligation of $ 1,169.00 per month was originally
calculated for six minor children based on Petitioner's gross income of $6,250 per month and
Respondent's gross income of $5,750 per month. See Order signed August 5, 2004 at ^ 4.
Although it is undisputed that one of the minor children turned 18 in October 2005, such does
not automatically entitle the respondent to unilaterally reduce his child support obligations
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without a court order. Not only did the number of minor children change, but the parties' gross
monthly incomes were also different at that time. If the court allowed a party to unilaterally
make changes to court-ordered obligations every time he or she determined a change in
circumstance had occurred, it would nullify the authority of the court and render petitions to
modify meaningless. Thus, the respondent did not have authority to unilaterally change (and
underpay) his child support obligations.
155. As a result, on June 16, 2006, the court awarded the petitioner a judgment of
$2,248.00 in child support arrearages as of April 13, 2006. See Order signed July 28, 2006 at ^|
1. In addition, on August 28, 2006, the court awarded the petitioner a judgment of $2,103.00 in
child support arrearages. See Order signed November 21, 2006 at *| 2.
156. Further, pursuant to the petitioner's testimony at trial, the court awards the
petitioner a judgment against the respondent for $489.68 in additional child support arrearages.
157. The court also finds that these judgments (and attdrney's fees spent in obtaining
these judgments) are classified as family support and/or maintenance, because child support is
necessary to provide the children with a living. Moreover, the petitioner is awarded her
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in obtaining these judgments against the respondent regarding
child support and as a sanction for the respondent's contempt.
158. The respondent requested a credit for child support he paid while the petitioner
was working from the spring of 2003 until it was actually reduced in July 2004. He also

45

requested to have child support recalculated from October 2005 to the present. However, the
respondent failed to present any evidence regarding the petitioner's varying incomes during these
time periods.
159. Therefore, the court has no evidentiary basis for determining what credit, if any,
to which the respondent would be entitled. Rather than recalculating years of child support and
attempting to determine both parties' income over the course of those months and years, the
court in its discretion will simply determine child support from the time of trial going forward.
Accordingly, the respondent is not entitled to a credit for child support paid from the spring of
2003 through July 2004, nor is he entitled to a recalculation of child support from October 2005
to the present.14
C. Child Support from October 2001 through April 2002
160. Petitioner testified that before the parties separated, the respondent used to
deposit his paycheck into the bill-paying account to cover family expenses. See Trial Exhibit 12.
However, from the time the parties separated in October 2001 until the respondent was ordered
to pay child support as of April 1, 2002, the respondent failed to provide any support to the
family. Id. The petitioner testified that she was forced to solely provide for all of the children
and family living expenses from her own funds during this time period even though she was not
working. She now asks for back support for that six-month period.
14

Indeed, given the income imputed to the respondent, he might be less than satisfied with
the result, were the court to recalculate all child support since the inception of this divorce action.
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161. As far as the court can determine, this matter has never been brought before the
court and has not been reserved by the petitioner. The court will not go back to the parties'
separation to award back child support.
D. Future Child Support
162. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a) allows this court to impute income to the
respondent for purposes of child support if he is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
Using the same analysis as it did in the above section on alimony, the court finds that the
respondent is voluntarily underemployed pursuant to U.C.A. § 78.45-7.5(7)(a) and income shall
be imputed to him at $5,996.00 gross per month ($71,952.00 per year) for purposes of calculating
child support. Petitioner's income for purposes of child support shall be $6,669 gross per month
($80,000.00 per year). See Trial Exhibit 9. Child support shall be calculated for five minor
children.
163. Since the time of trial, the Utah State Legislature has modified the child support
income tables, effective April 30, 2007, for modified and future child support. Rather than
estimating the base child support amount under the prior statute, the court has used the new
statutory amount established for combined incomes of $12,665.00 per month as a guideline.
Using the above-listed incomes, the court has determined that (1) the combined income of the
parties is $12,665,00 per month; (2) the base child support for their income is $2,967.00; (3) the
petitioner makes 53% of the combined income, while the respondent makes 47% of the
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combined income; (4) the parties' respective shares of the child support obligation are: petitioner,
$1,573.00 and respondent, $1,394.00.
164. The court orders the respondent to pay $1,394.00 for the support of the five minor
children as of the first date of trial, November 22, 2006.
XII. STOCKS
A. Novell Stock
165. On May 7, 2002, the court awarded the petitioner the Novell stock as her sole and
separate property, pursuant to a stipulation of the parties. See May 2002 Order at f 9. The
petitioner testified that she sold this stock in December 2004 and used the $14,000.00 she
received for attorney's fees. The respondent testified that he is not making a claim for this stock,
but argues that the court "can consider this stock division in the other property divisions and do
equity in this case." As the respondent provided no support for the petitioner during the early
months of their separation, the court is not inclined to set off this stock and its value against any
other property of the marriage. Thus, the respondent shall not receive a credit for this amount.
B. CINTAS Stock
166. In 1997 the petitioner received a gift of CINTAS stock from her uncle; she placed
the CINTAS stock in a private and separate account. See Trial Exhibit 2 at January 2001
statement. The respondent accused her, during a session of marriage counseling, of not being a
"team player"-due to the separate CINTAS stock account. Because of that accusation, she felt
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coerced to place the CINTAS stock into a joint account in January 2001. Id. at April 2001
statement. The respondent's name did not appear on the account until April 2001; however, the
respondent had access to the account as early as January 2001.
167. In April 2001 the respondent borrowed against the CINTAS stock to purchase
other stock without the petitioner's permission. Id. Subsequently, on July 19, 2001 the
respondent sold the CINTAS stock for $31,784.98. Id. at July 2001 Statement. However, the
parties only received approximately $18,000 in cash, since the remaining proceeds were used to
pay off the respondent's outstanding debt for the purchase of the other stocks. The petitioner has
not successfully demonstrated for the court that she did not receive any benefit from the
remaining monies, which were used to buy other stocks.
168. The court finds that the CINTAS stock was the petitioner's separate property and
that it retained its separate identity, despite being moved into a joint account. The respondent
certainly did not contribute to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of the stock or its
value and did not, thereby, acquire an equitable interest in it. Oliekan v. Oliekan, 147 P.3d 464,
469 (Utah Ct. App. 2006), citing Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988).
Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to a judgment of $18,000.00 against the respondent
169. The petitioner testified that she used the $18,000 in cash to support the family
between the time the parties separated in October 2001 until the May 2002 Order entered. See
also Trial Exhibit 11 and 12. Since this $18,000.00 was her sole and separate property and
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marital funds should have been used to support the family instead, the court now awards her a
judgment for $18,000.00 and, further, finds that this $18,000 is classified as family support
and/or maintenance, since the funds were spent to support the family. This $18,000.00 debt was
incurred before the filing of the bankruptcy petition judgment.
C. TwinLabs Stock
170. Refer to "Home Equity Line of Credit/Second Mortgage" category above.
XIII. MARITAL DEBTS
A. Pre-separation Debt
171. After the parties separated, the petitioner transferred a joint, marital MBNA credit
card debt of $2,400.00 into her name only; the respondent does not dispute that the MBNA debt
is a marital debt. The court awards judgment now against the respondent for $1,200.00, as his
share of his marital debt.
B. Debt During Separation
172. At approximately the same time the parties separated, the respondent took out a
$1,900.00 quick draw loan. The petitioner testified that she never saw this money, but that she
ultimately paid this loan back. The respondent failed to offer any evidence regarding this issue.
The court shall now awards the petitioner a judgment against the respondent for $1,900.00. This
debt was incurred before the filing of the bankruptcy petition judgment.
XIV. TAX EXEMPTIONS
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173. The respondent requested that the parties split the tax exemptions every year.
The court makes the following order: (1) The parties will split the tax exemptions each year; (2)
If there is an odd number of children still receiving child support, the parties will alternate the
extra deduction every other year with the petitioner being granted the odd-child exemption on
odd-numbered years and the respondent being granted the exemption on even-numbered years.
Therefore, for example, the petitioner will claim the odd-child exemption this year, 2007.
174. However, the respondent may not claim the children as tax exemptions unless he
is current on his obligations to the children, pursuant to the appropriate statutes which deal with
this issue.
XV. CONTEMPT
A. Respondent's Contempt for Repeated Discovery Delays (i.e.,
Psychological Records, Financial Records, Changing Position Regarding
Custody) and Failures to Comply with Court Orders
175. Petitioner requested that the court find the respondent in contempt for his
numerous discovery delays and repeated failures to comply with court orders; she also requested
a monetary judgment against the respondent as a sanction. While the court holds both parties
responsible for their failures to respond adequately to discovery requests, the court will not find
the respondent in contempt for altering his goals in this litigation, i.e., supervised visitation, etc.
The nature of divorce litigation is that, after discovery, court hearings, and negotiations, parties
change their minds about what should be pursued during the litigation. Holding parties in
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contempt for changes of strategy would stagnate divorce litigation and prevent settlement. In
addition, the court will not hold the parties in contempt for failure to provide discovery regarding
discovery which would have never been admitted, pursuant to state statutes, i.e., polygraph
results. Finally, the court will not hold the respondent in contempt for filing his bankruptcy
petition, as the court has no persuasive evidence before it that the only reason for filing the
petition was to delay the divorce proceeding.
176. On November 8, 2006, the petitioner filed a Motion for Default Judgment and
memorandum in support ("Default Judgment Memorandum"), wherein she outlined a history of
the respondent's repeated discovery delays and failures to comply with court orders. See
November 8, 2006 Default Judgment Memorandum.
177. Beginning in July 2002, the petitioner served her first discovery request upon the
respondent. See August 2002 Certificate of Service. However, in his August 2002 responses,
the respondent failed to provide, among other things, a financial declaration (not produced until
May 2003), monthly statements from his bank accounts and credit card accounts and complete
information on his life insurance policy. See Respondent's Answers attached to Default
Judgment Memorandum as Exhibit A.
178. In September 2003, the petitioner served another discovery request upon the
respondent to produce all test results for ISAT, sexual or psychological examinations and any
tests with Dr. C.Y. Roby. See September 2003 Certificate of Delivery of Discovery. After five
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months the respondent had failed to respond to this discovery request. See Pleadings. Thus, in
March 2004, the Guardian ad Litem filed a Motion to Compel for the same test results that the
petitioner was seeking. See March 2004 Motion to Compel.
179. By August 2004, the respondent still had not provided any further discovery. See
Pleadings. Thus, the petitioner filed a Motion to Compel production of the sexual test results and
financial information (i.e., a current financial statement, all bank and credit card information
from September 2001 through June 2004 and a list of deposits and purchases). See August 19,
2004 Affidavit in Support of Motion to Compel. The respondent filed an opposition
memorandum claiming he had already provided the requested discovery or the documents were
not in his possession. See September 20, 2004 Response to Petitioner's Motion to Compel.
180. The parties came before the court in September 2004 on the petitioner's Motion
to Compel. See September 21, 2004 docket entry. However, the day before the motion to
compel hearing, the respondent provided documents that were partially responsive to the
petitioner's first discovery request from more than two years ago. See Respondent's September
2004 Responses attached to Default Judgment Memorandum as Exhibit F. Further, the
respondent also failed to produce the psychological and sexual test results as requested in
September 2003. Id.
181. At the September 2004 motion to compel hearing, the court ordered the
respondent to comply with "all [of Petitioner's] requested documents within two weeks",
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including the production of signed releases for "all psychosexual records as well as the other
requested discovery." See September 21, 2004 Order at ^[ 3. However, the respondent provided
the petitioner only one signed release for Dr. Roby. See Respondent's October 6, 2004 Second
Supplemental Response to Petitioner's Request for Production of Documents attached to Default
Judgment Memorandum as Exhibit H.
182. In October 2004, more than two weeks after the court's order, the petitioner filed
a notice with the court of the respondent's refusal to sign the remaining releases, including a
release for ISAT.15 See October 12, 2004 Notice to Court of Willful Refusal. Immediately
thereafter, the respondent filed a notice with the court claiming he had allegedly complied with
the court's order, when in reality he had only signed one release and failed to produce any other
documents. See October 18, 2004 Notice to the Court of Respondent's Compliance.
183. In March 2005, the petitioner filed a motion on order to show cause regarding
discovery issues. See March 2005 Motion in Support of Order to Show Cause. She requested
that the respondent show cause why he should not be sent to jail for his failure to produce, among
other things, a current financial declaration, signed releases for various financial institutions, and
a list of deposits and purchases. Id. atfflf3-7.
184. In April 2005, at the order to show cause hearing, the court again found that the

Petitioner's Notice also indicated that she had not received a release for Dr. Roby. However, Petitioner
filed her Notice on October 8 and Respondent indicates he filed his release for Dr. Roby on October 6. Thus,
Petitioner had not yet received the release for Dr. Roby when she filed this notice.
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respondent "has not been forthcoming in his efforts to comply with multiple discovery requests.
However, to strike his pleadings would be a last resort by the Court." See April 18, 2005 Order
at f 3. Also, the court again ordered the respondent to sign releases for all requested information
(i.e., financial, psychosexual, etc.). Id. at f 5. Further, the court "ordered Respondent to serve
five (5) days in the Utah County Jail as a direct result of his continued non-compliance with
discovery requests and contempt of court in this matter." Id. at ^ 8. However, the court stayed
the sentence because the county jail was near capacity "and only for that reason." Id. If the
respondent failed to sign the releases within two weeks of the hearing, he was to be "ordered to
serve these five (5) days in the Utah County Jail at the next hearing." Id.
185. The following week, the respondent filed another notice of compliance with the
court. See April 28, 2005 Notice of Compliance. Further, the respondent testified at trial that in
a subsequent review hearing on May 16, 2005, he indicated to the court that all the releases had
been signed and discovery was complete. However, the respondent admitted at trial that he had
actually withdrawn his releases from Dr. Roby on May 9, 2005, almost two weeks before the
review hearing at which the respondent indicated all releases had been signed. Although the
respondent claimed at trial that he withdrew his release after "everything had been gotten a hold
of by lawyers", the petitioner testified that she did not receive the documents until November
2005.
186. In early April 2006, the petitioner sent another discovery request, but the
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respondent failed to timely respond. See April 11, 2006 Certificate of Service of Discovery. In
May 2006, the parties came before the court for yet another hearing on discovery. See May 15,
2006 Docket Entry.
187. Also in mid-May 2006, at a pretrial conference, the court ordered the respondent
to respond to the petitioner's discovery requests and trial was rescheduled for August 2006.
Finally, at the end of June, the respondent responded to Petitioner's April 2006 discovery. See
Respondent's June 2006 Responses to Petitioner's Second Set of Interrogatories attached to
Default Judgment Memorandum as Exhibit S. However, his answers to the interrogatories were
incomplete and evasive. Id. For example, in response to Interrogatory No. 4, the respondent
failed to identify the amounts in each account or the account numbers. Id. Also, in response to
Interrogatory No. 5, the respondent did not identify a branch or account location for each
account. Id. Most significant was the respondent's refusal to answer interrogatories 8-15
because they allegedly went beyond the amount of interrogatories allowed under the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. Id. In addition, the respondent failed to produce any documents. Id.
188. In mid-July 2006, the petitioner filed a motion to compel the respondent to
produce the remaining discovery. See July 13, 2006 Motion to Compel. Further, because the
respondent had not provided the requested discovery by the end of July 2006, the petitioner was
forced to file a motion to continue the trial. See July 28, 2006 Motion to Continue Trial Date.
189. At the phone conference, the court agreed to continue the trial again to November
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2006. See July 31, 2006 Docket Entry. Also, at a subsequent pretrial hearing on August 24,
2006, the court again ordered the respondent to produce specified documents by September 24,
2006. See August 24, 2006 Order. Further, at this hearing, Judge Taylor stated:
Now, if I authorize Mr. Weckel to withdraw, I will not, I will not change these
deadlines.... So when you go to hire new counsel, if you go hire new counsel, you
must tell them, ' J have discovery deadlines in place... which will not be moved
9
unless somebody dies
See August 24, 2006 Audio Recording.
190. The parties scheduled the depositions of the respondent and his new wife for
October 11. See October, 2, 2006 Notice of Deposition. However, these depositions never took
place due to the respondent's failure to timely produce discovery. On October 17, 2006 the
parties had another phone conference with the court. See October 17, 2006 Docket Entry. Once
again the court ordered the respondent to complete discovery. Id. The respondent's deposition
was rescheduled for November 6, 2006. See October 25, 2006 Notice of Deposition. However,
the respondent failed to timely produce the discovery as ordered by the court. See Pleadings and
November 14, 2006 Order at \ 5.
191. Finally, on November 7, 2006 (two weeks before trial) the petitioner filed a
Motion for Default Judgment because she had not yet received discovery from the respondent as
ordered by the Court. See November 7, 2006 Motion for Default Judgment. This motion was
ultimately denied; however, the court found that, because of the respondent's long-term failure to
respond to discovery requests, a sanction of five (5) days in jail was appropriate. In her proposed
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memorandum decision, the petition quotes an order which can not be found in the court file;
however, the court's minute entry reflects the order of jail. The respondent was given time to
purge that contempt by replying to the requested discovery. His request to continue the trial, due
to the late entry of his new attorney, was denied. The court finds that, through the efforts of his
new attorney, the respondent substantially complied with the discovery requests by the time of
trial.
192. Accordingly, the court makes a finding that the respondent has displayed a
distinct pattern of withholding, evading and avoiding discovery and that he has repeatedly failed
to comply with court orders. The petitioner requests a judgment against the respondent in the
amount of $10,000 as a sanction for his behavior. This court does not believe that a $10,000
sanction is appropriate in this matter. However, the court believes that the respondent's
intentional efforts to thwart discovery have increased the petitioner's attorney's fees substantially
and will, therefore, increase her award of attorney's fees accordingly.
B. Petitioner is Not in Contempt
193. Although not clearly requested, the court infers that the respondent sought to have
the court also find the petitioner in contempt for allegedly failing to comply with discovery. It is
undisputed that in early 2005, the petitioner did not produce documentation for two bank
accounts. The petitioner testified that she did not produce said documents because the
respondent had been using the information to interfere with her accounts. The court ordered on
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March 7, 2005 that neither party could use the information received pursuant to discovery to
interfere with any accounts of the other party. See March 7, 2005 Order at f 1. The court also
ordered the petitioner to produce the requested documents within two weeks, but the court never
made a finding that the petitioner was in contempt. Id. at T] 2.
194. Subsequently, the respondent testified this same issue arose on February 23,
2006. However, this was merely a pretrial conference and no motions were pending regarding
the petitioner's discovery. The respondent also testified that this same issue arose in the August
24, 2006 hearing. Yet, the only motion pending for that hearing was Petitioner's Motion to
Compel Respondent to produce discovery. The respondent had not filed any motions claiming
the petitioner failed to comply with discovery; the judge simply ordered the petitioner sua sponte
to produce the same documents that the respondent was ordered to produce.
195. The court does note that there were delays in this case because the petitioner
changed attorneys-one change resulting in a delay of trial.
196. Accordingly, the court does not find the petitioner in contempt, but notes that her
hands are not completely clean.
C. Contempt for Individual Issues
197. Refer to the individual issues above for the court's finding of contempt as to each
issue. XVI.
ATTORNEYS' FEES

59

A. Fourth District Court Domestic Case
198. Both parties requested that they be awarded attorneys' fees for this domestic
matter.

This court has authority to award attorneys' fees and costs "upon determining that the

party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defenses." U.C.A. § 30-3-3(2). Further, an award
of attorneys' fees must be based on the reasonableness of the fees requested, the financial need of
the receiving spouse and the ability of the other spouse to pay." Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036,
1040 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted).
199. Has the petitioner substantially prevailed upon her claims? The court looks at the
overall success of the petitioner on the important issues. The petitioner did successfully obtain
imputation of the respondent's salary, but not the higher level she sought. While she was
awarded somewhat less than she requested for child support, she was not at all successful in her
quest for a exorbitant amount of future alimony. She wasted incredible amounts of time, energy,
and attorney's fees on small issues, such as the gym equipment and the entertainment center. She
was successful in her request regarding the CINTAS stock, but not regarding the Twin Labs
stock. She was not awarded the $64,000 she wanted for making the house payments, but she was
awarded a substantial amount of the money she put into the repair and maintenance of the marital
home. She was also rewarded some reimbursement for the home equity line of credit. She was
not awarded the child-care expenses she sought. Overall, the petitioner was not successful in her
presentation of many of the major issues before this court.
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200. The court must also evaluate the reasonableness of the fees, the financial needs of
the petitioner, and the ability of the respondent to pay her fees. The court finds that the fees
incurred by the petitioner are not reasonable, but are truly beyond reason for a marital estate of
this size. The court is appalled at the effort that went into minor areas, such as the $180.00 in
used gym equipment and the used $75.00 entertainment center. Some of the petitioner's requests
were absurd, such as the amount requested for alimony and reimbursement for all of the house
payments. The respondent should not have to pay for attorney's fees incurred in pursuing such
unreasonable requests.
201. However, the court does consider reasonable an a^yard of attorney's fees based
upon the respondent's pattern of obstructing the discovery process. The failure of the
respondent to timely and fully respond to the petitioner's discovery requests has certainly
increased her attorney's fees in this matter. See the discussion on contempt.
202. As for the financial needs of the petitioner, she makes more money than the
respondent and will be receiving monthly financial help from him. She is more than capable of
paying her own attorney's fees, as is the respondent capable of paying his own fees.
"revious Oi cic i s to Show Cause
203. An award of some of the petitioner's attorneys' fees could also be independently
based upon every order to show cause in which she substantially prevailed:
•

In the May 2002 Order, the petitioner was awarded custody, child support, health
insurance, car insurance, Novell stock, child care expenses. See May 7, 2002 Order.
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•

In the June 2004 Order, the petitioner was awarded reimbursement for reasonable child
care expenses. See June 24, 2004 Order. Also, the respondent's request to alter
alimony was denied because he had not completed psychosexual testing as previously
ordered by the Court. Id.

•

In the September 2004 Order, the respondent was ordered to produce requested
documents within two weeks and to sign the necessary releases. See September 21,
2004 Order. The petitioner also received a judgment for unpaid child care expenses.
Id.

•

In the December 2004 Order, the respondent was ordered to sell the RV and his request
to stay garnishment proceedings was denied. See December 2, 2004 Order.

•

In the August 28, 2006 Order, the court entered a judgment against the respondent for
unpaid child support, medical insurance and child care expenses. See August 28, 2006
Order. Further, the court made a finding that "Petitioner's attorney substantially
prevailed on the issues before the court." Id. at f 5.

Since the issue of attorneys' fees was reserved for each of these matters, the court now finds that
the petitioner's general award of attorneys' fees is also based on the petitioner's success in each
of these individual orders to show cause.
204. Further, the court already awarded the petitioner attorneys' fees in the April 2005
and June 2006 Orders. See April 18, 2005 Order at If 7 and June 15, 2006 Order at % 4. Rather
than require an individual affidavit of attorneys' fees for each order to show cause, the court will
accept a final, all-inclusive affidavit of fees incurred by the petitioner throughout this litigation.
C. Conclusion as to Petitioner's Divorce Litigation Fees
205. The court finds that the petitioner was not substantially successful on the issues
she presented to the court, that the total bill for attorney's fees and costs of $83,349.61 was not
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reasonable, and that she makes more money than the respondent and will be receiving financial
help from him on a monthly basis. On the other hand, the respondent's efforts to avoid or delay
discovery have cost the petitioner a great deal in attorney's fees and delays. Therefore, the court
finds it appropriate that the respondent should pay for 15% of the petitioner's attorney's fees, for
a total of $12,502.00. The court will allow the respondent to pay this amount, with the statutory
interest, over the next 10 years at the rate of $1,250.24 per year, plus the appropriate interest.
C. Bankruptcy Attorneys' Fees
206. Petitioner requested that a judgment enter against the respondent in this matter for
attorneys' fees she has incurred in the Bankruptcy Court. In Condie v. Condie, 139 P.3d 271
(Utah Ct. App. 2006), the Court of Appeals explained that "as a general rule, attorney fees are
not awardable under federal bankruptcy law [in a bankruptcy action] for enforcement of
obligations contained in a divorce decree." Id. at 275. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the
trial court erred in ruling that the wife should have requested her fees in the Bankruptcy Court.
Instead, the Court of Appeals' holding implied that the former wife must seek an award in state
court for attorneys' fees incurred in a bankruptcy action. Id. at 276. See also In re Marriage of
Wright 841 P.2d 358 (Colo. Ct App. 1992).
207. Further, the Court of Appeals explained that the state trial court had authority to
award bankruptcy attorneys' fees to the former wife pursuant to UTAH CODE. ANN. § 30-3-3(2),
which provides that, "[i]n any action to enforce an order of.. . child support, alimony, or
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division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon
determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense."
208. In compliance with U.C.A. § 30-3-3(2), the petitioner testified that she filed an
adversarial proceeding against the respondent in the bankruptcy court in order to save the marital
home. Ms. Drake, the petitioner's bankruptcy attorney, also testified that the petitioner filed the
adversarial proceeding to protect the marital home and to prevent the respondent from
discharging his family debts to the petitioner (e.g., child support, alimony, etc.). Similar to
Conche, Ms. Drake confirmed that the petitioner will not receive an award of her bankruptcy
attorneys' fees in the Bankruptcy Court.
209. Using the same analysis as above, this court finds that the petitioner was
somewhat substantially successful on the bankruptcy-related issues of child support, but not on
alimony. The issue of the marital home was not litigated before this court, while the issues of
personal property were-to some small extent.
210. Accordingly, this court awards the petitioner her attorneys' fees incurred in the
bankruptcy action at the same rate as in the divorce case proper-10%. See U.C.A. § 30-3-3(2).
See also Conche, 139 P.3d at 274-76. In addition, Ms. Drake submitted an affidavit of attorneys'
fees for the bankruptcy case in the amount of $26,401.00 as of December 12, 2006. See Trial
Exhibit 28. Ms. Drake testified about her experience in bankruptcy law and stated that her fees
were reasonable for someone with her experience in Salt Lake County. This court finds that the
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bankruptcy attorneys' fees incurred by the petitioner are reasonable. The court orders the
respondent to pay the sum of $3,960.00 in attorney's fees for Ms. Drake's work in the bankruptcy
matter. The court will allow the respondent to pay this amount, with the statutory interest, over
the next 5 years at the rate $792.00per year, plus the appropriate interest.
^

Vttorney's Fees for the Respondent

211. As the respondent has not requested that the petitioner pay his attorney's fees, the
court makes no corresponding order, nor does the court believe that such an order would be
appropriate.
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U.R.C.P. RULE 7(f) NOTICE
The foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE has been submitted to the Court for execution and
entry. Rule 7(f), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allows five (5) days following handdelivery, or five (5) days plus three (3) days for mailing if service by mail, for opposing counsel
or opposing parties to submit notice of objection. If such objection as to form is not received
within the prescribed time period, the Order will be submitted for signing by the Court.
DATED this

|1

day o f M u ^

, 200/

SCpTT F(. CAI
Attorney for Respondent

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I mailed the foregoing postage prepaid this / C. day of June, 2008 to the
following:
Clark R. Nielsen
Kathryn J. Steffey
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC
215 South State Street, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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motion.

Something needs to be done to remind him to comply

with these Court orders and it's just been a history that's
gone on too long.
THE COURT:

All right.

As I indicated off the

record before we began today, I've spent a great deal of time
looking at the files, I've completely reviewed the docket in
this matter and have read all of the minute entries that are
part of the docket, looked at the orders and read the
memoranda of the parties very carefully.
I am not going to grant the ultimate desire of the
petitioner today, but I am going to impose a sanction that was
reserved earlier.

I am persuaded that the petitioner comes

with slightly unclean hands.

I don't find it persuasive that

the petitioner had the records that were ordered on August
24th of 2006, ready, and instead of mailing them, expected the
respondent to come and get them and them holds the respondent
responsible for not coming and picking them up.

That's

absurd.
The order from Judge Taylor at that hearing was for
both parties to produce the documents and get them to the
other side.
fault.

So, I find that the petitioner is partly at

And that's why I don't take the extreme, very extreme

sanction of defaulting the respondent.
On the other hand, I am persuaded that the
respondent's hands are very unclean.

There is a pattern that
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exists throughout this litigation.

There have been motions to

compel from both sides, I see that in the record, I understand
that clearly; but the unvarying pattern in this case has been
that the respondent has been trying to duck and to evade and
to avoid and to withhold and I think much of what has been
said on behalf of the petitioner is well taken and welldeserved.
With or--with or without his attorney or the help of
his previous attorneys, and I, too, make a distinction as to
what's happened before and after Mr. Card's appearance in this
matter, the defendant has not complied and has failed to do
things which he could have easily done, or even have done with
some work.

Discovery takes effort by the client.

The

attorney can't do it all and the client can't sit back and
say, that's too much work for me to do, which seems to have
been part of the excuse here, too.
There was a previous order of five days in jail and
I think it's time now, that based on the lack of cooperation
historically in the case and most specifically since August
24th when Judge Taylor in that hearing went through one item
at a time with the parties and made specific orders one after
another, that there would be compliance; since that time, the
respondent has sat back and not done what Judge Taylor told
him to do.

And based on that, I think it's time for the

sanction of the five days in jail to be issued.
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Now, the problem, as I see, is that today's the 14th
and this trial is to start the 22nd, which by my calculations
would be one week from tomorrow; right?
MR. CARD:

Correct.

THE COURT:
December 8th.

With the second day of triaL being

I'm not going to continue the trial.

Judge

Taylor made an order that he set in concrete.
If it turns out that we get to trial and the
petitioner is unable to present the necessary evidence based
on the defendant's failure to provide the necessary evidence
through the discovery, I'm going to make the ruling that the
respondent will be precluded from defending on that issue; so,
in effect, they get part of what they want.

But if the

respondent wants to be able to show where the funds went from
the sale of various personal items, and I assume we're talking
about the R.V. and some other things here, then he'd better
get the proof to the other side of what he thinks he did with
that money but fast.
I am going to reserve so that we can get to the real
issues, I'm going to reserve for a later date, these issues of
contempt and attorney's fees, for prior contempt issues and
for the trial itself.

That way, we can spend the day-and-a-

half that we've got on the substantive issues, rather than rehashing history.

Okay?

MS. TEGEDER:

Your Honor, sorry to interrupt.

Just
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U.C.A. 1953 § 30-3-3
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 30. HUSBAND AND WIFE
CHAPTER 3. DIVORCE
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
30-3-3 Award of costs, attorney and witness fees —Temporary alimony.
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to establish an
order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of property in a
domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness
fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party to
prosecute or defend the action. The order may include provision for costs of the action.
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or
division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon
determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. The court, in
its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party
is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees.
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to provide money,
during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other
party and of any children in the custody of the other party.
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or judgment may be
amended during the course of the action or in the final order or judgment.
History: C. 1953, 30-3-3, enacted by L. 1993, ch. 137, § 1; 2001, ch. 255, § 3.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Repeals and Reenactments. —Laws 1993, ch. 72, § 10 repeals former § 30-3-3, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, allowing a court to order either party to pay for the separate
support and maintenance of the adverse party and the children, and enacts the present
section, effective May 3, 1993.
Amendment Notes. —The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, substituted "parenttime" for "visitation" in Subsections (1) and (2).
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Compiler's Notes. —In 1997, the Utah legislature changed the designation of parties in
domestic relations cases from "plaintiff and "defendant" to "petitioner" and
"respondent." Annotations from decisions before the amendments will not reflect these
changes in terminology.
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U.C.A. 1953 § 30-3-5
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 30. HUSBAND AND WII^E
CHAPTER 3. DIVORCE
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
30-3-5 Disposition of property —Maintenance and health care of parties and children -Division of debts —Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and parent-time —
Determination of alimony —Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include
the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical
and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for
the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts,
obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the
court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate,
current addresses; and
I
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11,
Recovery Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning
financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of
the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial
parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the
dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the
noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the
employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for
the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and
for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents
and other members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of
the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the
court may include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a
provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered
parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this chapter.
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court

order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable
attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that
the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith.
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or
a visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate family pursuant to
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted by
the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees
and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to
provide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time.
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor
spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor
spouse to attend school during the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time
of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (7)(a). However, the
court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion,
base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of
short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the
court may consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties'
respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the
income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be
considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If
one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing
the marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each
party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders
regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not
foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs
of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not
be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (7).

(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living
expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the
payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that
a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or
death of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void
ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to
the action of annulment and his rights are determined.
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with
another person.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L. 1909, ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S.
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3; 1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984,
ch. 13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1; 1991, ch. 257, § 4; 1993, ch. 152, § 1;
1993, ch. 261, § 1; 1994, ch. 284, § 1; 1995, ch. 330, § 1; 1997, ch. 232, § 4; 1999, ch.
168, § 1; 1999, ch. 277, § 1; 2001, ch. 255, § 4.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Amendment Notes. —The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, designated
Subsection (4) as (4)(a) and added Subsection (4)(b).
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, deleted a provision from Subsection (3) for
support and maintenance orders; deleted former Subsections (5) and (6), providing that
alimony terminates upon remarriage, or cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex,
by the payee; added Subsections (7) to (9); renumbered former Subsections (7) and (8) as
(5) and (6); and made stylistic changes.
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "Recovery Services" for "Parts
4 and 5" in Subsection (l)(d) and deleted Subsection (l)(e) which provided for an
assesment against the obligor for a check handling fee.
The 1999 amendment by ch. 168, effective May 3, 1999, inserted "or death" in the first
sentence of Subsection (8) and made a stylistic change.
The 1999 amendment by ch. 277, effective May 3, 1999, added Subsections (7)(a)(v)
through (7)(a)(vii) and made stylistic changes.
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, in Subsection (4)(a), substituted "parenttime rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents" for "visitation rights of
parents, grandparents"; in Subsection (4)(b), added "parent-time or" in two places; in
Subsection (5), substituted "parent-time" for "visitation"; in Subsection (6), substituted
"parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by" for "visitation order by a parent"
and added "or parent-time" in two places; and made punctuation changes.
Compiler's Notes. -Laws 1995, ch. 330, which amended this section, provides in § 2 that

the Legislature does not intend that termination of alimony based on cohabitation, in
accordance with Subsection (9), ,fbe interpreted in any way to condone such a
relationship for any purpose."
Cross-References. -Grandparents' visitation rights, § 30-5-2.
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, Title 30, Chapter 8.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Compiler's Notes. —In 1997, the Utah legislature changed the designation of parties in
domestic relations cases from "plaintiff1 and "defendant" to "petitioner" and
"respondent." In 2001, the legislature designated parental visitation as "parent-time."
Annotations from decisions before the amendments will not reflect these changes in
terminology.

